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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Scope of the Article
This is a study of Federal Trade Commission' (FTC) prosecutions
of advertisements that misrepresent the existence of tests or surveys
as support for selling claims.
If the essential challenge of American advertising is to create belief
within a marketplace of intense competition, then the essence of the
advertiser's task is to make his product claim credible in the minds of
consumers who are under constant invitation to favor a competitor.
Thus, it is important not merely to describe the product's worthiness,
but to establish an underlying support for the claim so as to compel
the consumer's belief in its truth. The most common means the ad-
vertiser employs in establishing credibility is to effect a proof by
means of the aura which surrounds the scientific test or survey.
Such evidence, when available, is likely to be used in advertising.
In some cases, such evidence is used even when not available because
it has been contrived and presented to the public as if true. In the
1960's, a shaving cream was presented on television in a contrived
test that misrepresented its ability to enable a razor blade to shave
sandpaper. The practice was proscribed, but in 1985 the maker of an
analgesic cream was told to cease claiming superiority absent proof of
the implied representation that the claim was supported by scientific
tests. The intervening years have seen dozens of similar orders
against test or survey misrepresentations.
Although orders proscribing such misrepresentations have been
mentioned in various articles,2 no source has provided a complete cat-
alog or categorization of the many order provisions in these cases.
The considerable impact of the FTC on the area is not readily dis-
cernible without such an overview. In particular, there is a tendency
for misrepresentations to become more subtle over time. Apparently,
1. For F.T.C. authority and actions generally, see Kintner and Smith, The Emer-
gence of the Federal Trade Commission as a Formidable Consumer Protection Agency,
26 MERCER L. REV. 651 (1975); Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the
Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661 (1977); Hammer, FTC. Knights and
Consumer Daze: The Regulation of Deceptive or Unfair Advertising, 32 ARK. L. REV.
446 (1978); Comment, The Ad Substantiation Program: You Can Fool All of the People
Some of the Time and Some of the People All of the Time, But Can You Fool the
F.TC.?, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 429 (1981) [hereinafter Ad Substantiation]; Holmes, FTC.
Regulation of Unfair or Deceptive Advertising: Current Status of the Law, 30 DE PAUL
L. REV. 555 (1981); Vercammen and Smith, Advertising and the FTC.: Less Regulation
Can Mean More Consumer Protection, 8 CORP. L. REV. 49 (1985) [hereinafter Less
Regulation].
2. Ad Substantiation, supra note 1; Barnes, The Significance of Quantitative Evi-
dence in Federal Trade Commission Deceptive Advertising Cases, 46 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBs. Autumn 1983, at 25; Handler, Pfizer Revisited: From "Reasonable Basis" to "Es-
tablishment Claims" in Advertising Substantiation, 38 FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 325
(1983); Less Regulation, supra note 1.
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when a strongly explicit form of misrepresentation has been forbid-
den, advertisers fall back to less obvious forms.
Thus, while advertisers such as the shaving cream maker have re-
duced their tendency to misrepresent with explicit demonstrations or
tests, they have shifted to referring to tests and surveys as proof
without showing them in the ads. Or, they have used the representa-
tion that tests or surveys exist not as proof but merely as support for
the product claims. Since the early 1970's, however, advertising regu-
lation has fallen back correspondingly to prohibit such references to
tests or surveys when they do not support the claims they purport to
substantiate.
Of even greater subtlety and frequency has been the advertising
that makes no explicit reference to tests or surveys, but which by its
nature implies that a test, survey or equivalent scientific evidence ex-
ists as support for the claims. This is the ultimate fallback position,
because the advertiser makes no explicit references that may be chal-
lenged. Again, advertising regulation has fallen back in tandem,
prohibiting such implications. Thus, the broad overview offered here
shows that the early cases primarily involve explicit claims about
tests and surveys, while the later cases concentrate on references al-
leged to be implied merely by existence of the product claims.
Another emerging pattern is that of an increase in standards to
prohibit a wide variety of common yet inadequate test and survey
practices. Whereas advertisers' past expectations appear to have
identified the methodological criterion as being merely a showing
that a test or survey was conducted, the recent FTC record has speci-
fied numerous requirements for performance at valid scientific
levels. The accumulated thrust of these requirements, which have
raised scientific standards tremendously, has not heretofore been
summarized.
B. Method of Analysis
By the nature of the topic, this article constitutes an interdiscipli-
nary study, examining physical science and social science methods
and knowledge as drawn from the testimony of numerous expert wit-
nesses in those fields. Fittingly, the method of analysis is one famil-
iar to the social scientist, a content analysis.
The units of study consist of those FTC order provisions that per-
tain to tests and surveys. The method involves separating all such
provisions into groups in accordance with their similarities and dif-
ferences. The evolving categories then are named and defined, and
their significance is discussed.
In most cases, the FTC order provisions are consistent with the na-
ture of the misrepresentation-that is, the provision forbids the pre-
cise type of violation that has been charged or found to occur. There
are exceptions, however, in which an order provision falls into a cate-
gory different from that specified in the violation. Such cases are cat-
egorized according to the provision, because that is the unit of study.
For each order, only those provisions that involve surveys or tests
are cited. This means many of the orders mentioned are described
only partially in the article. Further, two or more parts of the same
order often are described in separate sections because of assignment
to different categories.
Case contents that describe or explain the order provisions are dis-
cussed. In many consent orders, the complaint allegations are the
only source of explanation. In the litigated cases, the initial decision
of the administrative law judge (ALJ, called Hearing Examiner in
the earlier cases) and the opinions of the Commission are available.
For some litigated cases, there are appellate opinions.
The materials examined were identified by searches on LEXIS for
FTC cases containing the terms "test," "survey," "reasonable basis,"
and "substantiation." The LEXIS file begins in 1950. The assumption
that few earlier cases exist is suggested by finding only one from the
1950's and few from the early 1960's. Casual search has identified a
few cases prior to 1950, but that era produced no systematic treat-
ment of tests and surveys.
Another analytical decision is that tests and surveys are discussed
simultaneously to the extent possible, but in parallel subsections to
the extent necessary. Tests and surveys generally are defined sepa-
rately, despite one Commission opinion that "'test' shall include
demonstrations, experiments, surveys, reports and studies." 3 The
more typical position is that "[t]ests, which ascertain scientifically
product specifications and quality, are different from surveys, which
measure popular opinion."4 Actually, some surveys in FTC cases
measured phenomena other than opinion-prices, for example, at
which a product sells, or the number of jobs at given salaries secured
by graduates of trade schools. Because of that, surveys are defined
herein as involving observations of nonuniform populations, i.e.,
3. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.T.C. 873, 881 (1979). The statement was probably written
for the limited purpose of creating a generic term for the phenomena involved in the
particular case.
4. Litton Indus., Inc. v. F.T.C., 676 F.2d 364, 372 (9th Cir. 1982) (modified to in-
volve only surveys and not tests).
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those anticipated to have significant uncontrolled variation from unit
to unit.
Tests, by contrast, are made on objects whose characteristics are
controlled; they are anticipated to be uniform (although uniformity is
not always perfectly achieved). People in stores all over the nation,
for example, upon purchasing a cake of Dial Soap expect to get es-
sentially the same item. Accordingly, tests and surveys are distin-
guished here, but also are treated in parallel format because of the
similar treatment they receive from the FTC.
C. Structure of the Article
The structure reflects the categories derived from the content anal-
ysis, based on the types of FTC order provisions. The categories vary
mainly by the strength with which the advertising references are
made. Two ways of varying such strength are by mentioning the test
or survey explicitly or implicitly, the latter being the weaker. These
variations are further subdivided as follows.
The strongest type of reference occurs in ads that show tests actu-
ally taking place (surveys are not amenable to this treatment). The
consumer does not merely hear about the findings, but personally
sees them created. These presentations are held to be misrepre-
sented as constituting demonstrations of the proof of the accompany-
ing product claim. This is called, herein, the "Demonstrated Proof
Misrepresentation."
The second strongest type of reference occurs in ads that cite the
existence of a test or survey. The ad either mentions it, or shows or
quotes from a document that reports it, or depicts the laboratory or
other setting in which it took place. As with the first category, the
advertising is held to misrepresent the cited test or survey as proving
the truth of the accompanying claim. This is called the "Cited Proof
Misrepresentation."
A third category also involves ads that cite tests or surveys, absent
explicit references that they constitute proof of the accompanying
claim. Because it is held to misrepresent the cited test or survey as
supporting evidence, it is called herein the "Cited Evidence Misrepre-
sentation." The three categories discussed thus far involve explicit
mentions of tests or surveys, albeit sometimes indirectly by related
terminology or nonverbal means.
Ads in the fourth category involve no such explicit references.
Rather, they are alleged to imply falsely that prior to the advertising
a reasonable basis existed for believing the claims, or, in alternative
wording, substantiation for the truth of the claims existed.5 The rea-
sonable basis or substantiation could only be a test or survey, or test-
like or survey-like evidence, and such material either was
nonexistent prior to the advertising or was not of a quality to consti-
tute the requisite support. This category is called herein the "Rea-
sonable Basis/Substantiation Misrepresentation" or the "RB/S
Misrepresentation."
The four categories just discussed represent the major types of mis-
representations involving tests and surveys. Section II discusses the
"Demonstrated Proof Misrepresentation," Section III the "Cited
Proof Misrepresentation," and Section IV the "Cited Evidence Mis-
representation." Section V discusses the conceptualizing of the "RB/
S Misrepresentation," and the following sections discuss three' kinds
of order provisions resulting from it. Some provisions specify a test
and/or survey as a firm requirement (Section VI). Other provisions
specify a test and/or survey, but allow alternatives of test-like or sur-
vey-like evidence (Section VII). Others specify test-like or survey-
like evidence without mentioning tests or surveys explicitly (Section
VIII). Sections II-VIII thus depict the aforementioned progression
from use of explicit claims to use of more subtle implied claims. The
explicit claims discussed in the earlier sections generally predate the
implied claims discussed later.
A further topic is the specifications offered by the FTC as to ac-
ceptable and nonacceptable characteristics of tests and surveys. This
is the portion of the article that most specifically demonstrates the
Commission's imposition of test and survey standards of significantly
higher quality than found in the exhibits offered by many respondent
advertisers.6 Section IX discusses these specifications.
Finally, Section X examines additional order provisions reflecting
other types of test and survey misrepresentations. They include over-
claiming of results, the parallel topic of underclaiming, misrepresen-
5. Considerable discussion in these cases is devoted to the process of implication,
whereby an advertisement conveys meanings to consumers over and above its literal
content. F.T.C. treatment of such implications is in itself a topic worth far more study
than can be accommodated here. This article, therefore, does not question the legal
rationale nor factual evidence for concluding that consumers see ads to be conveying
the various implications cited. For a thorough discussion, see Preston, The FTC's Han-
dling of Puffery and Other Selling Claims Made "By Implication", 5 J. Bus. RES. 155
(1977); Rotfeld and Preston, The Potential Impact of Research on Advertising Law, 21
J. ADV. RES. 9 (1981).
6. Tests and surveys also occur prominently in litigated F.T.C. cases as evidence
for determining the meanings implied to consumers by an advertisement's literal con-
tent. That topic is not undertaken here. Also not included are cases involving the mis-
representation by door-to-door or telephone salespersons that they are conducting
surveys when they are actually making sales pitches. Such cases do not involve refer-
encing of such surveys as the basis for accompanying product claims.
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tations about experts, provisions about consumer endorsements or
testimonials related to tests and surveys, general misrepresentation
provisions, records maintenance provisions, advertising agency de-
fense provisions, test requirements apart from substantiation, contra-
dictory or inconsistent claims, misuse of name or authorization of
government or testing organizations, failure to forward evidence, and
requirements to disclose test limitations. Section XI presents a brief
statement of conclusions.
II. THE DEMONSTRATED PROOF MISREPRESENTATION
The strongest type of reference to tests in FTC advertising cases
occurs in ads that depict product performance tested before the con-
sumer's eyes, with an accompanying explicit or implicit representa-
tion that what is seen proves the product claims. Surveys, along with
some types of tests, are not amenable to such treatment because they
do not produce outcomes that can be demonstrated before an adver-
tising audience.
The "Demonstrated Proof Misrepresentation" began when Rapid
Shave was "shown" applied to sandpaper which was then "shaved." 7
In reality, the camera had photographed loose grains of sand sprin-
kled on a sheet of plexiglas. It was impossible to conduct such a dem-
onstration with real sandpaper. The order provision, therefore,
prohibited the advertiser from doing the following:
[u]nfairly or deceptively advertising . . . by presenting a test, experiment or
demonstration that (1) is represented to the public as actual proof of a claim
made for the product which is material to inducing its sale, and (2) is not in
fact a genuine test, experiment or demonstration being conducted as repre-
sented and does not in fact constitute actual proof of the claim, because of the
undisclosed use and substitution of a mock-up or prop instead of the product,
article, or substance represented to be used therein.8
The Commission found that to claim the consumer was seeing
proof was deceptive even if the claim was true. Colgate argued that
7. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 59 F.T.C. 1452 (1961), rev'd and remanded, Colgate-
Palmolive Co. v. F.T.C., 310 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1962); revised, 62 F.T.C. 1269 (1963); re-
manded, 326 F.2d 517 (1st Cir. 1963), rev'd and enforced, 380 U.S. 374 (1965). (Colgate's
advertising agency, Ted Bates, also a named party).
8. Colgate-Palmolive, 62 F.T.C. at 1282. The complaint referred to the depiction
as a demonstration rather than test, which may be fitting inasmuch as "test" may sug-
gest the formality of work done by a scientist in a laboratory. The announcer's voice,
however, referred to "this sandpaper test," and the Commission opinions referred to
the same with no discussion of terminology. The Commission probably used "test" to
emphasize that the advertiser was claiming to show proof. The provision's reference to
a "test, experiment or demonstration" became a formula used in many future cases.
if the benefits were as represented, the consumer could not be hurt,
but the Commission held that this:
would flout the principle implicit in the multitude of cases [involving misrep-
resentation of a variety of other sorts] already decided .... The vice assailed
in these cases is the use of a falsification of fact, extrinsic to the objective
value of the product, to sell that product, whether or not it may deserve to be
bought on its own merits. 9
Three cases shortly thereafter involved the same elements, but their
provisions mentioned demonstrations rather than tests.10
9. Colgate-Palmolive, 59 F.T.C. at 1466. "[T]he 'proof' was not proof at all ...
[and yet] the 'proof' offered was a material element of the advertising; without it, the
advertiser might not have succeeded in selling the product." Id. "[The] respondents
must have thought so, or else they would not have emphasized the pictorial 'sandpaper
test' in the expensive television advertisements of their product." Id. at 1467. Later
the F.T.C. added that:
The product may in fact be all the purchaser thinks it to be; but if he has been
induced to buy it by the seller's fraud, injury is done both to the advertiser's
competitors and to the public.... Regardless whether consumers are 'injured'
... honest competitors are injured-because some or many of such sales have
been made at their expense.
Colgate-Palmolive, 62 F.T.C. at 1273-74. The Supreme Court, reversing the First Cir-
cuit's remand, noted that Colgate had argued, based on the accepted premise that only
material misrepresentations may be held in violation, that:
the only material facts are those which deal with the substantive qualities of a
product. The Commission, on the other hand, submits that the misrepresenta-
tion of any fact so long as it materially induces a purchaser's decision to buy is
a deception prohibited .... The Commission's interpretation of what is a de-
ceptive practice seems more in line with the decided cases than that of
respondents.
Colgate-Palmolive, 380 U.S. at 386-87.
10. When the television viewer was "shown" how a competing brand compared
unfavorably to Rise shaving cream, the substance actually presented on screen was no
competitor but a special formula that "contained properties which caused it to disap-
pear rapidly and appear to dry out immediately after being applied to the face of the
actor." Carter Prods. Inc., 60 F.T.C. 782, 786 (1962), modified, Carter v. F.T.C., 323
F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1963), modified order, 63 F.T.C. 1651 (1963).
In its own defense, respondent ... offered... certain tests... to support its
claim that more than 50 percent of the competing aerated shaving creams on
the commercial market dry out faster than "Rise." Even assuming this con-
tention to be true, this does [not] make the representation . . . any less a
misrepresentation.
Carter Prods., 60 F.T.C. at 787. The context compels belief that the word shown in
brackets was meant to be included. "[O]ur views with respect to the use of television
demonstrations that convey false or deceptive impressions to the public were fully set
forth in our opinion in the matter of Colgate ... and the rationale of that decision is
equally applicable here." Id. at 795. Carter was ordered to cease:
(a) Disparaging ... through the use of false or misleading pictures, depictions
or demonstrations .... (b) Representing ... that pictures, depictions or dem-
onstrations . . . accurately portray or depict the superiority of any product
over competing products when such portrayal or depiction is not an accurate
comparison of such product with competing products.
Carter Prods., 63 F.T.C. at 1652. The appellate court substituted "an accurate" for "a
genuine and accurate" because "accurate" allows some variation from absolute truths
and "genuine" does not. Carter, 323 F.2d at 532. The court did not want to require
that "the actual products used in the comparison must be the real thing," but only that
the comparison not be deceptive. Id.
Libbey-Owens Ford involved similar advertising and order provisions, the opinion
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The cases thus far involved the consumer "seeing" something he
was not really seeing. Another Colgate case" introduced the type of
test or demonstration that was true as seen, yet still failed to prove
the claim it accompanied. Baggies sandwich bags were truthfully
shown keeping a sandwich dry under water, a test the competitor
failed. Falsely claimed, however, was that the test proved Baggies su-
perior for keeping food fresh under ordinary conditions. The result
was an order to cease "[a]dvertising any such product by presenting a
test, experiment or demonstration or part thereof that is presented as
actual proof of any fact or product feature that is material to induc-
ing the sale of the product, but which does not actually prove such
fact or product feature."12
Sun Oil's 13 claims about engine power had been accompanied by il-
lustrations of an automobile pulling railroad cars, or pulling a trailer
to the top row of a stadium. Although the complaint charged the il-
lustrations to be represented as proving the claims, the decision did
not discuss the point, probably because it found the claims were not
true. Complaint counsel asked for an order provision 14 as follows,
but the provision actually written omitted the portion shown in
brackets:
cease and desist from . . . [a]dvertising any such product by presenting evi-
dence including tests, experiments or demonstrations, or the results thereof,
or any other evidence [that appears or purports to be proof] of any fact or
product feature that is material in inducing the sale of the product which is
stating that the "same considerations discussed in Colgate apply with equal force in
this proceeding." Libbey-Owens Ford Glass Co. & General Motors Corp., 63 F.T.C. 746,
783 (1963), affirmed, Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. F.T.C., 352 F.2d 415 (6th Cir.
1965). The appellate court agreed to the reliance on Colgate. Libbey-Owens Ford, 352
F.2d at 417-18. The provisions referred to "any picture, demonstration, experiment, or
comparison." Libbey-Owens Ford, 63 F.T.C. at 786. See also Ideal Toy Corp., 64 F.T.C.
297 (1964).
11. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 77 F.T.C. 150 (1970) (consent) (Colgate's advertising
agency, Masius, also a named party).
12. Id. at 153. Bishop Industries received the same provision. Bishop Indus., 77
F.T.C. 380, 383 (1970) (consent). A similar provision for Campbell Soup referred to
"tests, experiments or demonstrations, or the results thereof, or any other evidence
that appears, or purports, to be proof .... " Campbell Soup Co., 77 F.T.C. 664, 676
(1970) (consent). Four others in the next two years were similar. Rhodes Pharmacal
Co., Inc., 78 F.T.C. 680, 685 (1971); Borden, Inc., 78 F.T.C. 686, 689 (1971); Union Car-
bide Corp., 79 F.T.C. 124, 127 (1971); American Home Prods. Corp., 81 F.T.C. 579, 585,
586 (1972) (all consent) (American's agency, Cunningham and Walsh also a named
party). The provisions in Borden and Union Carbide emphasized distortions and
exaggerations.
13. Sun Oil Co., 84 F.T.C. 247 (1974) (litigated) (agency William Esty also a named
party).
14. Id. at 275.
not evidence which actually proves such fact or product feature.1 5
Less than a year later the omitted phrase was used in provisions
otherwise similar to that of Sun Oil. Ford showed a car lifted by a
crane that held it only by the steel guard rails embedded within its
doors.16 This was misrepresented as proof that the lateral strength of
the embedded rails, which is what protects against force exerted hori-
zontally, was that of highway guard rails.
In a Standard Oil of California advertisement, a claim to eliminate
pollutants was supported by demonstrating a plastic bag attached to a
car exhaust, accompanied by "Here's proof."17 Before using the gaso-
line the bag was filled with smoke; afterward it was clear. However,
the "before" effect was created by prior artificial production of heavy
engine deposits, not typical of cars on the road. In addition, much
pollution is invisible and could remain even though the visible smoke
was eliminated.
Another Socal ad showed a meter labeled "Exhaust Emissions" in-
dicating a reduction of 80 of the dial's 100 units, an apparent 80 per-
cent change.1S But the meter measured only one pollutant, and the
reduction was much less than 80 percent for that one. Accordingly,
an additional provision forbade representing that "[a]ny machines,
measuring devices or technical instruments have particular charac-
teristics or capacities when such is not the fact .... 19
Sears, Roebuck's ads showed demonstrations purporting to prove
the false claim that its dishwashers would clean all dishes, pots, and
pans without prior rinsing or scraping. Its agency consented to an or-
der specifically prohibiting a "Demonstrated Proof Misrepresenta-
tion."20  Sears, following litigation, received an order provision
discussed in Section VII which generally forbade representations
15. Id. at 280. "Complaint counsel cites the decision of the Commission in Colgate
[Rapid Shave] as support for this provision." Id. at 275. However, "(T]he provision in
the order pertaining to Colgate was not identical with the provision now proposed. Ac-
cordingly, the provision will be modified to conform with that prescribed in the Col-
gate case." Id. No commentary explained why the excised phrase brought the
provision closer to Colgate. The decision gave no explanation as to how "tests, experi-
ments, or demonstrations" might differ, or why tests were cited although not involved.
16. Ford Motor Co., 84 F.T.C. 729, 735 (1974); J. Walter Thompson Co., 84 F.T.C.
736, 742 (1974) (agency for Ford) (both consent), affirmed, Ford Motor Co. and J. Wal-
ter Thompson Co. v. F.T.C., 547 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1976).
17. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 84 F.T.C. 1401, 1470 (1974), modified (no changes in-
volving tests), Standard Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 577 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1978), modified, 95
F.T.C. 866 (1980) (repeated word-for-word at 96 F.T.C. 380 (1980) without explanation).
Standard's agency BBD & 0 also a named party). See also STP Corp., 87 F.T.C. 56, 59,
61 (1976), in which a screwdriver was dipped into the oil additive, whereupon a strong
man was shown unable to hold it by the tip end. That demonstrated slipperness, but
did not prove the additive would help oil lubricate better. (STP's agent, Stern, Walters
& Simmons also a party).
18. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 84 F.T.C. 1401, 1473 (1974).
19. Id. at 1490.
20. J. Walter Thompson Co., 94 F.T.C. 331, 338 (1979).
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about product performance absent substantiation.21 This included
misrepresentations of demonstrations of such performance, but no
explanation was offered for the different wording. Whether such
general coverage presages the dropping of specific recognition of the
"Demonstrated Proof Misrepresentation" in the future is hard to say,
but there have been almost no charges of such misrepresentation
since Sears.22 The charges and consequent provisions that have oc-
curred are sufficient to prohibit the "Demonstrated Proof Misrepre-
sentation," but they omit specific guidance concerning it.
The "Demonstrated Proof Misrepresentation" was the most bla-
tant, the earliest to gain prominence, and the earliest to wane, of the
types seen in this article. The trend over time has been to more sub-
tle misrepresentations.
III. THE CITED PROOF MISREPRESENTATION
In this category the test or survey is explicitly cited but not shown
in action. The ad misrepresents explicitly or implicitly that the cited
test or survey proves the product claim. Tests and surveys are dis-
cussed separately, with development and early history discussed
under tests.
A. Tests
1. Development and Principal Cases
Although this category generally came later than the "Demon-
strated Proof Representation," there was an early order telling the
advertiser to "cease and desist from: ... (1) Disseminating... any
advertisement... which advertisement represents ... [t]hat the ther-
apeutic value of said preparation has been proven clinically by tests
made in a hospital."23 The FTC apparently felt such tests could
never be made, and therefore issued an outright prohibition of the
proof claim.
However, two later advertisers charged with the same explicit fal-
21. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 95 F.T.C. 406, 525 (1980), affirmed, Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. F.T.C., 676 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1982).
22. North Am. Philips, No. 842-3177, F.T.C. slip op., at 4 (Feb. 10, 1986)); National
Energy Assocs., No. C-3179, F.T.C. slip op., at 9 (Feb. 5, 1986) (both consent).
23. Foley & Co., 48 F.T.C. 670, 680 (1952). The same occurred with International
Safe-T-Trac, 79 F.T.C. 318, 325 (1971), LeConte Cosmetics, Inc., 87 F.T.C. 1348, 1355
(1976); North Am. Phillips Corp., 101 F.T.C. 359, 364 (1983); McCaffrey & McCall, Inc.,
101 F.T.C. 367, 368 (1983) (all consent).
sity were given orders that conceded the absent proof might someday
be produced. They were told to cease:
representing that said product or products have been tested, and have passed
such tests.., or that tests have demonstrated that its products are superior to
other products tested ...unless and in fact, tests have actually been per-
formed and the results establish that such representations are true.2 4
Disseminating ... any advertisement ... which in any manner makes refer-
ence to scientific or medical tests or studies as allegedly substantiating any
representation or claim as to the effectiveness or performance of any such
product unless scientific or medical tests or studies in fact substantiate such
representation or claim.2 5
These provisions illustrate the now-familiar "unless" form of order
provision, in which the test or survey reference is permitted if true.
Typically, it had not been true, either because it did not exist or be-
cause it did not prove the product claim. But the "unless" provision
recognized that a test or survey adequate to constitute proof might in
the future exist, and that the claim thereupon could be permitted.
Such a conditional provision is inappropriate for the "Demon-
strated Proof Misrepresentation," because the latter represents a test
conducted in a specific way. Because such a test cannot support what
it claimed, the appropriate remedy is the outright prohibition. How-
ever, in the "Cited Proof Misreprentation" the test or survey is not
described but only represented to exist. That leaves open the possi-
bility of concluding that an appropriate test or survey could exist.
Standard Oil of California was charged with a "Cited Proof Misrep-
resentation" in addition to the "Demonstrated Proof Representa-
tion." It was told to cease representing that:
Tests, demonstrations, research or experiments have been conducted which
prove or substantiate any of said representations .. .Unless and only to the
extent that each and every such representation is true and has been fully and
completely substantiated by competent scientific tests.2 6
Warner-Lambert was charged with representing "that the latest or
most recent tests conducted by or for it, or available to it, prove that
children who gargle with Listerine twice a day have fewer and
24. Matsushita Electric of Hawaii, Inc., 78 F.T.C. 353, 357 (1971) (consent).
25. J. B. Williams Co., Inc., 79 F.T.C. 410, 419 (1971) (consent). See also Wasem's,
Inc., 84 F.T.C. 209, 213 (1974) (consent).
26. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 84 F.T.C. 1401, 1490 (1974). The order for its agency,
BBD&O, was similar, with the "unless" portion stating, "Unless and only to the extent
that respondent has a reasonable basis for such representation based upon competent
scientific tests by it or its client." Id. at 1491.
How did the "Cited Proof Misrepresentation" occur along with the "Demonstrated
Proof Misrepresentation?" It was because the demonstrations not only amounted to
misrepresentations per se but also implied the existence of more formal scientific tests:
'[H]ere's proof' and 'You're about to see proof' . .. clearly invite the assump-
tion that what follows is based on tests or other reliable substantiation. The
appearance in the demonstrations of complicated measuring instruments and
white-coated 'technicians' contributes to the impression that scientific testing
is behind the advertisements.
Id. at 1472.
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milder . . . colds than do those children who do not so use Lister-
ine."27 The company had based this claim on a series of tests lasting
twelve years, but had received disconfirming evidence in a recent sec-
ond series of tests.
The ALJ noted that "[a] representation that tests prove a claim is a
representation as to the most recent tests available," yet he also
found extenuating circumstances. 28 The respondent had stopped the
claim after the second year of the disconfirming studies, although not
after the first year. The twelve-year series had been reliable enough
that "respondent cannot be said to have acted unreasonably when it
waited until it received an indication of what the second year of the
[second series] would show before it abandoned reference to the [first
series] in its advertising."29 Accordingly, the charge of a "Cited Proof
Misrepresentation" was abandoned.
In Crown Central, the ALJ was unwilling to find references made
to tests as proof, because only a single test was advertised, and only
in a footnote "in small type not prominent."30 The Commission re-
versed this with the comment that "[a] specific study is cited .... "31
The resulting order provision 32 was exactly as for Standard Oil of
California.
In all of the cases mentioned thus far, companies misrepresented
that proof existed for a claim. In National Commission on Egg Nu-
trition,33 the principal misrepresentation was that no scientific proof
existed that eating eggs increases the risk of heart attack or heart
disease.34
Respondents do not deny that well-qualified experts have relied upon compe-
tent and reliable scientific studies in hypothesizing a relationship between di-
etary cholesterol and heart disease. Respondents argue, however, that... such
studies lend little or no support to the diet-heart disease hypothesis, and that
the studies consequently do not rise to the level of "evidence that eating eggs
27. Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1401 (1975), modified,'Warner-Lambert v.
F.T.C., 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (no change involving tests), cert denied, 435 U.S.
950 (1978), modified order, 92 F.T.C. 191 (1978).
28. Warner-Lambert, 86 F.T.C. at 1465.
29. Id.
30. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 84 F.T.C. 1493, 1547 (referring to 1529 n. 40)
(1974), modified, Crown v. F.T.C., 530 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir., 1976) (no published opin-
ion), modified order, 88 F.T.C. 210 (1976).
31. Crown Cent., 84 F.T.C. at 1549.
32. Crown Cent., 88 F.T.C. at 210.
33. 88 F.T.C. 89 (1976), modified, NCEN v. F.T.C., 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977),
modified order, 92 F.T.C. 848 (1978).
34. Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. at 180. The ads tended not to refer to proof, the ALJ
said, but "any distinction between 'proof' and 'evidence' would not be generally recog-
nized by the public in the context of respondents' advertisements." Id. at 112.
will increase the risk of heart disease."3 5
The appellate court stated, however, in affirming the FTC order,
that respondent "has made statements denying the existence of scien-
tific evidence which the record clearly shows does exist."3 6 Accord-
ingly, the advertiser was ordered to cease representing falsely that
there is or is not scientific evidence on the relationship between eggs
and various health matters.3 7 It was also forbidden from making rep-
resentations about such relationships "unless it is clearly and conspic-
uously disclosed in immediate conjunction therewith that there is a
controversy among medical experts . . . and that respondents are
presenting their side of that controversy."38
In 1977 two cases involving claims about television sets resulted in
typical provisions against "Cited Proof Misrepresentations."3 9 The
same occurred in later cases. 40
2. Establishment Representation Cases
In the 1980's the "Cited Proof Misrepresentation" acquired its
greatest fame in several analgesics cases, where it was called the "es-
tablishment representation." That term has not been used generally
herein because the treatment of such claims began much earlier.41
The term "establishment" stresses the need to prove the truth of a
claim to a degree that satisfies the relevant scientific or medical com-
munity. However, it is not unreasonable to see the same standard of
proof implied in all orders involving "Demonstrated" or "Cited Proof
Misrepresentations."
Order provisions for American Home Products, Bristol-Myers, and
Sterling Drug were as follows, with the material in brackets absent
in Sterling:
cease and desist from: ...
[m]aking any representation, directly or by implication, that a claim concern-
35. Id. at 181.
36. NCEN, 570 F.2d at 161 (quoting F.T.C. v. Nat'l Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517
F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1975)).
37. Egg Nutrition, 92 F.T.C. at 848.
38. Id. at 849.
39. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 89 F.T.C. 157, 161 (1977); General Elec. Co., 89
F.T.C. 209, 217 (1977) (involved only surveys, but provision mentioned tests) (both
consent).
40. J. Walter Thompson Co., 94 F.T.C. 331, 338 (1979) (same provision, but with
emphasis here on phrase "referring to"); Dancer-Fitzgerald-Sample, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 1,
14 (1980); Champion Home Builders, 101 F.T.C. 316, 324 (1983); North Am. Philips
Corp., 101 F.T.C. 359, 365 (1983); McCaffrey & McCall, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 367, 369 (1983)
(agency for Philips); California-Texas Oil Co., 104 F.T.C. 268, 278 (1984) (all consent).
41. The term "establish" means nothing more than "proven." American Home
Prods., 98 F.T.C. 136, 374 (1981). No ads actually used the term "establish," but that
was declared immaterial in light of the terms actually used, including "proves," "sub-
stantiates," "shows," and "beyond a doubt." Id.
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ing the superior effectiveness [or superior freedom from side effects] of such
product has been established or proven unless such representation has been
established by two or more adequate and well-controlled clinical investiga-
tions, conducted by independent experts qualified by training and experience
to evaluate the comparative effectiveness [or comparative freedom from side
effects] of the drugs involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and respon-
sibly be concluded by such experts (1) that the drug will have the comparative
effectiveness [or freedom from side effects] that it is represented to have, and
(2) that such comparative effectiveness [or freedom from side effects] is
demonstrated by methods of statistical analysis, and with levels of confidence,
that are generally recognized by such experts.
4 2
In addition, Sterling was ordered to cease:
making any representation, directly or by implication, that the superior fresh-
ness, purity, stability, or speed of disintegration of such product has been es-
tablished, demonstrated, or proven unless at the time such representation is
made, respondent possesses and relies upon competent and reliable scientific
evidence which would permit qualified experts to conclude that the product
has the comparative pharmaceutical qualities it is represented to have.
4 3
The type of proof required for the first of these provisions was dis-
cussed in the earliest of the cases, American Home Products:
The record reflects no real dispute as to the type of evidence scientists require
before they regard it as having been proven (established) that one drug is
more effective than another ... [I]t is clear that at least since the early 1950's
well-controlled clinical testing ...have [sic] been required to establish or
prove absolute or relative drug efficacy.
4 4
A follow-up comment in Bristol-Myers was that "we ... find no
reason to alter the decision we reached in American Home Products
regarding the sort of evidence necessary to substantiate a claim of es-
tablished superiority for analgesics."'45 In Sterling Drug, the stated
rationale was the same, with citations to American Home Products
and Bristol-Myers.46
42. American Home Prods., 98 F.T.C. 136 (1981), modified, American Home Prods.
Corp. v. F.T.C., 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982), modified order, 101 F.T.C. 698, 698 (1983),
modified order, 103 F.T.C. 57 (1984), modified order, 103 F.T.C. 528 (1984); Bristol-My-
ers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 390 (1983), affirmed, Bristol-Myers v. F.T.C., 738 F.2d 554 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985); Sterling Drug, 102 F.T.C. 395, 802 (1983),
affirmed, 741 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985).
43. Sterling Drug, Inc., 102 F.T.C. at 804.
44. American Home Prods., 98 F.T.C. at 376. The appellate court approved, rea-
soning that the regulatory climate created by the government encourages consumers to
expect such high standards. American Home Prods., 695 F.2d at 698. It cited the F.T.C.
approvingly for asserting that "consumers reasonably assume that the proper govern-
mental authorities will take steps to ensure that unqualified claims of a drug's superi-
ority are supported by whatever proof the appropriate medical or scientific experts
consider sufficient." Id.
45. Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 332. Precedents seen earlier in this section were
cited. See id. The point was affirmed. Bristol-Myers, 738 F.2d at 558.
46. Sterling Drug, 102 F.T.C. at 747. The appellate opinion affirmed this point.
Sterling Drug, 741 F.2d at 1153.
In a later analgesics case a "Cited Proof Misrepresentation" was
also found, but the opinion stated that:
Our analysis here does not employ the term 'establishment claim' to avoid
creating the impression that claims for an advertiser's possession of scientific
proof will be treated by us as a unique category of claims. There is no concep-
tual or practical reason to single out such claims for special treatment. They
are but one example of an express or implied claim that an advertiser pos-
sesses a particular level of substantiation.
4 7
The Thompson Medical provision thus is cited in section VI rather
than here. The required substantiation is the same, however, which
may mean that in the future the categories described in this article
will be consolidated.
3. Substantial Question Cases
Certain misrepresentations are unusual for presenting the proof
claim without explicit or implicit indicia. In the analgesics cases, the
"establishment representation" was conveyed through what were
called "affirmative indicia of 'proof.' "48 These indicia included ex-
plicit expressions. 49 They also included implicit verbal claims such as
descriptions of test controls or references to doctors' formulas, as
well as nonverbal visual depictions of technical graphs, chemical for-
mulas, or medical literature. All were held to add to the consumer's
belief that the claim was proved to the satisfaction of the scientific or
medical community. 50
It was also determined, however, that when an analgesic is claimed
to be superior, consumers may reasonably understand it to be estab-
lished in the scientific community even though the ads are "unembel-
lished with specific references to underlying scientific proof or tests,
or other clear indicia of scientific or medical evidence (graphs, charts,
treatises, etc.)."5 1 The result was the following order provision in ad-
dition to the one cited earlier in this section, i.e., to cease and desist
from:
[m]aking any representation, directly or by implication, of superior effective-
ness or freedom from side effects of such product unless:
1. The superior effectiveness or superior freedom from side effects so repre-
sented has been established according to the terms set forth .. .[i.e., in the
AHP provision cited earlier in this section], or
2. Each advertisement containing such representation contains a clear and
conspicuous disclosure that there is a substantial question about the validity of
the comparative efficacy or side effects claim, or that the claim has not been
proven. Such a disclosure may consist of a clear and conspicuous statement
47. Thompson Medical Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648, 822 n. 59 (1984), affirmed, Thomp-
son Medical Co. v. F.T.C., 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986). For resulting provision see in-
fra text accompanying note 126.
48. American Home Prods., 98 F.T.C. at 392.
49. See supra note 41 for examples.
50. American Home Prods., 98 F.T.C. at 374-75.
51. Id. at 385. The appellate court supported the conclusion. American Home
Prods., 695 F.2d at 696-97.
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that the claim is 'open to substantial question,' or that the claim 'has not been
proven.' If other language is used by respondent to convey the required
message, respondent shall maintain... records sufficient to demonstrate that
the required message is effectively conveyed to the advertisement's intended
audience. 5
2
The second part of this order was described as the "substantial
question" issue.53 When an ad makes a proof claim through "affirma-
tive indicia," the order gives the advertiser no alternative to estab-
lishing it by the specified testing. But, for ads that prompt
consumers to believe the claim, even though no "affirmative indicia"
of establishment are presented, the advertiser is offered the alterna-
tive of disclosing in the advertising that there is a substantial ques-
tion about the claim's validity.54
Commissioner Clanton dissented on the substantial question issue,
because he disagreed that any comparative performance claim would
automatically create the consumer belief of establishment. No evi-
dence, he said, existed for such an assumption. He would have or-
dered AHP merely to satisfy a reasonable basis requirement less
rigorous than the two-test requirement.55
Later, changes in the makeup of the FTC turned Clanton's dissent
into a majority opinion. Accordingly, provisions in Bristol-Myers and
Sterling Drug that might have followed American Home Products
were written to require only a reasonable basis, which could be, but
would not have to be, clinical tests. They are identified in Section
VII. The FTC reopened American Home Products and decided it es-
sentially in the same manner. 56
52. American Home Prods. Corp., 101 F.T.C. 698, 700 (1983). For AHP's agency,
Clyne Co., the parallel provision states to cease and desist from the following:
B. Making any representation, directly or by implication, of superior freedom
from side effects of such product, unless: 1. Respondent knows or has reason
to believe that the superior freedom from side effects so represented has been
established according to the terms set forth... [i.e.,. the AHP provision cited
earlier in this section], or 2.... [same as just stated for AHP].
Id. at 702. For Sterling's agency a similar provision was written in a consent order en-
tered much earlier, to be rendered valid only when and if such a provision was written
into Sterling Drug, Inc. Sterling Drug, 102 F.T.C. at 804; Dancer-Fitzgerald-Sample,
Inc., 96 F.T.C. 1, 15, 16 (1980).
53. American Home Prods., 98 F.T.C. at 385.
54. The "substantial question" ruling was not decided as a question of a reasonable
basis, even though the Commission characterized it as a logical elaboration of the rea-
sonable basis idea. American Home Prods., 695 F.2d at 694, 695 n. 22.
55. American Home Prods., 98 F.T.C. at 417-23.
56. This was done by removing the provision cited supra, text accompanying note
52, and substituting the following:
cease and desist from . . . making any therapeutic performance or freedom
from side effects claim for such product unless respondent possesses a reason-
In discussing the change, Bristol-Myers emphasized the Commis-
sion's resolve to "hold the advertiser to the level of evidence required
to convince the relevant scientific community of the claim's truthful-
ness only when the advertisement expressly or implicitly represents
that the claim's truth has been scientifically established."57 This in
itself was no different; the difference, rather, was that the new ma-
jority now felt a bare claim of superior effectiveness did not imply es-
tablishment to consumers. It backed away from the earlier finding in
American Home Products, observing that "there has never been any
evidence to confirm this somewhat counter-intuitive reading of con-
sumer expectations."5 8
Commissioners Pertschuk and Bailey dissented, Pertschuk observ-
ing that "[t]he absence of extrinsic evidence about consumer expecta-
tions has never barred the Commission from making informed,
considered judgments about what consumers could reasonably be ex-
pected to believe about a given claim."59 He added that the decisions
involving consumer expectations about ads that do contain references
to establishment were made with no greater degree of proof. To re-
quire nothing but a reasonable basis might create a situation in which
competitors each have a reasonable basis for their conflicting claims,
which would create a "substantial question" yet provide no
disclosure.60
Bailey's dissent 6l 'discussed how critical the factual findings would
be, under the new majority, as to whether the claim of establishment
was represented to consumers. She gave examples to illustrate the
fine line that would exist. One was that depiction of a computer
typewriter would not constitute such a representation by itself, but
could do so if accompanied by certain text. She concluded that find-
ing facts would now become very difficult.62
able basis for making that claim. A reasonable basis for such a claim shall
consist of competent and reliable scientific evidence supporting that claim.
Well-controlled clinical tests conducted in accordance with the criteria set
forth... shall be deemed to constitute a reasonable basis for a claim.
American Home Prods., 103 F.T.C. at 529-30. No change was made for the Clyne provi-
sion cited supra note 52. Reference to the "substantial question" written into Dancer
was rendered invalid by its own terms when no similar provision was written into Ster-
ling. Dancer, 96 F.T.C. at 16.
57. Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 318 (1983).
58. Id. at 350-51. Sterling offered similar conclusions, with reference to the rea-
sons given in Bristol. Sterling Drug, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 395, 777 (1983). Bristol added that
"in some future case, a proper showing might be made that consumers did expect une-
quivocal scientific proof even when the advertisements made no express or implied
reference to such proof." Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 351. But here the evidence on
consumers' expectations was not sufficient. Id.
59. Id. at 384.
60. Id. at 386.
61. Id.
62. Research on consumer perceptions of ad claims was not introduced in any of
these cases, but Bailey appeared to imply that it would have to be in the future. It
[Vol. 14: 229, 1987] FTC Order Provisions
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The "substantial question" issue appears dead in the form it took in
the analgesics cases. However, the Egg Nutrition case keeps the issue
alive with its provision calling for disclosure that a controversy exists
among medical experts and that respondents' claims represent only
one side.63
4. "Cited Proof Misrepresentation" Charged or Found But Not
Specifically Prohibited
There have been consent cases in which the "Cited Proof Misrepre-
sentation" was charged, or litigated cases in which it was found, but
in which no order provision forbade it specifically. For each there
were provisions of other sorts identified in later sections of this arti-
cle.64 They serve to prohibit the misrepresentation, but omit specific
would not be important for the explicit indicia of establishment, such as the word
"proves," which would be assumed to create a claim of proof. Nor would it be impor-
tant for a bare claim of superiority or other performance, because such claim would
now as a matter of law convey no implication of establishment (a point, however, on
which communication and behavior researchers might disagree-see discussion, supra
note 3). Research would be recognized as critical, however, in dealing with those indi-
cia, including visual and other nonverbal content, plus verbal content making indirect
expressions, that might possibly be taken to imply establishment. Bristol-Myers, 102
F.T.C. at 386-89.
63. See supra text accompanying note 38. The rationale was that:
Respondents object.., to that portion of the law judge's proposed order...
which requires that they possess a reasonable basis, consisting of competent
and reliable scientific studies, for any claim that eating eggs will not increase
the risk of heart disease. They contend that the difficulty of determining
what constitutes adequate substantiation for the claim will prevent them from
making any assertions on this subject whatsoever.
National Commission on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89, 192 (1976). Therefore:
The simple solution to this deception, we believe, is for respondents to indi-
cate clearly and conspicuously in their advertising that the claim they seek to
make for eggs is subject to substantial disagreement by qualified experts
within the scientific community .... [W]ere the Commission to maintain a
narrow view of what constitutes a 'reasonable basis' for respondents' position
and require that as a condition for its expression, it might indeed come at the
expense of respondents' ability to publicize new developments in the field. On
the other hand, were the Commission to adopt a more expansive view of 'rea-
sonable basis,' it would be granting carte blanche to respondents to assure con-
sumers directly or by implication that egg consumption is safe, without
mention of the substantial contrary opinion.
Id. at 193-94. See also cases with certain similarities, discussed infra as contradictory
or inconsistent claims, in Section X.
64. Litigated cases: John Treadwell, 106 F.T.C. 163 (1985); Thompson Medical Co.,
Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984); Cliffdale Ass'n, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984); Porter & Dietsch,
Inc., 95 F.T.C. 806 (1980); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398 (1972).
Consent cases: Ogilvy & Mather Int'l, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 1 (1983) (agency for Thompson
Medical); Ball-Matic Corp., 98 F.T.C. 836 (1981); Great N. Am. Indus., Inc., 98 F.T.C.
817 (1981); Standard Brands, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 233 (1981); Ted Bates & Co., 97 F.T.C. 220
reference to it.65 Of the four litigated cases, only Thompson Medical
discusses the discrepancy.6 6 The apparent rationale is that a provi-
sion forbidding claims unless supported by the cited tests (see Section
VI) will automatically forbid misrepresentations that those tests con-
stitute proof. Thus, the result will not differ.
Despite that seemingly reasonable rationale, numerous advertisers
have received provisions identifying the "Cited Proof Misrepresenta-
tion" specifically. Perhaps the real question is why that has been
done. A possible reason is that such cases, except for the very early
Foley,6 7 came after identification of the "Demonstrated Proof Misrep-
resentation," which had made the FTC sensitive to the specific issue
(1981) (agency for Standard Brands); Sorga, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 205 (1981) (agency for
American Home Products); American Home Prods. Corp., 95 F.T.C. 884 (1980); Mid
City Chevrolet, Inc., 95 F.T.C. 371 (1980); Harvey Glass, M.D., 95 F.T.C. 246 (1980); San-
Mar Laboratories, Inc. 95 F.T.C. 236 (1980); The Nat'l Media Group, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 1096
(1979); Karr Preventative Medical Prod., Inc., 94 F.T.C. 1080 (1979); C.I. Energy Dev.,
Inc., 94 F.T.C. 1337 (1979); RR Int'l, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 1312 (1979); Leroy Gordon Cooper,
Inc., 94 F.T.C. 674 (1979); Admarketing, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 664 (1979) (agency for Cooper);
American Consumer, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 648 (1979); Ford Motor Co., 93 F.T.C. 873 (1979);
Savoy Drug & Chem. Co., 86 F.T.C. 957 (1975); Hugh Mooney t/a Organic Masque Co.,
85 F.T.C. 507 (1975); General Motors Corp., 84 F.T.C. 653 (1974); Mota-Nu, Inc., 83
F.T.C. 1467 (1974); PPG Indus., Inc., 80 F.T.C. 53 (1972).
65. The situation is similar to that discussed for the "Demonstrated Proof Misrep-
resentation" Supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
66. Thompson Medical Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984); see supra note 47 and ac-
companying text. The ads used such terms as "controlled clinical test," and the deci-
sion held that "we find it reasonable for consumers to expect that the claims... would
be substantiated in a manner acceptable to the medical scientific community." Thomp-
son Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 814.
The Commission in Firestone alluded to the discrepancy, noting that "[r]espondent
agrees that its advertisement represents that its 25 percent quicker stopping claim has
been substantiated by adequate scientific tests." Firestone, 81 F.T.C. at 450. The appel-
late court agreed that this was implied to consumers. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
F.T.C., 481 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973). Yet, the or-
der provision did not specifically forbid a proof misrepresentation. Perhaps the reason
is that the hearing examiner refused to find that tests had been represented to exist.
Firestone, 81 F.T.C. at 407. He wrote an order accordingly. Id. at 427-28. The Commis-
sion later disagreed with him on that point. Id. at 444, 450. However, the factual find-
ing to which the Commission gave most attention was that the accompanying product
claim was unsupported. The examiner's proposed provision forbade the claim unless
supported, and the Commission's final order left it substantially unchanged. Id. at 475.
Apparently it saw no need to change it to forbid the "Cited Proof Misrepresentation"
specifically.
In Porter & Dietsch the complaint did not charge a "Cited Proof Misrepresentation,"
and this may be why it was not prohibited specifically in the order. Still, the finding
was made that the advertisers "not only. implied the existence of substantiation but
they also represented that this substantiation consisted of competent scientific proof."
Porter & Dietsch, 95 F.T.C. at 865. See also Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. F.T.C., 605 F.2d
294, 302 (7th Cir. 1979).
In Cliffdale the ads used such terms as "tested and proven," "field tests," and "lab
tests," and the decision held that "[t]hese advertisements can be reasonably understood
to imply that competent scientific tests support the performance claims." Cliffdale, 103
F.T.C. at 169.
67. 48 F.T.C. 670 (1952).
[Vol. 14: 229, 1987] FTC Order Provisions
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
of proof. It was only later that formulations were developed (see
Sections VI-VII) which included proof misrepresentations within pro-
visions aimed at misrepresentations more widely. A current ration-
ale for maintaining separate identification of the "Cited Proof
Misrepresentation" exists in the analgesics decisions in which the
FTC decided that proof claims should be subjected to a higher level
of substantiation than claims misrepresented merely as true. Such a
distinction serves at present to keep the "Cited Proof Misrepresenta-
tion" alive as a specific category.
B. Surveys
American Tire was ordered to cease "representing... that respon-
dents have, through an independent survey, or in any other manner,
determined the prices being charged, in the trade area in which the
representation is made, for merchandise ... unless respondents...
have determined... that the identical merchandise is being sold...
at the represented prices."68
General Electric was ordered to:
cease and desist from ... [a]dvertising or offering such product(s) for sale by
referring to any test, experiment, demonstration, study or survey, or any or
all of the results thereof (hereafter "evidence"), which evidence is repre-
sented, either directly or by implication, as supporting, showing or proving...
the existence or nature of any fact or product feature respecting such prod-
uct(s) when such evidence does not support, show or prove such fact or prod-
uct feature .... 69
A number of cases were similar to those discussed under the tests
discussed above, in that the "Cited Proof Misrepresentation" was
charged or found, but the resulting provisions (see Sections VI-VIII)
made no specific reference to it.70 No rationales were offered. 71
68. American Tire Co., 77 F.T.C. 1169, 1176 (1970) (consent).
69. General Elec. Co., 89 F.T.C. 209, 217 (1977) (consent). The provision mentions
tests, but the misrepresentations involved only surveys. Thompson, as agency for
Sears, was given a similar provision, even though Sears, after litigation, was not. See
supra notes 20, 21 and accompanying text. The application to surveys was apparently a
throw-in, because the advertising involved no reference to surveys.
70. Consent cases: J. Walter Thompson Co., 97 F.T.C. 333 (1981) (agency for
Teledyne); Teledyne Inc., 97 F.T.C. 320 (1981); Standard Brands, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 233
(1981); Ted Bates & Co., 97 F.T.C. 220 (1981) (agency for Standard Brands). Litigated
cases: American Home Prods. Corp., 95 F.T.C. 884 (1980); The Kroger Co., 100 F.T.C.
573 (1982); Litton Indus., Inc., 97 F.T.C. 1 (1981).
Additional cases mentioned surveys as an apparent throw-in, because the challenged
representations involved only tests: Ford Motor Co., 93 F.T.C. 873 (1979); American
Consumer, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 648 (1979); Admarketing, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 664 (1979) (agency
for Cooper); Leroy Gordon Cooper, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 674 (1979); RR Int'l, Inc., 94 F.T.C.
1312 (1979); C.I. Energy Development, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 1337 (1979); Mid City Chevrolet,
C. Summary
Advertisers who commit "Cited Proof Misrepresentations" have
frequently been ordered specifically to cease them unless tests or
surveys of the type cited substantiate the accompanying claims. Such
specific orders are very likely to occur in those cases that also include
provisions involving lesser references to tests which may be substan-
tiated by lesser standards. In some cases involving "Cited Proof Mis-
representations," the orders do not mention such misrepresentations
specifically.
IV. THE CITED EVIDENCE MISREPRESENTATION
Whereas, the first two categories involve claims that tests or
surveys prove accompanying claims, the "Cited Evidence Misrepre-
sentation" involves the lesser claim that tests or surveys exist as sup-
port. Gurley Industries was ordered to:
cease and desist from ... [representing ... that respondents' spark plugs or
any other products have been tested unless such spark plugs or other products
have in fact been subjected to such tests and testing procedures as will estab-
lish that each spark plug or other item will fully perform in the manner and
to the extent ... represented.
72
General Motors, after false claims of EPA tests of Cadillac's gaso-
line mileage, was banned from:
Representing... by reference to a test or tests, that the performance of any
automobile has been tested either alone or in comparison with other
automobiles unless such representation(s) accurately reflect the test results
and unless the tests themselves are so devised and conducted as to substanti-
ate each such representation concerning the featured tests.
7 3
Mooney and Savoy were ordered to "cease and desist from ... dis-
seminating ... any advertising.., which misrepresents.., the ex-
tent to which any such product has been tested, or the results of its
use demonstrated."74
Inc., 95 F.T.C. 371 (1980); Great N. Am. Indus., Inc., 98 F.T.C. 817 (1981); Ball-Matic
Corp., Inc., 98 F.T.C. 836 (1981); Cliffdale Assoc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984).
71. Litton suggested the F.T.C. had come close to specifically prohibiting a "Cited
Proof Misrepresentation," after concluding that Litton represented the survey prefer-
ences of servicing technicians as establishing that Litton's microwave ovens were supe-
rior. Litton, 97 F.T.C. at 18. The reason for not doing so may have been because of the
finding that the preferences were not as claimed in the first place, which was a reason
parallel to that noted for Firestone. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398
(1972) and supra note 66.
72. Gurley Indus., Inc. 77 F.T.C. 477, 483-84 (1970) (consent).
73. General Motors Corp., 84 F.T.C. 653, 660 (1974) (consent).
74. Hugh Mooney t/a Organic Masque Co., 85 F.T.C. 507, 510-11 (1975); Savoy
Drug & Chem. Co., 86 F.T.C. 957, 961 (1975) (both consent). The term "demonstrated"
appears in the context to mean only "displayed," not "proved." Similarly, advertisers
of acne preparations were ordered to "cease and desist from... [d]isseminating... any
advertisement ... which... [m]isrepresents the extent to which any product has been
tested or the results of any such test(s)." Cooga Mooga, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 310, 319 (1978),
modified, 98 F.T.C. 814 (1981) (no change involving tests); Karr Preventative Medical
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The remaining cases have provisions referring to both tests and
surveys, although the misrepresentations did not involve both.
Ford75 was given the same provision as General Motors after failing
to disclose its lack of evidence that its advertised test conditions, on
which its mileage claims were based, approximated or equaled the
conditions an ordinary driver would face. Ford had used tests of its
own devising.
Standard Brands, along with its agency, Ted Bates, was charged
with misrepresenting that surveys showed that doctors recommended
Fleischmann's margarine. They were ordered to:
cease and desist from... [making representations... by reference to a sur-
vey or test [of 'experts' or 'consumers'... ] or the results thereof, concerning
the performance or any characteristic, benefit, recommendation, usage or
choice of or other preference for such Product, unless: (a) such survey or test
[of experts or consumers] is designed, executed and analyzed in a competent
and reliable scientific manner; and (b) such survey or test [of experts or con-
sumers] substantiates the claim(s) represented by providing a reasonable basis
therefor; and (c) ... .76
This type of misrepresentation has been infrequent because men-
tions of tests or surveys usually have resulted in charges of proof
misrepresentation. Only two of the cases just discussed, Gurley and
Cooga Mooga, actually involved charges of the Cited Evidence Mis-
representation. The others except for AHC Pharmacal involved
charges of the "Cited Proof Misrepresentation," which resulted in
provisions not mentioning that misrepresentation specifically.77
Prods., Inc., 94 F.T.C. 1080, 1090 (1979); The Nat'l Media Group, 94 F.T.C. 1096, 1107
(1979); AHC Pharmacal, Inc., 95 F.T.C. 528, 534 (1980), modified, 101 F.T.C. 40 (1983)
(no modification of this provision). The following had virtually identical provisions:
San-Mar Laboratories, Inc., 95 F.T.C. 236, 241-42 (1980); Harvey Glass, M.D., 95 F.T.C.
246, 253 (1980). See also John Treadwell, 106 F.T.C. 163, 170 (1985). All were consent
cases.
75. Ford Motor Co., 87 F.T.C. 756 (1976) (partial order and remand), 93 F.T.C. 873,
881 (1979) (consent). The order defined tests as including surveys, although the case
involved no surveys.
76. Standard Brands, Inc., 97 F.T.C. at 233, 242 (1981); Ted Bates & Co., 97 F.T.C.
220, 229 (1981). The material in brackets appears in Bates only. The section headed by
"(c)" is discussed in Section X, infra note 342. The misrepresentations involved no
tests.
77. General Motors Corp., 84 F.T.C. 653 (1974); Hugh Mooney, t/a Organic Masque
Co., 85 F.T.C. 507 (1975); Savoy Drug & Chem. Co., 86 F.T.C. 957 (1975); Ford Motor
Co., 93 F.T.C. 873 (1979); Karr Preventative Medical Prods., Inc., 94 F.T.C. 1080 (1979);
The Nat'l Media Group, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 1096 (1979); San-Mar Laboratories, Inc., 95
F.T.C. 236 (1980); Harvey Glass, M.D., 95 F.T.C. 246 (1980), Ted Bates & Co., 97 F.T.C.
220 (1981); Standard Brands, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 233 (1981); John Treadwell, 106 F.T.C. 163
(1985). AHC Pharmacal, Inc., 95 F.T.C. 528, 534 (1980), had no complaint charge involv-
ing tests. All are consent cases, which offer no explanation. See explanation in text at
notes 22, 65.
V. THE REASONABLE BASIS/SUBSTANTIATION (RB/S)
MISREPRESENTATION
The categories discussed thus far involve misrepresentations stated
explicitly, albeit sometimes indirectly by related terminology or by
nonverbal means. By contrast, the "Reasonable Basis/Substantiation
(RB/S) Misrepresentation" occurs in ads that make no references,
explicit or implicit, to tests or surveys, but which, according to the
FTC, imply to consumers that a reasonable basis or substantiation for
the claims existed prior to the claims' dissemination.
Prior to Sections VI-VIII, in which the RB/S order provisions are
identified, this section explains the rationale for combining reason-
able basis orders and substantiation orders. It also explains other
combinatorial decisions used here. A reader's caveat is that this arti-
cle, although exhaustive with respect to tests and surveys in FTC
cases, does not attempt to be exhaustive with respect to all RB/S
cases. Order provisions that call for a reasonable basis for substantia-
tion and yet require nothing interpretable as tests or test-like,
surveys or survey-like, are not within the topic treated here.78 More
theoretical discussions of the reasonable basis or substantiation prin-
ciples are not treated here either.7 9
78. Several cases contain at least one provision that so interprets the RB/S along
with at least one that does not: General Elec. Co., 89 F.T.C. 209, 219 (1977); Cooga
Mooga Inc., 92 F.T.C. 310, 320 (1978); Karr Preventative Medical Prods., Inc., 94 F.T.C.
1080, 1092 (1979); The Nat'l Media Group, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 1096, 1108 (1979); San-Mar
Laboratories, Inc., 95 F.T.C. 236, 243 (1980); Harvey Glass, M.D., 95 F.T.C. 246, 253
(1980); Hayoun Cosmetique, Inc., 95 F.T.C. 794, 801 (1980); Universal Bodybuilding,
Inc., 96 F.T.C. 783, 791-92 (1980); Ogilvy & Mather Int'l, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 1, 14-15 (1983)
(agency for Thompson Medical); AHC Pharmacal, Inc., 95 F.T.C. 528, 534-35 (1980). As
all were consent cases, no explanation is available for requiring the RB/S both with
and without specification. Perhaps those provisions requiring the RB/S without specifi-
cation were regarded by their authors as less essential than those dealing with the spe-
cific misrepresentations found.
Another type of case not treated here is illustrated by Warner-Lambert, in which
the Commission said, "[w]e must conclude that the preponderance of the evidence
demonstrates that . . . Listerine . . . will not prevent or cure colds or sore throats or
ameliorate cold symptoms." Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. at 1398, 1496-97
(1975)(footnote omitted). In such instances the prohibition of the claim is made out-
right. No RB/S (and so, no tests or surveys) can be considered because the F.T.C. con-
cludes none can ever exist.
79. But see, Note, Pfizer Reasonable Basis Test - Fast Relief for Consumers But a
Headache for Advertisers, 1973 DUKE L.J. 563 (1973); Note, Unfairness in Advertising:
Pfizer, Inc., 59 VA. L. REV. 324 (1973); Note, The FTC. Advertising Substantiation
Program, 61 GEO. L.J. 1427 (1973); R. POSNER, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY THE
F.T.C. (1973); Williams, Through the Looking Glass-The FTC's Advertising Substanti-
ation Exclusionary Rule, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 76 (1977); J. Healey, The F.T.C. Advertising
Substantiation Program and Changes in the Content of Advertising in Selected Indus-
tries (1978) (unpublished Ph.D thesis in F.T.C. library); Cohen, The F.T.C. 's Advertis-
ing Substantiation Program, 44 J. MARKETING 26 (Winter 1980); Ad Substantiation,
supra note 1; Scammon and Seminik, The FTC's "Reasonable Basis "for Substantiation
of Advertising: Expanded Standards and Implications, 12 J. ADVERTISING 4 (No. 1,
1983); Handler, supra note 2.
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A. Combining Reasonable Basis and Substantiation
Misrepresentations
The concept of the "RB/S Misrepresentation" combines two cate-
gories used by the FTC: (1) the advertising claim that falsely implies
the existence of a reasonable basis for the claim; and (2) the false ad-
vertising claim that is required to have substantiation. The existence
of separate designations implies a differentiation, and indeed the two
represented differing theories originally. However, in terms of the
roles subsequently played in the orders examined here, they are so
alike that it seems counterproductive to treat them separatelys 0 The
assumption, therefore, is adopted that the difference in terminology
represents no significant difference in substance for present pur-
poses. That assumption is based on the following analysis of the two
concepts, beginning with the case in which the term "reasonable ba-
sis" first appeared alongside the earlier "substantiation."81
The Pfizer complaint did not use the phrase "reasonable basis;"
rather, it charged a lack of substantiation.8 2 The opinion, however,
called it an "unfair practice ... to make an affirmative product claim
without a reasonable basis for making that claim."83 Thus, the term
was born as an interpolation into a matter introduced as involving
substantiation.
Firestone, reported only two months later, cited Pfizer in declaring
that claims failed to be supported by a reasonable basis.8 4 The order,
however, did not require a reasonable basis specifically, perhaps be-
cause the commissioners contented themselves with altering rather
than rewriting the initial decision's order.85 The initial decision had
80. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972), grounded the reasonable basis violation in un-
fairness in contrast to the substantiation concept's grounding in deceptiveness. Shortly
thereafter, however, in National Dynamics, the reasonable basis concept was grounded
as well in deceptiveness. National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488, 550 (1973); see also
id. at 550 n.10. No subsequent reasonable basis provision cited in this article was
grounded exclusively in unfairness (i.e., without also being grounded simultaneously in
deceptiveness), and many were grounded only in deceptiveness.
81. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972) (dismissed).
82. Id. at 25. The complaint included a standard that eventually became central to
the reasonable basis concept: that a claim should be called unfair if there is lacking
any basis for believing it prior to the time of its first dissemination. This idea of a
prior basis was not controversial for explicit mentions of tests or surveys, because the
explicit mention made clear that they were being represented to have existed prior to
the advertising. But, in cases involving no explicit representations about tests or
surveys, the matter of implying prior existence became a key issue.
83. Id. at 62; see also id. at 64.
84. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 463 (1972).
85. Id. at 428, 475.
been published prior to Pfizer. Thus the Firestone opinion, although
it incorporated the reasonable basis thinking, ordered that claims be
"substantiated by competent scientific tests."8 6
The interweaving of terms occurred further in 1973: "We have held
that the test applied to determine the adequacy of substantiation is
whether or not it provides respondents with a reasonable basis for
believing their claims are true."8 7 And in Ford and J. Walter Thomp-
son in 1974, each order used one of the concepts in one provision and
the other in another.8 8 Also in 1974, provisions otherwise the same
called for Standard Oil of California to provide substantiation and for
its agency, BBD&O, to provide a reasonable basis.89
After the Crown Central opinion said "[w]e conclude that compe-
tent test evidence is necessary to provide the required reasonable ba-
sis,"90 it then proceeded to require substantiation and not a
reasonable basis.91 A possible determinant was that the complaint,
written in 1971, charged only deception whereas the reasonable basis
concept originated under unfairness. Many later complaints rou-
tinely charged both deception and unfairness. Still, there were cases
in which complaints charged a lack of a reasonable basis but orders
required substantiation.92 Recent orders have been more prone to re-
quire a reasonable basis.
Perhaps the best evidence of interchangeability is seen in provi-
sions that blend the two terms to create, in effect, a "reasonable basis
that substantiates."93 Consistent with this frequent blending, no dis-
cussion in any case of the past decade has suggested the two concepts
are different. For these reasons, the two are blended here into what
is called the "RB/S Misrepresentation."
86. Id. at 475. This altered the examiner's requirement for claims "substantiated
by competent tests .... Id. at 428; see also Id. at 463.
87. National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488, 553 (1973), modified, National Dynam-
ics v. F.T.C., 492 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974) (modifications not affecting tests); cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974), modified, 85 F.T.C. 391 (1975), modified, 85 F.T.C. 1052
(1975).
88. Ford Motor Co., 84 F.T.C. 729 (1974); J. Walter Thompson Co., 84 F.T.C. 736
(1974) (agency for Ford) (both consent). See also, Ford Motor Co. and J. Walter
Thompson Co. v. F.T.C., aff'd, 547 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 915
(1977).
89. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 84 F.T.C. 1401, 1490-91 (1974).
90. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 84 F.T.C. 1493, 1548 (1974), modified with ex-
planatory Memorandum, Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. F.T.C., 530 F.2d 1093 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (no published opinion), modified, 88 F.T.C. 210 (1976). For similar com-
ments, see also Crown Cent., 84 F.T.C. at 1529, 1538.
91. Crown Cent., 88 F.T.C. at 211. The discussion of substantiation recognized the
"prior" requirement: "We find that the ... advertisements do represent that tests had
been conducted prior to the publication of the ads." Crown Cent., 84 F.T.C. at 1549.
92. The first of these was Porter & Dietsch, Inc., 95 F.T.C. 806 (1980). See discus-
sion supra text accompanying note 64.
93. E.g., Union Carbide Corp., 84 F.T.C. 591, 598 (1974) (consent); Sears, Roebuck,
& Co., 95 F.T.C. 406, 525 (1980).
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B. Combining RB/S Cases That Do and Do Not Explicitly Charge
The RB/S
This article combines RB/S cases resulting from two kinds of com-
plaint charges (or, in litigated cases, findings). In the first, the adver-
tiser is specifically charged with implying deceptively that an RB/S
exists for the product claim. In the other, the advertiser is charged
only with the deceptive product claim. Notwithstanding their differ-
ences, the compelling reason for combining these cases is that their
orders show no systematic variation; in both the advertiser is found
to lack the RB/S and must cease making the claim without having
one.
The reason for the similarity is the FTC's conclusion that product
claims typically imply to consumers that an RB/S exists. Thus, a
complaint charge of a deceptive product claim, because the claim im-
plies the RB/S, is no different from a specific charge of a deceptive
RB/S claim. The Commission's assumption of the implied RB/S was
first approached in New York Jewelry Co.:
The record herein reflected no attempt by respondent to check on any trade
area prices before making claims.... We do not believe that we ought to risk
subjecting the public to future deceptive practices by giving respondent free
rein to make any such claims it wants to without first having evidence to sup-
port them. To protect the public interest here, therefore, we are requiring re-
spondent to gather its evidence before making the representations .... 94
However, the concept in New York Jewelry Co. did not develop into
the fullblown form of a principle-it was more a matter of fitting the
remedy to claims made with a flagrant disregard for the truth. But,
it was cited in Pfizer, where the principle was developed: "The con-
sumer is entitled, as a matter of marketplace fairness, to rely upon
the manufacturer to have a 'reasonable basis' for making perform-
ance claims. '95 In the context of Pfizer there was no finding of an
implied reasonable basis, because the charge was of unfairness rather
than deceptiveness. In National Dynamics, however, the missing link
was added: "[W]e find [respondents] represented to consumers that
94. New York Jewelry Co., 74 F.T.C. 1361, 1411 (1968) (emphasis in original),
aff'd, Tashof v. F.T.C., 437 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The appellate court agreed:
Where a businessman has wrought a wrong on the public, he may be held to a
reasonable business procedure that will prevent repetition of that wrong, and
in view of his past record he will not be permitted to object that his own ap-
proaches might also avoid this wrong in the future ....
Tashof, 437 F.2d at 715. "This requirement shifts to [respondent] the burden of proving
its innocence; and as the majority opinion concedes, might subject [respondent] to
heavy civil penalties even if its advertisement is true." Id. at 716 (Robb, J., dissenting).
95. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 62 (1972) (dismissed).
they had a reasonable basis for believing their claims were true."9
There was an "implied representation of substantiation . . ." and it
may be found deceptive.97
Accordingly, it appears that when the FTC charges deceptiveness
in product claims, it is also charging a deceptive implication of an
RB/S, whether or not the latter is made explicit in complaint or find-
ings. Consequently, the discussion herein combines the two types of
cases without noting the distinction.
C. Combining RB/S Cases That Do and Do Not Chiarge A Specific
Type of RB/S
When the FTC charges (or, in litigated cases, finds) that an RB/S is
represented to consumers, the nature of the presumed RB/S is some-
times left unspecified, while at other times is said to consist of certain
specific tests. Pfizer was the progenitor of the latter, its complaint
charging that "respondent represents ... directly or by implication,
that each of the statements... has been substantiated by respondent
by adequate and well-controlled scientific studies or tests prior to the
making of such statements ....." and that doing so was unfair.98 The
charges were dismissed when the Commission concluded the specific
tests were not implied.99 It agreed that a reasonable basis of some
sort had been implied, but that complaint counsel, merely by showing
the absence of the specified type of tests, had not shown that a rea-
sonable basis was absent.100
96. National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488, 549 (1973).
97. Id. at 550. See also Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 84 F.T.C. 1493, 1529 (1974)
("the making of such performance claims is an implied representation that there is a
reasonable basis therefore."). Also, National Commission on Egg Nutrition held that:
It is settled law that an advertiser in rendering an affirmative claim for a
product must have a 'reasonable basis' therefor, consisting of such evidence as
is appropriate to provide substantiation for the type of claim being made [with
citations to Pfizer, National Dynamics, and Firestone].... The justification
for such a requirement is apparent. Many consumers are likely to assume
that when a product claim is advanced which is in theory subject to objective
verification, the party making it possesses a reasonable basis for so doing....
As a result, the rendition of a claim based upon inadequate or nonexistent
substantiation violates Section 5 for failure to state a highly material fact,
whose omission is deceptive.
National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89, 191 (1976), cited in Porter & Dietsch,
Inc., 95 F.T.C. 806, 866 (1980).
Bristol-Myers argued on appeal that "the FTC is not entitled to presume that con-
sumers expect all supportable product claims to possess a reasonable basis to support
the claims." Bristol-Myers v. F.T.C., 738 F.2d 554, 562 (2d Cir. 1984). However, the
contention was not explored, because the court ruled that the Commission had made a
factual finding rather than a presumption. Id.
98. Pfizer, 81 F.T.C. at 24-25. This was not a "Cited Proof Misrepresentation" be-
cause the ads for Un-Burn had mentioned no tests in making their claims about the
product's performance qualities.
99. Id. at 58-59.
100. Id. at 66-68.
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In National Dynamics, the complaint alleged false claims that
"[e]ach of the use or performance representations... has been sub-
stantiated by respondents through competent scientific tests or by au-
thenticated, controlled and duly recorded user tests or both."O1 The
Commission concluded that, although the referenced tests did not ex-
ist, a reasonable basis for making performance claims nonetheless ex-
isted.102 Apparently, consumers could be expected to infer that an
RB/S existed but not infer the existence of specified types of tests.
Allegations of specific test types have occurred in only two other
instances.10 3 The failures in Pfizer and National Dynamics demon-
strate why alleging a specific test is rare. An implication of an RB/S
consisting of precisely specified tests or surveys is considerably more
difficult to prove than an implication that an RB/S exists. Conse-
quently, the typical practice became either one of charging that an
unspecific RB/S was misrepresented to exist, or merely that a prod-
uct claim was misrepresented, which in turn implied that an RB/S
was misrepresented to exist. For these reasons, this discussion com-
bines the two types of cases.
D. Distinguishing RB/S Cases By the Role Given To Tests
and/or Surveys
As just discussed, various types of "RB/S Misrepresentations" are
combined in Sections VI-VIII. A process or a means to distinguish
these misrepresentations will now be discussed. When an RB/S of
unspecified type is held implied to consumers, the FTC must deter-
mine what kind of RB/S will match consumers' expectations. Thus,
where tests or surveys are implied, there have developed three gen-
eral types of matching RB/S expectations. Three types exist because
in the pioneer Pfizer case the role of tests or surveys was determined
to be variable. After the Commission concluded that "Pfizer did not
conduct adequate and well-controlled scientific studies or tests prior
to marketing Un-Burn,"l0 4 it considered the separate question of
whether Pfizer had no reasonable basis. The Commission concluded
101. National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488, 491 (1973).
102. Id. at 552-53 (with reference to Pfizer).
103. Intermatic was charged with representing that it "has a reasonable basis in
valid scientific studies or tests .... " Intermatic, 93 F.T.C. 537, 538 (1979) (consent).
Universal Bodybuilding was charged with representing "that they have, and rely on,
competent scientific tests or studies sufficient to provide a reasonable basis .... " Uni-
versal Body Building, 96 F.T.C. 783, 787 (1980) (consent). These were not "Cited Proof
Misrepresentations," since tests were not claimed in the ads. See infra note 112.
104. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 66 (emphasis in original).
that the lack of adequate tests did not necessarily imply the absence
of a reasonable basis. In Pfizer, tests were held unnecessary to the
formation of a reasonable basis,l0 5 although tests might be required
under other circumstances.106
The issue arose again in National Dynamics, where the complaint
alleged there were no "competent scientific or valid user tests,"10 7
and the facts did not show otherwise.108 Tests were done, however,
by independent laboratories which submitted reports to the respon-
dent. The Commission concluded that the reports constituted a rea-
sonable basis because "the record [did] not disclose respondents
possessed the capacity or the scientific expertise in-house to under-
take such technical evaluations. As laymen in the field of scientific
evaluation, respondents . . . relied upon conclusions in the test re-
ports as scientific statements based upon competent scientific tests
"109
The immediate impact in these cases was to excuse the advertis-
ers.110 The long-term impact, however, suggests that the extent to
which tests and/or surveys are required as necessary components of
an acceptable RB/S may vary.
Accordingly, the next three sections cover the existing variations,
arranged by the extent to which tests or surveys are demanded. Each
section proffers reasons for the use of the particular variations. The
recent FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantia-
tion"' offers additional explanation. It notes that any objective ad-
vertising claim carries an explicit or implied representation of a
reasonable basis, although not necessarily of a particular type. For
those that state or imply a certain level of substantiation or specific
type of support, the advertiser must provide backing for what is rep-
resented. For advertisements making no such representation, the
Commission will decide what constitutes a reasonable basis. Various
factors will be considered, including the type of substantiation that
experts believe consumers would expect. Finally, the Commission
urges that expert evidence be obtained.
The significance of the order of the provisions in Sections VI-VIII
105. Id. at 68.
106. Id. at 64.
107. National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488, 552 (1973).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 556.
110. Pfizer was dismissed because complaint counsel, by not having argued the lack
of reasonableness of such things as the tests Pfizer did conduct, or of the existing med-
ical literature or clinical experience, was found not to have met its burden of proving
that a reasonable basis was lacking. In National Dynamics the Commission concluded
a reasonable basis was not lacking.
111. 48 Fed. Reg. 10471 (1983). 47 A.T.T.R. 234 (1984), appended to Thompson Med-
ical Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648, 839 (1984).
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is their respective representations of relatively high, medium, and
low burdens of compliance for advertisers in the level of scientific ef-
fort, and consequent time and expense, required. Indeed, there may
be situations in which a higher level would mean the impossibility of
obtaining an RB/S, regardless of the resources expended, while a
lower level would create no such impediment.
VI. RB/S MUST BE, OR MUST INCLUDE, A TEST OR SURVEY
This section discusses order provisions which specify a test or sur-
vey as an absolute requirement for the RB/S. Only the "unless" por-
tions of these provisions are examined. Prior to this language, the
provisions typically order the advertisers to cease and desist from
making various representations. The "unless" portions then specify
that the advertisers may make the representations, should they ac-
quire the specified test or survey which was previously absent.
A large number of provisions specify a test requirement without
designating an exact type of test.112 The following sampling illus-
112. Sunbeam Corp., No. C-3181, F.T.C. slip op. (1986); Rush-Hampton, No. 9167,
F.T.C. slip op. (1985); Associated Mills, 106 F.T.C. 5, 23 (1985); Campbell-Ewald, 104
F.T.C. 511, 515 (1984) (agency for General Motors); General Motors Corp., 104 F.T.C.
511, 512 (1984); Monte Proulx, 102 F.T.C. 1722, 1726 (1983) (three provisions); Emer-
gency Devices, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 1713, 1718 (1983) (three provisions); National Ass'n of
Scuba Diving Schools, 100 F.T.C. 439, 446 (1982) (two provisions); Renuzit Home Prods.
Co., 99 F.T.C. 291, 294 (1982); Boekamp, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 291, 315 (1981); Energy Efficient
Sys., Inc., 97 F.T.C. 265, 286 (1981); Universal Bodybuilding, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 783, 791-92
(1980) (three provisions); Porter & Dietsch, Inc., 90 F.T.C. 770, 885 (1977), modified,
Porter & Dietsch v. F.T.C., 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950
(1980), modifTed order, 95 F.T.C. 806 (1980); Kettle Moraine Elec., Inc., 95 F.T.C. 398,
401 (1980); Montgomery Ward & Co., 95 F.T.C. 265, 273 (1980); C.I. Energy Dev., Inc.,
94 F.T.C. 1337, 1359 (1979); RR Int'l, 94 F.T.C. 1312, 1334 (1979); Intermatic, Inc., 93
F.T.C. 537, 541 (1979); Norris Indus., Inc., 92 F.T.C. 989, 1015 (1978); Vital-E, 92 F.T.C.
880, 896 (1978); Johnson Prods. Co., Inc., 91 F.T.C. 506, 507 (1978) (two provisions); Al-
bano Enters. Inc., 89 F.T.C. 523, 527 (1977); Revlon Inc., 89 F.T.C. 1, 10, 11, 13 (1977)
(five provisions); Relco Inc., 88 F.T.C. 396, 400 (1976) (two provisions); Crown Cent. Pe-
troleum Corp., 88 F.T.C. 210, 211 (1976); Perma-Strate Co., 87 F.T.C. 155, 161 (1976);
Lustrasilk Corp. of America, 87 F.T.C. 145, 150, 151-52 (1976) (six provisions); Parker
Advertising, Inc., 87 F.T.C. 68, 73 (1976) (agency for Bridgestone Tire); Bridgestone
Tire Co. of America, 86 F.T.C. 825, 830 (1975); C.E.B. Prods., Inc., 85 F.T.C. 565, 575
(1975); Hugh Mooney t/a Organic Masque Co., 85 F.T.C. 507, 511 (1975); Standard Oil
Co. of Cal., 84 F.T.C. 1401, 1490-91 (1974) (for each of two respondents) (Standard's
agency BBD&O also a named party); Ronnie Ray's National Health Studios, 84 F.T.C.
1238, 1242 (1974); K Mart Enter. Inc., 84 F.T.C. 574, 577 (1974); Gloria Stevens, Inc., 84
F.T.C. 438, 445 (1974); Peel-O-Matique, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1483, 1488 (1974) (two provi-
sions); Mota-Nu, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1467, 1470 (1974); Royal Indus., Inc., 83 F.T.C. 507, 512
(1973) (two provisions); Lear Siegler, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 503, 506 (1973); Boise Tire Co., 83
F.T.C. 21, 25 (1973); Nu Dimensions Int'l, Ltd., 81 F.T.C. 793, 804 (1972) (two provi-
sions); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 475 (1972); PPG Indus., 80 F.T.C. 53,
trates the many variations in wording. Some of these variations may
create significant differences in substantive meaning, while others
may not; the cases provide no guidance:
unless each such quality, characteristic, capacity, result, manner of perform-
ance, or effectiveness has been fully substantiated by competent and reliable
scientific testing.11 3
unless and only to the extent that each and every such representation is true
and has been fully and completely substantiated by competent scientific
tests.
1 1 4
unless at the time such representation is made, respondents have in their pos-
session, and rely on, competent, reliable and well-controlled scientific tests
which provide a reasonable basis to believe that the representations are
truthful.1 1 5
unless at the time such representation is made it is fully and completely sub-
stantiated by competent scientific or medical tests or studies, with the results
... available in written form for inspection by the Federal Trade Commission
for at least three years following the final use of the representation .... 116
unless at the time such representation is first disseminated... respondent has
a reasonable basis for such representation, which shall consist of a competent
scientific test or tests that substantiate such representation; and ... respon-
dent's agents, employees or representatives who are responsible for engineer-
ing approval of any advertisement containing such representation rely on such
test or tests in approving such advertisement and provide ... a written state-
ment that such reasonable basis exists which substantiates the
representation. 1 1 7
An alternative type of order provision has the same "unless" quali-
fication, but requires a precisely specified type of test. For example,
advertisers of automobile fuel-saving attachments need "dynamome-
ter testing of such device according to ... test cycles established by
the Environmental Protection Agency."1 18 Similarly, tests prescribed
by the Department of Energy are required for an electric space
heater;1 1 9 engine sequence tests from SAE Technical Report are nec-
essary for motor oil;120 tests by an accredited lab must be conducted
for storm windows;1 21 stopping, cornering, puncture, and high speed
57 (1972). All consent except Firestone, Standard Oil of California, Crown Central,
and Porter and Dietsch.
113. Hugh Mooney, 85 F.T.C. at 511.
114. Crown Cent., 88 F.T.C. at 211.
115. Kettle Moraine Elec., 95 F.T.C. at 401.
116. Porter & Dietsch, 90 F.T.C. at 885.
117. General Motors, 104 F.T.C. at 512-13.
118. John Treadwell, 106 F.T.C. 163, 170 (1985); Cliffdale Ass'n, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110,
199 (1984); California-Texas Oil Co., 104 F.T.C. 268, 277 (1983) (two provisions); Ball-
Matic Corp., Inc., 98 F.T.C. 836, 852 (1981); Great N. Am. Indus., Inc., 98 F.T.C. 817, 830
(1981); Mid-City Chevrolet, Inc., 95 F.T.C. 371, 376 (1980); C.I. Energy Dev., Inc., 94
F.T.C. 1337, 1358 (1979); RR Int'l, 94 F.T.C. 1312, 1333 (1979); Leroy Gordon Cooper, 94
F.T.C. 674, 695 (1979); American Consumer, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 648, 660 (1979); All consent
except Cliffdale.
119. Energy Efficient Sys., Inc., 97 F.T.C. 265, 286 (1981); Boekamp, Inc., 97 F.T.C.
291, 315 (1981) (both consent).
120. Renuzit Home Prods. Co., 99 F.T.C. 291, 294 (1982) (consent).
121. Heatcool, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 24, 32 (1983) (consent).
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performance tests are required for automobile tires; 2 2 a competent
and reliable clinical test is mandatory for an oral irrigating device; 123
two well-controlled clinical studies must be undertaken for acne
preparations,12 4 electric shavers,12 5 and a topical analgesic;1 26 and one
well-controlled clinical study is compulsory for preparations relating
to baldness, cellulite, anti-aging or sexual performance. 2 7
A few provisions specify test requirements in formats other than
the "unless" type.128 In all provisions discussed in this article, the
FTC appears to recognize no differences between "test" and alternate
terms such as "study" or "investigation."
When surveys are required for the RB/S, the "unless" format is
typically used. For example, Perma-Strate was told to cease claims
that beauticians used, approved, recommended, or endorsed its hair
straightener "unless at the time the representation is made respon-
dents have a reasonable basis, consisting of competent and reliable
survey data, to support such representation."'
2 9
A number of survey cases involved false claims of past retail prices,
122. Bridgestone Tire Co. of Am., 86 F.T.C. 825, 830 (1975); Parker Advertising,
Inc., 87 F.T.C. 68, 73 (1976) (agency for Bridgestone Tire).
123. Teledyne, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 320, 330 (1981); J. Walter Thompson Co., 97 F.T.C.
333, 336 (1981) (agency for Teledyne) (both consent)
124. Cooga Mooga Inc., 92 F.T.C. 310, 320 (1978); Karr Preventative Medical Prods.,
Inc., 94 F.T.C. 1080, 1091 (1979); Nat'l Media Group, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 1096, 1107 (1979);
San-Mar Laboratories, Inc., 95 F.T.C. 236, 242-43 (1980); Harvey Glass, M.D., 95 F.T.C.
246, 252 (1980); Hayoun Cosmetique, Inc., 95 F.T.C. 794, 800 (1980) (all consent).
125. Sperry Corp., 98 F.T.C. 4, 9 (1981); DKG Advertising, 98 F.T.C. 15, 23 (1981)
(agency for Sperry); North Am. Philips, 101 F.T.C. 359, 364 (1983); McCaffrey & Mc-
Call, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 367, 369 (1983) (agency for Philips) (all consent).
126. Thompson Medical Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648, 844 (1984) aff'd, Thompson Medi-
cal v. F.T.C., 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See additional provision, infra text accom-
panying note 182. The court agreed with Thompson that "[I]t does not appear that the
FTC has ever before required clinical testing to support a nonestablishment claim."
Thompson, 791 F.2d at 195. But qf, consent cases supra notes 123, 124, 125, and infra
note 127. The requirement was called valid nevertheless. Thompson, 791 F.2d at 193-
96.
127. U.S. v. Braswell, No. C81-558A, slip op. (N.D. Ga., Sept. 14, 1983) (final judge-
ment and reasons for settlement) (F.T.C. consent settlement arranged by court after
filing by Justice Dept. on F.T.C.'s behalf).
128. Aluminum Co. of Am., 93 F.T.C. 743, 747 (1979); Hair Extension of Beverly
Hills, Inc., 95 F.T.C. 361, 367-68 (1980); Terrance D. Lesko, M.D., 96 F.T.C. 73, 79 (1980);
Jordan-Simner, Inc., 95 F.T.C. 871, 879 (1980); American Home Prods. Corp., 95 F.T.C.
884, 894 (1980); Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 95 F.T.C. 899, 909 (1980); Benton &
Bowles, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 167, 174-76 (1981) (three provisions) (agency for Shaller Rubin);
Shaller Rubin Assoc., Inc., 97 F.T.C. 178, 186-88 (1981) (three provisions); Sorga, Inc.,
97 F.T.C. 205, 215 (1981) (agency for American Home Products) (all consent).
129. Perma-Strate Co., 87 F.T.C. 155, 160 (1976) (consent) (Perma's agency, Merrill
Kremer also a named party).
touted as comparative prices against which the lower current prices
would seem a great value. In the first of these, the advertiser was
required to cease such claims "unless respondent shall have con-
ducted, within twelve months before making any such representa-
tion, a statistically significant survey of principal retail
establishments in the same trade area, which survey establishes that
S.. [such price representations are true]."30 Later, a series of provi-
sions addressed to similar problems required a "market survey" to es-
tablish the validity of price comparisons.1 3i
Other cases involved false claims of demand for various kinds of
workers, or for graduates of trade or technical schools, or for earn-
ings such graduates may expect. The provisions called for "statisti-
cally valid surveys," with the following typical wording: "unless the
respondents in each and every instance... until the passage of a base
period . . . have in good faith conducted a statistically valid survey
which establishes the validity of any such representation at all times
when the representation is made."' 3 2
Finally, some orders offered a choice of tests or surveys. For in-
stance, General Electric was ordered to cease representations about
various household products "[u]nless ... respondent has a reasonable
130. New York Jewelry Co., 74 F.T.C. 1361, 1427 (1968), enforced, Tashof v. F.T.C.,
437 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
131. Dowd's, Inc., 77 F.T.C. 270, 276 (1970); Gurley Indus., 77 F.T.C. 477, 483 (1970);
Voedisch Bros., Inc., 77 F.T.C. 485, 489 (1970); Standard Reference Library, Inc., 77
F.T.C. 969, 977 (1970); Zale Corp., 77 F.T.C. 1098, 1108 (1970); American Tire Co., 77
F.T.C. 1169, 1176 (1970); Carpet Specialists, 77 F.T.C. 1256, 1263 (1970); Sidlis Sales
Corp., 78 F.T.C. 46, 52 (1971); Carpet Interiors, 81 F.T.C. 313, 324 (1972); Sewing Dis-
tributors, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 380, 386 (1973); Discount Carpets, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 1316, 1324
(1973); Rubins Discount Carpet Center of Va., Inc., 82 F.T.C. 1328, 1337 (1973); Freight
Liquidators, 83 F.T.C. 444, 454 (1973); Classic Carpet Center, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 467, 474
(1973); Carpet Bazaar, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1434, 1439 (1974); Atlantic Constr. & Supply Co.,
83 F.T.C. 1440, 1446 (1974); Metro Passbook, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1508, 1512 (1974); Buy-Rite
Sales Corp., 84 F.T.C. 310, 318 (1974); Oden Distrib. Co., 84 F.T.C. 1125, 1132 (1974);
Diener's, Inc., 84 F.T.C. 1306, 1308 (1974); Fashion Floors, Inc., 85 F.T.C. 820, 827 (1975);
Mark Enterprises, Inc., 85 F.T.C. 1068, 1075 (1975); Carpets "R" Us, Inc., 87 F.T.C. 303,
340 (1976); Melvin S. Landow, 89 F.T.C. 438, 448 (1977); Grolier, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 315,
(1978) (litigated), modified order, 98 F.T.C. 882 (1981), reissued order, 99 F.T.C. 379
(1982); Hiken Furniture Co., 91 F.T.C. 1115, 1128 (1978). All consent except Fashion
Floors, Mark Enterprises, Carpets "R" Us, and Grolier. The Grolier provision was re-
cently eliminated: modified order, 104 F.T.C. 639 (1984).
132. Fuqua Indus., 85 F.T.C. 93, 111 (1975); see also World Wide Sys., Inc., 86 F.T.C.
182, 191 (1975); Lear Siegler, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 860, 868 (1975); Diesel Truck Drivers Train-
ing School, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1062, 1069 (1975); Nationwide Training Ser., Inc., 87 F.T.C.
646, 655 (1976); Lafayette United Corp., 88 F.T.C. 683, 699-700 (1976) (all consent).
In two other cases the wording was only slightly different. M.T.I. Business Schools
of Sacramento, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1451, 1457 (1974) (two provisions); Ryder System, Inc., 90
F.T.C. 921, 931 (1977) (both consent). The most recent case required that data on job
demand "shall be collected at least once every two years by a statistically valid survey
of all LaSalle graduates who graduated within a period which is not less than twelve
months, and which begins not more than three years before the questioning of gradu-
ates in each survey." Macmillan Inc., 96 F.T.C. 208, 328 (1980) (litigated).
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basis for such representation which ... shall consist of competent
and reliable studies, surveys, or scientific or engineering tests."33 In
that case, the respondent had made claims of dependability and low
numbers of service calls on the basis of surveys, but the FTC appar-
ently felt such claims in the future might be made on the basis of
tests as well.134
What does the case record say about when and why the RB/S
should require a test or survey? First, in several cases, "Cited Proof
Misrepresentations" were charged or found to exist, but the order
provisions were written in the RB/S format.1 35 In two other cases,
"Cited Proof Misrepresentations" were found, and provisions were
written in both formats.' 36 It is natural in such cases that the re-
quired substantiation be the same as represented in the advertising.
133. General Elec. Co., 89 F.T.C. 209, 218 (1977) (consent). The exception was of-
fered that:
for a reasonable period following the introduction of a new feature or a new
model of such product, respondent may make representations... on the basis
of literature or generally recognized scientific or engineering principles, but
only if respondent immediately undertakes competent and reliable studies,
surveys or scientific or engineering tests relating to such representations. If
the results of such studies, surveys or tests do not provide a reasonable basis
for such representations with respect to the new feature or new model, re-
spondent shall forthwith cease and desist from making such representations.
Id.
134. Other "test or survey" provisions were in Trailer Coach Assn., 84 F.T.C. 13,
718 (1974); Recreational Vehicle Inst., Inc., 84 F.T.C. 720, 727 (1974); Commercial Auto-
motive Serv., Inc., 84 F.T.C. 637, 641 (1974); McCollum Ford Sales, Inc., 84 F.T.C. 643,
647 (1974) Camp Chevrolet, 84 F.T.C. 648, 652 (1974) (all consent). The provisions for
the latter three continued:
and 2. have made available to the general public, at the point of retail sale,
copies of a brief but comprehensive statement of the results and methodology
of such tests or surveys, in terms understandable to the average consumer....
In immediate conjunction with the representation, respondents clearly and
conspicuously disclose... where and how the test or survey results and meth-
odology may be obtained.
Commercial Automotive, 84 F.T.C. at 642; McCollum, 84 F.T.C. at 647; Camp Chevrolet,
84 F.T.C. at 652.
Two of the five respondents mentioned tests in their advertising; none mentioned
surveys. No explanation is available as to why the provisions mentioned both. The
mileage and energy claims would appear to require tests.
135. Cliffdale Ass'n, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984); Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C.
648 (1984); Great N. Am. Indus., Inc., 98 F.T.C. 817 (1981); Ball-Matic Corp., 98 F.T.C.
836 (1981); Porter & Dietsch, Inc., 95 F.T.C. 806 (1980); American Consumer, Inc., 94
F.T.C. 648 (1979); Leroy Gordon Cooper, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 674 (1979); RR Int'l, Inc., 94
F.T.C. 1312 (1979); C.I. Energy Dev., Inc., 94 F.T.C. 1337 (1979); Hugh Mooney t/a Or-
ganic Masque Co., 85 F.T.C. 507 (1975); Mota-Nu, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1467 (1974); Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398 (1972); PPG Indus., Inc., 80 F.T.C. 53 (1972).
136. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 84 F.T.C. 1401, 1490-91 (1974) (Standard's agency BBD
& 0 also a named party); Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 84 F.T.C. 1493, 1551 (1974).
Other cases, however, were pure RB/S cases; in other words, tests
or surveys were not advertised but were held necessary to supply the
RB/S that was implied to exist. The opinion in the earliest, Tashof,
had no comment on why the RB/S must be a survey; the need was
simply taken for granted, perhaps as implicit in the nature of the
claim.'3 7 In Pfizer, complaint counsel said tests were implied, but the
Commission interpreted the issue as unfairness rather than decep-
tiveness. It did, however, discuss adequacy or inadequacy of evidence
that fell short of the strongest type, the test. It ruled Pfizer had
failed to show that lesser evidence, such as medical literature or
clinical experience, would amount to a reasonable basis. Complaint
counsel, on the other hand, had failed to show they could not amount
to a reasonable basis.138
In Crown Central,3 9 complaint counsel appealed from the initial
decision's requirement of substantiation "by adequate scientific or
technical data."140 The Commission found:
Other factual evidence, such as research on relevant automotive engineering
principles or automotive performance characteristics, may be added to evi-
dence of tests on the advertised product to complete the substantiation pic-
ture, but the performance claims ... could not be reasonably made without
competent test data.
Furthermore, the designation of the advertised product as Formula CA-101
and the obviously technical nature of air pollution-related performance claims
for a gasoline or gasoline additive contribute to the clear suggestion that the
product has properties and characteristics which could not be fully verified
other than through adequate testing.1 4 1
Much discussion in Porter & Dietsch was on RB/S requirements:
"[R]espondents conceded that they had no tests, studies, scientific re-
ports, or other similar information to support their implied claim
that they had a reasonable basis for their weight-loss representations
.... 142 Emphasis, therefore, was given to the types of substantiation
respondent offered. They consisted of various documentations of the
characteristics of the drug, none of which were found relevant to sub-
stantiating the advertised claims.143
137. The appellate court observed that respondent had offered nothing "to support
its assertion that the statistical requirement is unduly burdensome. The requirement
does not appear onerous on its face." Tashof v. F.T.C., 437 F.2d 707, 715 (D.C. Cir.
1970). See discussion supra note 94.
138. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 66-72 (1972) (dismissed).
139. Crown Cent., 84 F.T.C. at 1547.
140. Id. at 1531.
141. Id. at 1548-49 (emphasis in original). Another principle offered was that:
When a test is cited for one performance claim or part of a performance claim,
and no indication is given that equally technical representations in the same
ad have no substantiation, or perhaps less adequate substantiation, the impli-
cation is clearly present that substantiation exists for all performance claims.
Id.
142. Porter & Dietsch, Inc., 90 F.T.C. 770, 868 (1977).
143. Id. at 868-72. Respondent also asked the court to find that the F.T.C. had
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The generalization arising from these cases is that when advertis-
ing implies existence of an RB/S, and an RB/S could not be less than
a test or survey, then the RB/S must be a test or survey. As to provi-
sions requiring the RB/S to consist of a specific type of test or survey,
some explanation is derivable from C7ffdale. A key finding in
C7iffdale was that respondents relied unreasonably on certain "con-
sumer type tests and reports which should not form the basis for fuel
economy claims ... ,"144 Apparently, the test requirement was pre-
cisely specified to preclude a similar error later in interpreting the
RB/S requirement of competent and reliable tests.
The rationale for specific types of tests was further developed in
the analgesics cases:145 "It is well settled that well-controlled clinical
trials are required to establish analgesic efficacy of a drug."'146 Evi-
dence such as long-term use of a drug on the market or reports of
clinical experience is not an acceptable substitute.147 In response to
Thompson's protest about the high quality of its expert testimony,
the Commission said such testimony could be no substitute for con-
trolled clinical testing.148 The initial decision discussed and rejected
various types of evidence respondent offered as substitutes for
clinical tests: patents, clinical observations and opinions of physicians,
user testimonials, drug compendia and general scientific literature,
information on a drug's pharmacology and mechanism of action, and
data on the product's marketing experience.149
The Thompson opinion discussed six factors it was using, cited in
an appended FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substanti-
ation,150 to determine the degree of substantiation to require.151 The
first factor concerned the type of product. Because past cases in-
volved products that posed health or safety issues and thus required a
high level of substantiation, namely scientific tests, it was noteworthy
that the present case also involved these issues. The second factor
wrongly found "scientific testing" to be the only possible reasonable basis. The court
retorted that the F.T.C. had not found that, but rather had found that respondent had
represented that the basis was scientific testing. Porter & Dietsch v. F.T.C., 605 F.2d
294, 302 (7th Cir. 1979).
144. Cliffdale Ass'n, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 153 (1984).
145. Supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
146. Thompson Medical Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648, 719, 822 (1984) (citations omitted).
147. Id. at 720.
148. Id. at 828.
149. Id. at 750-63.
150. 48 Fed. Reg. 10471 (1983). 47 A.T.T.R. 234 (1984), appended to Thompson Med-
ical Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648, 839 (1984).
151. Thompson, 104 F.T.C. at 821-26.
concerned the type of claim. A claim whose truth or falsity would be
difficult for consumers to evaluate, as in this instance, would call for
the high level of substantiation that scientific tests represent. The
FDA's panels on analgesics, the initial decision said, noted that pain
is subjective and efficacy cannot be shown simply by producing posi-
tive studies that do not meet the standards of science.152 The third
and fourth factors were the benefit of a truthful claim which, in this
case, would be substantial for both consumers and the respondent,
and the ease, meaning cost, of developing substantiation, which
would be low relative to the potential volume of the market. The ra-
tio of benefit to cost thus being high, the conclusion was that a high
level of substantiation would not deter product development. The
fifth factor involved the consequences of a false claim. Although the
Commission agreed with the ALJ that the economic consequences
were substantial, it disagreed that the health consequences would be.
The sixth factor was the level of substantiation experts find reason-
able, which was determined to be scientific tests.
The opinion also said the test requirement paralleled the FDA
standard.153 Thompson Medical had argued that in the case of a mild
and harmless topical analgesic, the requirement of scientific tests
should be relaxed or dispensed with. This position, however, was
contrary to the prevailing and accepted view of the medical and sci-
entific community and thus was rejected by the FDA.154 Further,
the FDA had refused to find the drug effective.155 If the FTC were
to hold that, for advertising purposes, efficacy claims were supported
by adequate medical/scientific substantiation, based on essentially the
same evidence considered by the FDA, this would be tantamount to
establishing a lower standard of efficacy for OTC drug advertising
than that applicable to OTC drug marketing.15 6
In summary, the required RB/S will include a test or survey when:
(1) the advertisement refers to such test or survey, or (2) the re-
quired RB/S cannot consist of any lesser standard. If the RB/S must
be a certain type of test or survey, then that type will be precisely
specified. Where these two situations do not apply, the specified RB/
S may consist of a lesser standard of evidence (see Sections VII-VIII).
VII. RB/S MUST CONSIST OF A TEST OR SURVEY OR ELSE AN
ALTERNATIVE TYPE OF EVIDENCE
These order provisions specify a test or survey as one type of evi-
152. Id. at 720.
153. Id. at 826.
154. Id. at 720.
155. Id. at 769-70.
156. Id. at 772.
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dence that can constitute the RB/S. They also specify alternative
types. A large number of provisions specify the alternatives to tests
only vaguely. 5 7 The following sampling illustrates the many varia-
tions in wording. Some variations may differ significantly in meaning
while some may not; the cases provide no discussion on the point:
Provided, however, that the use of such terms shall not be: prohibited if...
statements concerning such terms are substantiated by competent scientific
tests or other objective material which provide a reasonable basis for the rep-
resentations made, and the substantiation materials are either (i) available for
public inspection, or (ii) otherwise available to the Federal Trade Commission
to determine compliance with this order.
15 8
[u]nless such statements or representations are true and unless, at the time
the statements or representations are made, Sears, Roebuck and Co. possesses
and relies on a reasonable basis for such statements or representations, which
shall consist of competent and reliable tests, or other competent and reliable
evidence which substantiates such statements or representations. 1 59
[u]nless respondent possesses a reasonable basis for making that claim. A rea-
157. Saga International, No. C-3196, F.T.C. slip op. (1986) (two provisions); National
Energy Associates, No. C-3179, F.T.C. slip op., at 10 (1986); Blue Lustre, No. C-3195,
F.T.C. slip op., at 3 (1986); Sunbeam, No. C-3181, F.T.C. slip op., at 3 (1986) (two provi-
sions); North Am. Philips, No. C-3180, F.T.C. slip op., at 5 (1985) (two provisions);
Barry Bricklin, 106 F.T.C. 115, 161 (1985); Chesebrough-Ponds, 106 F.T.C. 567, 573
(1985); Weider, 106 F.T.C. 584, 598 (1985); Larry Brog, 106 F.T.C. 576, 582 (1985); Wein
Products, 106 F.T.C. 51, 62 (1985); (two provisions); Associated Mills, 106 F.T.C. 5, 23
(1985); Young & Rubicam/Zemp, 105 F.T.C. 317, 339 (1985) (agency for Rush-Hamp-
ton); Rush-Hampton, No. 9167, F.T.C. slip op., at 5 (1985); P. Leiner Nutritional Prod-
ucts, 105 F.T.C. 291, 304 (1985); Sentronic, 105 F.T.C. 197, 225-26 (1985) (two
provisions); Thomas A. Dardas, 104 F.T.C. 562, 573 (1984); Cynex Manuf. Corp., 104
F.T.C. 464, 475 (1984); Adria Laboratories, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 512, 526 (1984); Pharmtech
Research, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 448, 459 (1984); Spinal Health Services Inc., 102 F.T.C. 1319,
1323 (1983); Foote, Cone & Belding Adv., Inc., 102 F.T.C. 1274, 1283 (1983) (agency for
Amana); Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 1262, 1266 (1983); Sterling Drug, Inc.,
102 F.T.C. 395, 804 (1983); Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 392 (1983); Stihl Inc., 101
F.T.C. 840, 851 (1983) (Stihl's agency, Stuart Food also a named party); Meredith Corp.,
101 F.T.C. 390, 405 (1983); Plaskolite Inc., 101 F.T.C. 344, 349 (1983); Champion Home
Builders Co., 101 F.T.C. 316, 324 (1983) (two provisions); Teledyne, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 320,
330 (1981); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C. 406, 525-26 (1980); Clorox Co., 94 F.T.C. 1, 4
(1979); Block Drug Co., Inc., 92 F.T.C. 852, 853 (1978) (two provisions addressed to
Block's agency, Grey Advertising, also a named party); Astor-Scott Inc., 89 F.T.C. 536,
542-43 (1977) (two provisions); Robertson Prods., 87 F.T.C. 255, 264 (1976); Soft Sheen
Co. Inc., 87 F.T.C. 164, 170 (1976) (two provisions); Perma-Strate Co., 87 F.T.C. 155, 161
(1976) (Perma's agency, Merrill Kremer, also a named party); STP Corp., 87 F.T.C. 56,
66 (1976); (STP's agency, Stern, Walters & Simmons also a named party); Hercules
Inc., 84 F.T.C. 605 (1974), modified, 86 F.T.C. 1236, 1238 (1975); Yamaha Int'l Corp., 86
F.T.C. 973, 979-80 (1975) (two provisions); Union Carbide Corp., 84 F.T.C. 591, 597-602
(1974) (four provisions); K Mart Enters., Inc., 84 F.T.C. 574, 577 (1974); Pay Less Drug
Stores Northwest, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 1473, 1479 (1973); E.J. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 81
F.T.C. 169, 173 (1972); Proctor & Gamble Co., 80 F.T.C. 181, 186 (1972) (two provisions).
All consent except Sears, Roebuck, Bristol-Myers, and Sterling Drug. See also modifi-
cation in American Home Products, discussed supra note 56.
158. Hercules, Inc., 86 F.T.C. at 1238.
159. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 95 F.T.C. at 525-26.
sonable basis for such a claim shall consist of competent and reliable scientific
evidence supporting that claim. Well-controlled clinical tests conducted in ac-
cordance with the criteria set forth... shall be deemed to constitute a reason-
able basis for a claim. 1
6 0
unless at the time of making such representation respondent possesses and re-
lies upon a reasonable basis for such representation. A reasonable basis shall
consist of competent and reliable evidence which substantiates such represen-
tation. To the extent the evidence of a reasonable basis consists of scientific
or professional tests, experiments, analyses, research, studies or other evi-
dence based on the expertise of professionals in the relevant area, such evi-
dence shall be 'competent and reliable' only if those tests [etc.] are conducted
in an objective manner by persons qualified to do so, using procedures gener-
ally accepted in the profession or science to yield accurate and reliable
results.1 6 1
Other provisions are more specific, such as describing the alterna-
tives to tests as consisting of expert opinion.162 Elsewhere the alter-
natives were standards promulgated by designated organizations,
such as the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute,16 3 or, for
over-the-counter drugs, the Food & Drug Administration.164
Where surveys were required, the alternatives were vague. Claims
about the earning successes of a school's graduates were prohibited
unless "such substantiation include[d] a statistically valid survey or
other appropriate substantiating material which establishes the rea-
sonable basis for each such statement or representation."'165
Litton was ordered to cease claims about microwave ovens: "unless
and only to the extent that respondents possess and rely upon a rea-
sonable basis for such representation at the time of its initial and
each subsequent dissemination. Such reasonable basis shall consist of
competent and reliable surveys and/or other competent and reliable
160. Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. at 392.
161. Sunbeam, No. C-3180, slip. op. at 5 (1986).
162. Ford Motor Co., 84 F.T.C. 729, 735 (1974) (consent), off'd, Ford and Thompson
v. F.T.C., 547 F.2d 954, 961 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 915 (1977); J. Walter
Thompson Co., 84 F.T.C. 736, 742 (1974) (consent), aff'd, Thompson v. F.T.C., 547 F.2d
954 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 915 (1977) (agency for Ford); Ford Motor Co.,
87 F.T.C. 756 (1976) (partial order and remand), 93 F.T.C. 873, 881 (1979) (consent);
Thompson, 94 F.T.C. 331, 338 (1979) (consent) (agency for Sears); Montgomery Ward &
Co., Inc., 95 F.T.C. 265, 274 (1980); U.S. v. Braswell, No. C81-558A, slip. op. (N.D. Ga.,
Sept. 14, 1983).
163. City Investing Co., 83 F.T.C. 1078, 1082-83 (1973) (consent) (two provisions);
Whirlpool Corp. & Doyle Dane Bernbach, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1830, 1835, 1837 (1974)
(consent).
164. Biopractic Group Inc., 104 F.T.C. 845, 850 (1984) (consent); AHC Pharmacal,
Inc., 95 F.T.C. 528 (1980) (consent), modified, 101 F.T.C. 40, 45 (1983); Thompson Medi-
cal Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648, 844 (1984); Ogilvy & Mather Int'l Inc., 101 F.T.C. 1, 15
(1983) (consent) (agency for Thompson Medical); see also Chesebrough-Ponds, 106
F.T.C. 567, 573 (1984). The Thompson Medical provision followed that already dis-
cussed, supra text accompanying note 126; respondent had been charged with a "Cited
Proof Misrepresentation"; see supra note 47.
165. Career Academy Inc., 84 F.T.C. 453, 465 (1974) (consent).
National Systems was similar. National Systems Corp., 93 F.T.C. 58, 68-69 (1979)
(two provisions) (consent). All other provisions involving such claims required surveys
with no alternative, see supra note 132.
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evidence which substantiates the representation."' 66
What rationale exists for RB/S requirements specifying tests or
surveys only in conjunction with alternatives? Among the few liti-
gated cases 6 7 was Sears. After complaint counsel asked for a re-
quirement of "valid and scientific tests," Sears cited Pfizer for the
proposition that scientific tests would not invariably be required. 68
The initial decision responded that "[t]he product was a dishwasher,
not a food, drug, or potentially hazardous product,"169 thus neither
safety nor health were involved:
the consequences of Sears' falsity did not involve possible personal injury or
property damage. Sears, therefore, was entitled to rely upon other evidence
and information not necessarily rising to the level of 'adequate and well-con-
trolled scientific studies or tests,' so long as that evidence and information did,
in fact, provide a reasonable basis for the claim.1 7 0
The ALJ's argument was adopted by the Commission. Shortly
thereafter, Litton was granted a similar alternative on the basis that
"[a] formulation nearly identical to that recommended by complaint
counsel was recently applied by the Commission in Sears, Roebuck &
Co .... . "171 What was applicable to dishwashers and tests became
applicable to microwave ovens and surveys.
The original AHC Pharmacal provision did not allow the alterna-
tive of an FDA standard.172 Later, the FTC reopened the proceeding
on petition from AHC based on an FDA panel conclusion that the
drug was generally recognized as safe and effective. Commissioner
Pertschuk stated that the modification 73 would enable advertisers to
take FDA findings out of context to make claims they would not sup-
port.174 Commissioner Clanton disagreed because claims would still
be prohibited unless supported by "'competent and reliable scientific
or medical evidence.' "175
166. Litton Indus., Inc., 97 F.T.C. 1 (1981), modified, Litton v. F.T.C., 676 F.2d 364
(9th Cir. 1982), modified order, 100 F.T.C. 457, 458 (1982).
167. No answer was given in Ford Motor, in which the initial decision had said the
reasonable basis could only be tests. Ford Motor Co., 87 F.T.C. 756, 791 (1974). After
the remand, a second hearing never occurred because of the consent settlement that
permitted an alternative to testing. See supra note 162.
168. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C. 406, 481 (1980).
169. Id. at 482.
170. Id.
171. Litton, 97 F.T.C. at 74.
172. A.H.C. Pharmacal Inc., 95 F.T.C. 528, 534 (1980).
173. A.H.C. Pharmacal, 101 F.T.C. 40, 45 (1983).
174. Id. at 48.
175. Id. at 46. See also American Home Prods. Corp., 77 F.T.C. 726 (1970), modi-
filed, No. 8641 F.T.C. slip op. (1986).
Bristol-Myers dealt with both a "Cited Proof Misrepresentation"' 176
and an RB/S Misrepresentation. Two clinical tests were absolutely
required for the Cited Proof Misrepresentation and the same was
held sufficient, but perhaps not necessary, for the RB/S require-
ment:177 "Whether any lesser amount of evidence could also consti-
tute a reasonable basis is more difficult to determine.... [W]e cannot
rule out the possibility that other types of evidence might be ade-
quate ... ,"178 Thus, in dubious situations, Bristol could either con-
duct the two clinical tests, request an advisory opinion, or qualify its
advertising to inform consumers of the lesser substantiation.179
Bristol argued on appeal that the result was unduly vague, citing
the American Home Products appeal which stated that "any order
which essentially relies upon 'reasonable basis' language will be im-
precise .... "180 However, the court affirmed, stating that "absolute
precision is not possible in certain FTC orders, and we have upheld
reasonable basis provisions formulated in substantially identical
terms."S1
Thompson Medical involved a provision absolutely requiring tests
in addition to the provision seen here.18 2 The former applied to com-
parative efficacy or safety claims; the latter applied to noncompara-
tive efficacy or safety claims. For the latter, the FDA standard was
offered as an alternative, whether or not it called for the clinical
176. Supra note 42 and accompanying text.
177. Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 376 (1983).
178. Id. The opinion further states:
For example, in some situations the FDA will permit a drug to be marketed
without clinical testing if nonclinical tests show the drug to be as effective as
another drug whose effectiveness has already been established by clinical
tests.
Id. at 376 n. 100. The Commission further held that:
Accordingly, order Paragraph II does permit respondent to substantiate its'
claims with evidence other than two clinical tests if it can show that such evi-
dence is sufficiently reliable to support a good faith belief in the truth of the
claim. Such a showing must be based on the factors set forth in the Pfizer
line of cases.... Concededly permitting such a showing creates some ambigu-
ity regarding the absolute minimum amount of evidence necessary to provide
a reasonable basis.... But this is inherent in any reasonable basis order by
virtue of the factors set forth in Pfizer.
Id. at 376-77.
179. Id. at 377.
180. Bristol-Myers Co. v. F.T.C., 738 F.2d 554, 560 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing American
Home Products v. F.T.C., 695 F.2d 681, 710) (3d Cir. 1982)).
181. Bristol-Myers, 738 F.2d at 560. The Bristol-Myers court cited the Jay Norris
and Fedders cases as precedents. Both these cases cited infra note 187.
The same order provision was explained the same way in Sterling, where the result-
ing "flexibility" was called an appropriate balance between the need for clear stan-
dards and the need to prevent repeated violations. Sterling Drug, 102 F.T.C. at 796.
The point was affirmed by the court on appeal, Sterling Drug Inc., v. F.T.C., 741 F.2d
1146, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1984).
182. For absolute requirement, see supra note 126 and accompanying text; for alter-
native requirement, see note 164.
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tests.1 83 However, the opinion observed that there was "no reason to
think [the] FDA would dispense with the requirement of the two
well-controlled clinicals."184 Thus, for practical purposes, the provi-
sion offering an alternative was little different from the one abso-
lutely requiring tests.
In summary, tests or surveys are not necessarily required when an
RB/S is required. Alternatives are sometimes allowed when less sen-
sitive issues are involved, or when the alternatives are virtually
equivalent to tests or surveys. Although the alternatives ostensibly
create a lower standard of evidence, such standards seem only
slightly lower, and in many cases are essentially the same. The Pert-
schuk dissent,i8 5 however, argues that such provisions could serve as
loopholes to permit lower standards. These provisions are, on the av-
erage, more recent than those in the previous section.18 6
VIII. RB/S CONSISTS OF TEST-LIKE OR SURVEY-LIKE EVIDENCE
These order provisions call for the RB/S to consist of evidence that
could include tests or surveys but which at the least seems test-like
or survey-like. Descriptive terms such as "scientific," "objective," or
"competent" make the requirements seem little different from tests
or surveys. The RB/S provisions omitted from this article lack such
language that inferentially associates them with tests or surveys.
A large number of provisions fall in this category. 8 7 Given the
183. Thompson Medical Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648, 826 n.73 (1984).
184. Id.
185. A.H.C. Pharmacal, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 40, 48 (1983).
186. Compare cases supra note 157 to those supra note 112.
187. Pittsburgh Penn Oil, No. D-9203, F.T.C. slip op. (1986); Figgie, No. 9166, F.T.C.
slip op. (1986); Descent Control, 105 F.T.C. 280, 285 (1985); Charles E. Weller, 104
F.T.C. 1089, 1093 (1984); Cliffdale Assoc., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 200 (1984); Sovereign
Chem. & Petroleum Prods., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 478, 482 (1984); Estee Corp., 102 F.T.C.
1804, 1811 (1983) (two provisions); Sterling Drug, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 375, 379-80 (1983)
(three provisions) (Sterling's agency, SSC&B also a named party); McCaffrey and Mc-
Call, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 367, 369 (1983) (agency for North American Philips); North Am.
Philips Corp., 101 F.T.C. 359, 365 (1983); Bal-Matic, Inc., 98 F.T.C. 836, 853 (1981);
Great N. Am. Indus., 98 F.T.C. 817, 831 (1981); Standard Brands, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 233, 243
(1981); Ted Bates & Co., Inc., 97 F.T.C. 220, 230 (1981) (agency for Standard Brands);
Sorga, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 205, 215 (1981); Shaller Rubin Assoc., Inc., 97 F.T.C. 178, 186
(1981); Benton & Bowles, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 167, 174 (1981) (agency for Shaller Rubin);
Dancer-Fitzgerald-Sample, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 1, 15 (1980) (agency for Sterling Drug); Mor-
ton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 95 F.T.C. 899, 908 (1980); American Home Prods. Corp., 95
F.T.C. 884, 894 (1980); Jordan-Simner, Inc., 95 F.T.C. 871, 879 (1980); Gordon Cooper, 94
F.T.C. 674, 697 (1979); Admarketing, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 664, 672 (1979) (agency for Gordon
Cooper); American Consumer, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 648, 661 (1979); Jay Norris Corp., 91
F.T.C. 751 (1978), aff'd and modified, 598 F.2d 1244 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
types of products, the required evidence generally seems more test-
like than survey-like. The following sampling illustrates the many
variations in wording. Any significance of the differences is not dis-
cussed in the cases:
unless at the time of such representation respondent has a reasonable basis
for such statement or representation, which shall consist of competent scien-
tific, engineering or other similar objective material or industry-wide stan-
dards based on such material;1 8 8
unless petitioners have a reasonable basis for the representation(s) consisting
of competent and objective material, available in written form, that fully and
completely substantiates such characteristic(s); 1 8 9
unless, at the time of making the representation, respondents possess and rea-
sonably rely upon competent and reliable evidence that substantiates such
representation;1 9 0
unless, at the time the representation is made, Descent Control possesses and
relies upon a reasonable basis for the representation consisting of competent
and reliable objective evidence substantiating the representation. 19 1
Why is the RB/S defined in these ways? In Jay Norris, the initial
decision noted that complaint counsel's proposed order called for
"'competent scientific tests' or 'competent objective material.'"192
Noting respondent was a mail-order business, the AJ limited the re-
quirement to "competent objective material.1' 93 As to whether the
terms "competent," "full," and "complete" as applied to substantia-
tion, were unduly vague, the Commission said preceding cases "pro-
vide ample guidance" and that "the general meaning of the terms is
readily understood." 94
A mail-order business may merit leniency because it is a step re-
U.S. 980 (1979), modified order, 94 F.T.C. 415 (1979) (modified provision published, 598
F.2d at 1253, but not published in modified order; see explanation, 94 F.T.C. at 415)
(first provision); 94 F.T.C. at 423 (second provision); Vital-E, 92 F.T.C. 880, 897 (1978);
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 88 F.T.C. 465 (1976), modified, 97 F.T.C. 135, 136
(1981); Sonotone Corp., 88 F.T.C. 368, 373-74 (1976) (three provisions); Beltone Elecs.
Corp., 88 F.T.C. 336, 342-44 (1976) (three provisions); Dahlberg Elecs., Inc., 88 F.T.C.
319, 331, 333 (1976) (two provisions); Radioear Corp., 88 F.T.C. 308, 314-16 (1976) (three
provisions); Qualitone, Inc., 88 F.T.C. 287, 293-95 (1976) (three provisions); Nagle, Spill-
man & Bergman, Inc., 88 F.T.C. 244, 252-53 (1976) (four provisions) (agency for
Adolph's); Le Conte Cosmetics, Inc., 87 F.T.C. 1348, 1356 (1976); Allied Stores, 86
F.T.C. 1074, 1078 (1975); Fedders Corp., 85 F.T.C. 38, 69 (1975), qff'd sub nom., Fedders
Corp. v. F.T.C., 529 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976); General
Foods Corp., 84 F.T.C. 1572, 1575 (1974); Wasem's, Inc., 84 F.T.C. 209, 213 (1974); Whirl-
pool and DDB, 83 F.T.C. 1830, 1834, 1837 (1974) (two provisions for each respondent);
Biochemic Research Found. Corp. & Doyle Dane Bernbach, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1096, 1102
(1973); City Investing Co., 83 F.T.C. 1078, 1083 (1973); Volvo, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 1851, 1857
(1973); Thomas J. Lipton, 82 F.T.C. 1493, 1500 (1973) (two provisions). All consent ex-
cept Fedders, Jay Norris, and Cliffdale.
188. Fedders Corp., 85 F.T.C. at 69.
189. Jay Norris, 598 F.2d at 1253 (first provision).
190. Ciffdale, 103 F.T.C. at 200.
191. Descent Control, 105 F.T.C. 280, 285 (1985).
192. Jay Norris, 91 F.T.C. at 823.
193. Id. This was changed by the Commission to "competent and objective mate-
rial." Id. at 865 (not changed on appeal).
194. Id. at 857 (aff'd on appeal, 598 F.2d at 1250).
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moved from manufacturing. But none of the cases involving manu-
facturing explains why its RB/S has no specific reference to tests or
surveys. All of the product claims could easily be subjected to test-
ing; hearing aids are a good example.195 Of course, provisions that
define the RB/S in this most favorable way are in keeping with the
observations of Pfizer that the nature of a reasonable basis will vary
from case to case, and may include such things as expert opinion, ex-
isting literature, and the state of knowledge generally in a field.196
Another explanation is that several such provisions appear to play
a secondary role to other provisions that absolutely require tests.1 97
In CMiffdale the provisions applying to the products featured in the
advertising' 98 called for tests absolutely, while the provisio calling
only for "competent and reliable evidence" covered the advertising of
any other product.1 99 The latter thus may be interpreted as a
"throw-in" supplementary to, and consequently less significant than,
the principal provision.
In summary, the required evidence for an RB/S may sometimes be
merely test-like or survey-like. This may seem to involve "lesser"
criteria, but certainly such cited terms as "competent and reliable"
and "scientific" imply a testing standard quite often. These provi-
sions do not omit testing or surveying entirely, but they allow the ad-
vertiser maximum flexibility in finding alternatives. Technically,
they do not allow testing to be avoided where it is the only way to
achieve the RB/S. Still, there seems little question that advertisers
would find these provisions less burdensome than those mentioning
tests or surveys explicitly.
IX. SPECIFICATIONS FOR TESTS AND SURVEYS.
The previous sections have made occasional reference to the char-
acteristics required in tests and surveys. The full references are
presented in this section, covering the ways in which such require-
195. See, e.g., Sonotone Corp., 88 F.T.C. 368 (1976); Beltone Elecs. Corp., 88 F.T.C.
336 (1976); Dahlberg Elecs., Inc., 88 F.T.C. 319 (1976); Radioear Corp., 88 F.T.C. 308
(1976); and Qualitone, Inc., 88 F.T.C. 287 (1976).
196. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 100.
197. See, e.g., Cliffdale Assoc., Inc. 103 F.T.C. 110, 200 (1984); McCaffrey and Mc-
Call, Inc. 101 F.T.C. 367, 369 (1983); North Am. Philips Corp., 101 F.T.C. 359, 365
(1983); Ball-Matic Corp, Inc., 98 F.T.C. 836, 853 (1981); Great N. Am. Indus., Inc., 98
F.T.C. 817, 831 (1981); Standard Brands, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 233, 243 (1981); Ted Bates &
Co., Inc., 97 F.T.C. 220, 230 (1981).
198. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
199. Cliffdale Assoc., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 200 (1984).
ments are specified, defined, qualified, explained, or otherwise dis-
cussed. Included also are the reasons given for such specifications,
and the decisions establishing whether various tests or surveys satisfy
them.
What is acceptable must be inferred from what is forbidden. No-
where has the FTC offered a comprehensive statement of what is ac-
ceptable. However, the FTC has expressed its interest in promoting
acceptability by its statement in Litton that it worded the order to
avoid "discouraging in any way the proper use of survey-based
advertising." 200
A. Tests
The tests discussed are of two types, depending on the products in-
volved. The first involves clinical tests of drugs and medical devices,
which emphasize subjective responses of consumers. All tests ex-
amine product characteristics and performance, but assessment of a
drug lies not so much in its ingredients per se as in the consumer's
reaction to it. The second type, scientific tests of a more general
sort, involves observing the product per se apart from consumer
response.
1. Clinical Tests of Devices and Drugs, Mostly Analgesics
In Pfizer, complaint counsel called for "prior, fully documented,
adequate and well-controlled scientific studies or tests"2o1 of claims
that Un-Burn would relieve pain in sunburned skin. Although coun-
sel showed that the Food & Drug Administration had issued criteria
for such tests, 202 counsel ultimately rested its case on the "ordinary
dictionary definitions" of the words in its proposed requirement.20 3
For that reason, the exacting details found in later decisions were not
articulated.
Pfizer, however, noted a number of principles which have since
been followed.20 4 A test used as support should be an adequate and
well-controlled scientific test. It should be germane to the claim;
thus, testing for safety and antiseptic effects did not amount to sup-
port for claims of efficacy and anesthetic effects. Nor could guinea
pig tests substantiate effects on humans. A pre-existing test protocol
is usually essential, and double-blinded scientific tests are strongly
desirable. Tests conducted after making the claims are insufficient to
meet the reasonable basis requirement. And finally, a valid efficacy
200. Litton Indus., Inc., 97 F.T.C. 1, 75 (1981).
201. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 25 (1972).
202. Id. at 65-66.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 66-68.
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test for a competing product of similar composition might have pro-
vided a reasonable basis for a similar efficacy claim for Un-Burn.
The way in which these principles were developed in subsequent
cases is discussed under a variety of topics, as follows.
a. Definitions of Clinical Tests
The post-Pfizer sophistication reached its greatest development in
the litigated analgesics cases. The first, American Home Products,
called for:
[t]wo or more adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations, conducted
by independent experts qualified by training and experience to evaluate the
comparative effectiveness or comparative freedom from side effects of the
drugs involved.... The investigations shall be conducted in accordance with
the procedure set forth below:
At least one of the adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations to
evaluate the comparative effectiveness of the drug shall be conducted on any
disease or condition referred to, directly or by implication; or, if no specific
disease or condition is referred to, then the adequate and well-controlled
clinical investigations shall be conducted on at least two conditions or diseases
for which the drug is effective. The clinical investigations shall be conducted
as follows:
1. The subjects must be selected by a method that: a. Provides adequate as-
surance that they are suitable for the purposes of the investigation, and diag-
nostic criteria of the condition to be treated (if any); b. Assigns the subjects to
the test groups in such a way as to minimize bias; and c. Assures comparabil-
ity in test and control groups of pertinent variables, such as age, sex, severity
or duration of disease or condition (if any), and use of drugs other than the
test drugs.
2. The investigations must be conducted double-blind, and methods of
double-blinding must be documented. In addition, the investigations shall
contain a placebo control to permit comparison of the results of use of the test
drugs with an inactive preparation designed to resemble the test drugs as far
as possible.
3. The plan or protocol for the investigations and the report of the results
shall include the following: a. A clear statement of the objective of the investi-
gation; b. An explanation of the methods of observation and recording of re-
sults, including the variables measured, quantitation, assessment of any
subject's response and steps taken to minimize bias on the part of subject and
observer; c. A comparison of the results of treatments or diagnosis with a con-
trol in such a fashion as to permit quantitative evaluation. The precise nature
of the control must be stated and an explanation given of the methods used to
minimize bias on the part of the observers and the analysts of the data; d. A
summary of the methods of analysis and an evaluation of data derived from
the study, including any appropriate statistical methods.2 0 5
Definitions also occurred in other analgesics cases 2 06 and in cases
205. American Home Prods. Corp. v. F.T.C., 101 F.T.C. 698, 699-700 (1983).
206. The definition in Bristol-Myers is the same as for American Home Products,
with the following added:
A test or investigation which is not conducted in accordance with these proce-
involving other products.20 7
b. Number of Tests Required
Two clinical tests were required for comparative establishment ef-
ficacy claims, as in American Home Products:
The record shows that a minimum of two clinical trials conforming in design
to the . . . criteria and reaching the same conclusions and statistical signifi-
cance is required to establish comparative drug efficacy.... The two-test mini-
mum further reduces the chance that an observed therapeutic value is
attributable to factors other than the pharmacologic activity of the tested
drug. Even in the most meticulously planned study, unknown factors that the
investigator simply could not have recognized could be operative .... 208
The ALJ stated that while there may be "a number of respected
clinical pharmacologists who will be satisfied by a single well-con-
trolled clinical demonstration," he felt this fact alone was insufficient
dures may be used to establish a claim only if respondent can show that,
notwithstanding the failure to satisfy these procedures, the test or investiga-
tion would still be generally accepted by the relevant scientific community as
sufficient to establish the truth of the claim.
Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 391 (1983). This addition was added later to American
Home Prods., 103 F.T.C. at 530.
The definition in Sterling Drug is the same as in Bristol-Myers, absent the phrases
"comparative freedom from side effects" and "freedom from side effects." Sterling
Drug, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 395, 803 (1983).
The definition used in Thompson Medical provides for "at least two adequate and
well-controlled, double-blinded clinical studies which conform to acceptable designs
and protocols and are conducted by different persons, independently of each other.
Such persons shall be qualified by training and experience to conduct such studies."
Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 844 (1984). The definition for its agency is simi-
lar. See Ogilvy & Mather Int'l, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 1, 15 (1983).
207. In Teledyne, involving the Water Pik oral irrigating device, a clinical test was
defined as
[o]ne in which a person with skill and expertise in the field conducts a well-
controlled test on human subjects, using those testing procedures generally
accepted in the profession which ensure accurate and reliable results, and
evaluates its results in a disinterested manner. The results of the tests must
be clinically significant, which requires that the test be, among other things,
of sufficient duration to ensure that the results are not materially distorted by
any unusual short term practices or temporary physical conditions of the test
subjects (as such practices or conditions related to the test conditions).
Teledyne, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 320, 330-31 (1981). The order for Teledyne's agency was al-
most the same: Thompson, 97 F.T.C. 333, 336 (1981).
For shavers claimed to be efficacious for "razor bumps" experienced by black men:
"at least two well-controlled clinical studies which conform to acceptable designs and
protocols and are conducted by different persons independently of each other. Such
persons shall be qualified by training and experience to treat "razor bumps" and to
conduct the aforementioned studies." Sperry Corp., 98 F.T.C. 4, 9 (1981); DKG Adver-
tising, Inc., 98 F.T.C. 15, 23 (1981) (agency for Sperry); North Am. Philips Corp., 101
F.T.C. 359, 364 (1983); McCaffrey & McCall, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 367, 369 (1983) (agency for
Philips) (all consent).
For hair restorative products: "one well-controlled, double-blinded clinical study
that conforms to acceptable designs and protocols." U.S. v. Braswell, No. C81-588A,
slip op. at 3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 1983). See supra note 127.
208. American Home Prods., 98 F.T.C. at 377-78. See discussion of establishment
claims, supra text Section III.A.2.
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to "argue that the rigors of established research methodology in
clinical pharmacology should be discarded in advertising regulation,"
especially where the question was of superior effectiveness rather
than mere effectiveness.2 09
These conclusions were described as fully consistent with and re-
flected in the regulations of the Food and Drug Administration:
"[T]he FDA is now directed to refuse approval of an NDA [new drug
application] in the absence of 'substantial evidence' that the drug is
effective for its indicated uses . . . . 'Substantial evidence' is defined
in the Act to mean: evidence consisting of adequate and well-con-
trolled [clinical] investigations."210
The two-test requirement was extended to nonestablishment
claims in Thompson Medical.211 On appeal, the court agreed the re-
209. Id. at 306 n.42. Similarly, Bristol-Myers stated that:
[I]n order to establish the comparative efficacy of an analgesic, two well-con-
trolled studies meeting all the criteria set forth ... are required.... Replica-
tion reduces the possibility that the results are due to chance and reduces the
effect of flaws in the design of any one study .... [R]eplication is especially
important for clinical studies of OTC analgesics because of the subjective na-
ture of participants' responses and because of the presence of other variables
which are difficult to quantify but could influence test results.
Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 337. On appeal Bristol argued the correct requirements
should be "clinical or other experience, tests, or other scientific data," but the court
decided the F.T.C. properly determined that only two well-controlled clinical studies
could establish superior freedom from side effects. Bristol-Myers v. F.T.C., 738 F.2d
554, 559 (2d Cir. 1984). The American Home Products appeal was cited as precedent.
Id. Sterling agreed with Bristol. See Sterling, 102 F.T.C. at 763. Sterling argued on
appeal that "a therapeutic judgment comparing brands of the same drug could be
based on pharmacological and other nonclinical data," but the court, though acknowl-
edging an evidentiary conflict, said it could not reweigh the evidence. Id., 741 F.2d at
1153.
210. American Home Prods., 98 F.T.C. at 378-79. Similar comments appeared in
Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 337, and Sterling Drug, 102 F.T.C. at 768-69. Thompson
Medical observed that FDA panels on analgesics required a minimum of two positive
well-controlled trials by different investigators or laboratories to demonstrate effec-
tiveness. Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 720. Replication was necessary because of
the potential for systematic bias and random error in any clinical trial. Even an exper-
ienced investigator may use an aberrant methodology, or some unexpected flaw or
anomaly in the randomized population may bias the results. Respondent argued that
the medical community does not typically require two tests, but the Commission re-
jected the idea. Id. at 827. Respondent argued that the FDA does not always require
two tests, but this was rejected as not disturbing the general rule. Id. Being consistent
with FDA requirements, however, does not automatically make FDA determination a
suitable alternative. That could not be so for Bristol, the appellate court said, because
FDA dealt with absolute and not comparative levels of efficacy and safety. However,
should the FDA do the appropriate studies, Bristol could rely on them. Bristol-Myers,
738 F.2d at 558-60.
211. Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 844. The requirement was absolute for com-
parative claims, id., while for noncomparative claims an alternative requirement was
quirement was unprecedented but affirmed its appropriateness
anyway. 212
A potential softening of the two-test requirement for efficacy
claims occurred when the Commission reconsidered several consent
cases:
Recently the Commission has become aware of the existence of reliable ex-
pert opinion to the effect that one clinical study, if properly conducted, can
provide a reasonable basis for future razor bump efficacy claims. Given the
apparent conflict between the substantiation requirement contained in the or-
ders and this expert opinion, the Commission believes that it is in the public
interest to reopen the proceedings to examine whether one or two clinical
tests is the proper reasonable basis standard.... [T]he Commission is seeking
simply to put into effect the dictum expressed in Pfizer that the amount of
evidence required to substantiate a claim can only be determined 'on a case-
by-case basis.' 2 1
3
Commissioners Pertschuk and Bailey dissented; Pertschuk objecting
that "the costs of further review and introspection about the 'perfect'
level of substantiation for this type of product far exceed any bene-
fits."214 Bailey noted that the presumed value of a second test was to
correct unforeseen problems in the first test. Although the expert
opinion held that one test would be sufficient if adequately con-
ducted, Bailey said the majority's proposed change involved no more
rigorous methodology. It involved only changing the word "two" to
"one." "[T]he Commission," she said, "has not adopted .. .any new
requirements to ensure that the single test can compensate for the
absence of the second." 2 15
Later the Commission declined to change the two-study require-
ment because:
[S]avings the company might achieve by conducting one fewer test appear
modest since the relatively low cost of conducting a second test would not
greatly exceed the cost of a single test that included additional procedural
safeguards needed to enhance its reliability, such as those proposed by com-
plaint counsel and the experts who commented. [R]espondent's past conduct
... of making false and unsubstantiated claims for its product on the basis of
inadequate and flawed testing warrants imposition of a more rigorous substan-
tiation requirement to provide additional assurance that the respondent will
not engage in such conduct in the future.
2 1 6
Meanwhile, the FTC required only one clinical study for efficacy
allowed. See supra text accompanying note 164. In General Nutrition (Commission
opinion pending), the initial decision required one clinical study, with an FDA stan-
dard as alternative, for misrepresentations which were disease preventive claims
rather than the more familiar curative or therapeutic (i.e., efficacy) claims. Dkt. 9175,
F.T.C. slip op., at 106, 109 (Feb. 24, 1986).
212. Thompson Medical v. F.T.C., 791 F.2d 189, 193-96 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
213. North Am. Philips, McCaffrey & McCall (agency for Philips), Sperry Corp.,
DKG (agency for Sperry), F.T.C. slip ops. (Mar. 8, 1983) (identical show cause orders,
never published).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. North Am. Philips Corp., McCaffrey & McCall, Sperry, DKG, 104 F.T.C. 549,
(1984) (identical orders terminating show cause proceedings).
[Vol. 14: 229, 1987] FTC Order Provisions
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
claims in the Braswell hair restorative case.21 7 Commissioner Bailey
dissented on the ground of inadequacy.2 18 Commissioner Pertschuk
voted in favor, but cited reservations, including the objection that
"the substantiation requirements are neither as tough as they ought
to be... nor are they consistent with traditional Commission ad sub-
stantiation policy." 219 He cited the two-study standard of the FDA,
and said "it is sensible and proper for the commission to look at the
expert judgment of FDA for guidance in gauging what level of scien-
tific substantiation to require. '220 The majority's rationale was not
discussed in the Commission's brief statement.
c. Discussion of Standards
The analgesics opinions discuss at length what constitutes an ac-
ceptable clinical test. That standards exist was well established in
American Home Products: "[e]xperts in the field of clinical testing
are generally agreed on the requisites of a well-designed clinical
study."221 Later, the Commission said it "[found] no reason to alter
the decision we reached in [American Home Products] regarding the
sort of evidence necessary to substantiate a claim of established supe-
riority for analgesics." 222  Thompson Medical agreed. In that case,
the respondent had argued that such a requirement should be re-
laxed or dispensed with for a mild and harmless topical analgesic.
That, however, was declared contrary to the prevailing and accepted
view: "A number of standards for an adequate and well-controlled
clinical trial have been developed by the medical scientific
community." 223
A primary goal of standards is that "[p]re-existing bias toward the
tested product on the part of the subjects or those involved in the ex-
ecution of the study must be eliminated."224 This is especially impor-
tant with the tests in question: "Pre-existing bias toward the tested
product is a particularly significant factor in working with OTC
217. U.S. v. Braswell, No. C81-588A, slip op. (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 1983). See supra
note 127.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. American Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136, 376 (1981). The statement was
cited with approval in the appeal, which upheld the F.T.C.'s findings that the tests and
other evidence did not meet such requirements. American Home Prods. Corp. v.
F.T.C., 695 F.2d 681, 691-93 (3d Cir. 1982).
222. Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. 21, 332 (1983).
223. Thompson Medical Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648, 720-21 (1984).
224. American Home Prods., 98 F.T.C. at 376.
analgesics, which are readily identifiable by color, shape, or other dis-
tinctive attributes."225 Bias may be eliminated by complying with
various standards as discussed in the following subsections.
d. Double-Blinding
A primary way to eliminate bias is that:
[Tihe well-designed clinical study should be double-blinded-that is, neither
the subjects nor those conducting the study should be able to identify the test
drugs until preliminary analysis of the data is complete . . . . The record
shows that the expectations of both subjects and observers can affect the
amount of relief obtained from the tested drug, and that this is a major source
of bias in clinical testing.2 2 6
[N]either the test subject nor the person administering the test should be able
to tell which treatment is being administered .... [Ilt is important that the
treatments all look and taste the same. If double-blinding is not used, sub-
jects' responses may be influenced by their own pre-existing biases and by the
expectations of those administering the tests.
2 2 7
Bristol-Myers objected that double-blinding was not necessary, but
offered no expert testimony to support its position.22 8 It protested
that double-blinding would "eliminate the actual and real clinical ef-
fect of expectation."229 This was construed as an assertion that an
analgesic works partly because the user believes it will work, and the
respondent has a right to exploit that belief. However, "[t]he Com-
mission cannot accept as proof of a product's efficacy a psychological
reaction stemming from a belief which, to a substantial degree, was
caused by respondent's deceptions." 23 0 The opinion added that "were
we to hold otherwise, advertisers would be encouraged to foist unsub-
stantiated claims on an unsuspecting public in the hope that consum-
ers would believe the ads and the claims would be self-fulfilling."2sl
Studies not double-blinded were downgraded in American Home
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 335. Further explanation was offered in Thompson
Medical: "There is an important difference between a consumer's ability to perceive
his pain relief and his ability to evaluate the true pharmacological efficacy of an OTC
analgesic drug." Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 714. "Perceptions of performance
are heavily influenced by expectations." Id. at 716. "[T]here is in fact no opportunity
for usage to disconfirm consumer expectations, and each time consumers use Asper-
creme they are reinforcing expectations they had when they came to the product in
the first place." Id. at 717. Therefore,
[an analgesic trial should be double-blinded. ... Effective blinding requires
that neither the bottles, the physical characteristics of the test substance (such
as taste and smell), nor the data sheet give any clue as to the identity of the
substances used in the trial. Blinding both the subjects and the investigators
is required .... Single-blind studies are not acceptable for mild to moderate
analgesics.
Id. at 723.
228. Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 335-36.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 336 (quoting Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1496 (1975)).
231. Id.
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Products, Bristol-Myers, and Thompson Medical.232 Double-blinding
was a problem in Warner-Lambert, where subjects in a study com-
paring Listerine to an inert substance may have been able to tell the
difference because the latter simulated Listerine in color but not in
taste or odor.23 3 The doctor may have been able to detect the odor on
subjects' breath.2 3 4 The Commission observed that blinding the con-
trol group is a generally accepted procedure, 235 and that whatever
bias the examiner may possess can be neutralized by preventing him
from knowing which subjects used the product and which did not.23 6
e. Placebo Control
This is another type of control essential to clinical studies:
[T]he customary practice in drug comparison studies is to require a pharmaco-
logically inactive treatment (placebo control) as a direct measure of test sensi-
tivity. [If the drug tests no differently than the control the test is insensitive;
it cannot measure the drug's effects (if any)]. Placebo control is particularly
important in the case of analgesic studies because a subjective response like
pain relief is highly susceptible to influence by the subject's expectations. ....
In clinical studies of mild to moderate pain, the rate of positive response to a
pharmacologically inactive substance has been as high as 60%.... The inert
substance serves as a control for perceived pain relief based on expectations
alone, or attributable to the self-limiting nature of mild to moderate pain.
2 3 7
232. 98 F.T.C. 136, 384 (1981); 102 F.T.C. 21, 342 (1983); 104 F.T.C. 648, 742-43, 827
(1984). A study cited in the latter had problems when subjects got headaches from the
test agent's odor and bitter taste. Id. at 733.
233. Warner-Lambert, 86 F.T.C. at 1427, 1509.
234. Id. at 1511.
235. Id. at 1509.
236. Id. at 1510. The doctor knew the test was being conducted for Warner-Lam-
bert, that it involved Listerine and that the data would be used to determine the effect
on colds of gargling with Listerine daily. Id. at 1511. By using the same charts from
day to day the doctor upon evaluating each subject's symptoms would know how he
had evaluated them the previous day. Id. at 1512. On Mondays he made evaluations
for Saturday and Sunday that could have been biased by being based on the
nonblinded subjects' subjective evaluations. Id. In another study the investigators
were found to have predetermined beliefs that Listerine was good for colds. Id. This
and other criticisms of studies in Warner-Lambert were upheld on its appeal. Warner-
Lambert v. F.T.C., 562 F.2d at 753.
237. American Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136, 377 (1981) (comment in brackets
added). Elsewhere,
[iln an analgesic trial, it is not appropriate to use "no treatment" as a control.
Pain is a subjective sensation.... And the placebo effect is known to be sub-
stantial.... A placebo control is commonly required for a clinical trial of an
analgesic drug in order to provide a consistent variable to determine whether
a drug has a pharmacological effect.... A placebo is particularly important in
a study involving a drug for relief of pain because administration of a placebo
produces a response that resembles the response to a mild analgesic.
Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 722 (1984). "A comparison of two drugs, one
known to be effective, is termed a positive control.... If efficacy has not yet been es-
Placebo problems and blinding problems often occur together. A
Warner-Lambert study had an ineffective placebo; the substance was
inert but participants could differentiate it from Listerine.238 An-
other study had no placebo, thus it compared Listerine's efficacy with
nothing.239 American Home Products, Bristol, Sterling, and Thomp-
son Medical also criticized studies for no effective placebo control.240
f. Historical Control
While most controls are discussed for their applicability, the histor-
ical control was discussed for its inapplicability.
In circumstances involving diseases with high and predictable mortality and
uniform symptoms, an historical control may be used, whereby the results of a
new treatment are compared with case histories in similar patient populations
In an analgesic trial... the use of an historical control is not appropriate be-
cause there is no reason not to use a current control.... Moreover, since all
pain is subjective and musculoskeletal pain fluctuates, use of an historical con-
trol for a drug like TEA/S is inappropriate.
2 4 1
Bristol-Myers cited studies using an historical control, where sub-
jects given Bufferin were asked to compare its side effects with those
which they remembered to be associated with aspirin. "It is impossi-
ble," the opinion said, "to know whether the test subjects accurately
remembered and related past experience with aspirin or whether
they were able to distinguish the side effects caused by aspirin from
side effects generated by other possible causes." 242
tablished for the second drug, a placebo must be incorporated into the study design in
order to demonstrate the sensitivity of the study's methodology." Id. at 728.
Whenever possible, tests comparing two mild analgesics should also compare
those drugs against a pharmacologically inert placebo .... The use of the pla-
cebo provides a measure of the study's sensitivity; if the study cannot detect
the difference between a standard and the placebo, it cannot be relied upon to
detect the difference between the analgesics being tested.
Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 335 (1983).
"[T]he placebo response rate is known to be always above zero in well-blinded stud-
ies." Id. at 180. See also Sterling Drug, 102 F.T.C. 395, 765 (1983).
238. 86 F.T.C. at 1509 (referenced in American Home Prods., 98 F.T.C. at 377 n.30).
239. Id. at 1512.
240. 98 F.T.C. at 384; 102 F.T.C. at 180; 102 F.T.C. at 772; 104 F.T.C. at 743. The lat-
ter cited a study testing Aspercreme against an active control (aspirin), but not em-
ploying a third group using only placebo pills and placebo cream. Id. at 728.
Since there was no placebo control, there is no way to evaluate whether the
methodology of this study was sufficiently sensitive to pick up even the
known difference between aspirin and a placebo .... Accordingly, there is no
way to determine whether the study failed to show a difference between aspi-
rin and Aspercreme because no real difference exists or because the method-
ology used was not sensitive enough to show a difference between the two.
Id.
241. Id. at 722.
242. Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 342.
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g. Obtaining Statistical Significance
Another type of control is handled through determinations of sta-
tistical significance.
The statistical analysis serves to determine the probability that any apparent
differences in efficacy are due to the treatments being tested and are not due
to chance .... Scientists generally will accept the differences as being real
and not due to chance if analysis shows a 95% level of statistical significance
(i.e., there is no greater than a 5% likelihood that the results were produced
by chance). 24 3
Bristol-Myers called the 95% level arbitrary.244 The opinion re-
sponded that such standard was selected not by the Commission but
by scientists, and that among experts a consensus existed that the ap-
propriate level was 95%.245 Bristol-Myers also objected that scientists
do not always submit comparative studies to statistical analysis. The
decision conceded that scientists for some purposes do not test for
significance, but that
[w]hen those same tests are used to establish the comparative superiority of
one drug over another, it is essential to determine the statistical significance
of the results.... If this is not done, it is impossible to reject the hypothesis
that the drug which may appear superior in the test is, in fact, of only equal
(or even lesser) effectiveness.2 46
Thompson Medical observed that a null hypothesis (that no differ-
ence exists between two tested items) cannot be proved true; statis-
tics can only disprove the hypothesis or draw no conclusion:
A danger in evaluating clinical trials is to misinterpret a failure to demon-
strate a difference between two treatments as meaning that the treatments
are in fact the same. When differences are statistically significant, the results
can be said to be due to essential differences in the drugs. When differences
are statistically insignificant, however, this does not rule out the possibility
that real differences may exist.2 4 7
Even when differences are statistically significant, they can be clin-
ically insignificant.248 Bristol-Myers stated that a determination must
be made concerning whether a statistically significant difference is
clinically significant; this will not be so if scientists regard the differ-
ence as too small to matter.249
243. Id. at 336. See also similar statements in American Home Prods., 98 F.T.C. at
377; Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 723-24.
244. Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 337.
245. Id. "A lesser standard may be appropriate to support claims that have been
adequately qualified or that are made to a limited audience capable of understanding
levels of statistical significance." Id. at 337 n.54.
246. Id. at 336.
247. Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 724.
248. Id.
249. 102 F.T.C. at 337.
One improper procedure is "peeking" at the data. That is, the data
are summarized not at the end of the study, but in small units each
time more subjects are tested. By peeking after each such increment,
American Home Products was able to order a study terminated when
statistical significance had been reached in its favor.250 Such "se-
quential analysis" could be legitimate if prior established procedures
called for the study to stop when statistical significance was reached
in favor of either possible conclusion. However, the ALJ concluded
that this study would not have been stopped if significance were
reached in favor of aspirin rather than Anacin.25 1
h. Protocol
The protocol is the document stating the testing procedures.
A written protocol which defines the study's objectives and methods is a criti-
cal element of a well-controlled trial. . . . The protocol should be written
before the study is conducted.... It should describe the essential elements of
the study design as well as the analysis plan, including the scoring system....
Departures from the protocol should be minimized to insure the validity of
the ultimate analysis .... Any major change or amendment to the protocol
should be in writing .... Data for a subject who breaches the protocol in a
meaningful manner, by not taking the drug as directed or by otherwise acting
inconsistently with the protocol's directions, should be discarded .... Includ-
ing the analysis plan in the protocol is essential to protect the integrity of the
study. . . Selecting the statistical analysis and scoring system in advance
guards against conscious or unconscious bias on the part of the
investigator.2 5 2
A written protocol contributes to maintaining integrity in the test-
ing procedures by encouraging strong suspicion of bias if subsequent
deviation from the protocol occurs. 253 A similar deviation occurred in
American Home Products where the protocol did not call for the "se-
quential analysis" discussed above, nor for termination of the study
upon significance in AHP's favor.254 Sterling discussed a study in
which investigators changed their statistical method upon discovering
that the original design would demonstrate no difference between
Cope and aspirin. One expert called the study "a gross and obvious
example of statistical manipulation, and.., not acceptable scientific
methodology." 255
250. American Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136, 220-21 (1981). "Ongoing 'peeking'
and evaluation of data by the party most interested in favorable results for one medi-
cation is generally recognized as injecting bias and necessitates a more critical review
of the ultimate conclusions." Id. at 220.
251. Id. at 221. Bristol added that procedures for statistical analysis should be set
forth in advance and adhered to in order to guard against bias caused by a premature
conclusion when the data show a favored result. Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 336.
252. Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 721-22 (1984). See similar statement in
American Home Prods., 98 F.T.C. at 337.
253. Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 334.
254. 98 F.T.C. at 221.
255. Sterling Drug, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 395, 772 (1983).
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Another study focused, in the original protocol, on pain relief gen-
erally, with no interest in specific body location.256 That became a
problem when the study was later used to support claims of pain re-
lief in specific body areas. The study's original analysis had not sepa-
rated weightbearing and nonweightbearing bodily areas, but an
analysis three years later did so. 257 "Such post hoc analysis of clinical
data calls into question the integrity of the result because of the po-
tential bias present in any rearranging or manipulation of data
"258
Also, the rating system was developed by the doctor long after he
had broken the code, seen the raw data, and read the original report.
This was "an improper procedure and renders the results questiona-
ble .. .[T]he results .. .can be significantly affected by the type of
scaling system used .... The record demonstrates that [the] scaling
system has affected the analysis in favor of Aspercreme . ... 259
Thus, before the study is begun, the rating scale should be developed
and set forth in the protocol to avoid data manipulation.
One study had no written protocol and inadequate records and
analysis.2 o Another relied on subjective measures of pain, yet failed
to report what questions patients were asked by doctors.261 In an-
other study the investigators were not provided with a uniform defi-
nition of a "cold." Common colds last no longer than ten days, yet
illnesses lasting up to 69 days were counted as colds. In addition, the
examining doctor spent only one and one-half minutes with each
child. This may not have been an adequate amount of time.262
'Sometimes protocols must be virtually identical:
It is also important in a multi-site study that the different investigators ad-
here to the same protocol.... [T]here is no assurance that the two physicians
256. Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 732.
257. Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 736.
258. Id. [citation omitted].
259. Id. at 736-37 [citation omitted]. The study had other protocol breaches. About
30% of subjects were outside the pre-specified age parameters. While the protocol re-
quired that subjects suffer moderate or severe pain, at least six of the forty had only
mild to moderate pain symptoms. Id. at 733. Although departures should be minimized
and major changes put in writing, the doctor made no written changes to the protocol.
He testified that the protocol was subsequently amended orally, but was unable to re-
call any amendments. Id. In another study, several patients breached the protocol by
applying the test cream twice rather than once. Since all were in the Aspercreme
group and reported pain relief the question was raised of potential bias favoring Asper-
creme. Id. at 739.
260. Id. at 742-43.
261. Id. at 744.
262. Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1512-13 (1975).
applied the same criteria .... As of the time of Dr. Golden's deposition.., the
two physicians had never even spoken to one another.... Dr. Altschuler...
was unaware that another investigator was conducting a trial with a protocol
that was identical to his.263
i. Choosing Subjects, Including Randomizing
A protocol should specify choice of subjects. American Home
Products discussed the need for random distribution of subjects
among treatment groups to balance out variables and biases not
otherwise controlled.264 Similarly:
There is virtually no disagreement that test subjects must be randomly as-
signed to the treatment groups.... The purpose of randomization is to make
certain that ... observed differences between treatment groups are attributa-
ble to the analgesics being tested and not to the inherent characteristics of the
groups.... Failure to randomize the test subjects renders questionable the va-
lidity of the study and all subsequent analysis . . . although statistical tech-
niques may be available to correct the imbalance if the importance of the
imbalanced variable and the magnitude of the imbalance are not
significant.2 6
5
Two studies lacked randomization.266 One study used respondent's
own employees, and allowed them to choose between using Listerine
or nothing. This could have biased the results because those who
thought gargling was effective for fighting a cold would most likely
join the test group.267
Studies may likewise be inaccurate due to the failure to control
characteristics of subjects. For example, a Bristol-Myers study in-
volved baseline pain imbalance. Because response to medication is
related to the starting level of pain, the greater the starting level, the
more the opportunity for the pain to be relieved. More patients with
severe initial pain were assigned to be tested on Excedrin, which
meant that "Excedrin had a greater opportunity to relieve pain than
did aspirin."2 68
Thompson Medical criticized a small sample for having an unac-
ceptably wide array of conditions and diseases. With adequately sized
subsets, comparisons could have measured the effects on persons suf-
fering from each particular problem. But, lacking sufficient numbers
in individual groups, the study could not provide a reasonable basis
for efficacy claims concerning each specific condition.269
One analgesics study was conducted with only arthritis sufferers;270
263. Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 738-39 (citation omitted).
264. 98 F.T.C. 136, 376 (1981).
265. Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 334 (1983). See similar statement in Thomp-
son Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 723.
266. Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 342, 356.
267. Warner-Lambert, 86 F.T.C. at 1512.
268. 102 F.T.C. at 347.
269. Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 731, 737.
270. Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 342.
[Vol. 14: 229, 1987] FTC Order Provisions
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
a second study failed to screen out aspirin non-responders and 18% of
its subjects took concurrent analgesic, antirheumatic, or mood-alter-
ing drugs. Use of other medications concomitantly was deemed unac-
ceptable in a noncrossover study. Moreover, because the subjects
were given no washout period from pre-existing aspirin use, the re-
searchers could not be sure what was measured. 27 1
Pooling the subjects and data of separate groups was criticized as
follows:
It is a requirement of a multi-site study that not only the same protocol be
adhered to by all investigators, but also the patient groups be homogeneous in
order that the data obtained from the different groups may be combined....
If the patients in the different groups are dissimilar or if they are being
treated for different conditions, pooling the data is inappropriate.... [One
study] provided mostly rheumatology patients while [the other] provided gen-
eral medical patients.... [In the first study] thirty-two of the fifty patients (or
64%) self-rated their baseline pain as severe while only four of... forty-five
patients (or 11%) did so [in the second].2 7 2
Despite these differences, "the statistical analyses lumped the groups
together." 273
j. Equivalence Requirements
A study must test exactly what the advertising claims:
[I]f the objective is to determine comparative drug efficacy, the tested prod-
ucts should be evaluated in the same study (together with a placebo). Without
such head-to-head studies, the investigator is unable to determine whether
products vary from each other to a significant degree.
[Alt least one of the required studies should be conducted on the type of pain
for which the superior efficacy claim is being made. Because scientists do not
fully understand the mechanism by which trauma evokes pain, they are not
comfortable about extrapolating from one pain situation to another, or from
experimental pain models, which employ artificially induced pain, to a clinical
situation.2 7 4
One study examined, not headache pain, but two types of severe
post-partum pain: uterine and episiotomy pain. American Home
271. Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 732-33. Another study had 10% of its subjects
using anti-inflammatory or mood-altering drugs at the time of their participation, with
no washout period. Id. at 739.
272. Id. at 738 (citations omitted).
273. Id.
274. American Home Products, 98 F.T.C. at 377-78. The same point was made in
Bristol-Myers. See Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 332-34 (according with American Home
Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136, 334 (1981)). Bristol challenged the equivalence proposition,
but had itself once argued that tests on subjects experiencing pain other than headache
pain are not transferable. Bristol argued that studies cannot be conducted on headache
pain, but six were mentioned in the record and one was expressly relied on by Bristol.
Id.
Products' witnesses admitted that headache pain is different from
other kinds of pain. It is not known whether headache pain is a
cramping pain, similar to uterine pain, or a constant pain, like episi-
otomy pain. Therefore, the study was rejected as not establishing
Anacin's superiority over aspirin for relief of headache pain.2 75 The
general point was summarized in Thompson Medical: "[T]he use of
the test drug should conform to reality. The test subjects should use
the drug in the same manner as a consumer would in terms of dosage
level, method of application, and the like .... "276
As an obvious corollary, the medication tested must be the same as
advertised. A study tested an aspirin-caffeine combination that was
not equivalent to Anacin in its commercial form. It was not clear
whether Anacin would achieve similar results.277 Other studies com-
pared Cope to aspirin while using a formulation of Cope which was
different from the marketed version.278 The same studies compared
Cope against nothing but a placebo, which could not support Cope's
superiority over other analgesics.279
Sterling Drug argued that the need for exact equivalence would
mean testing Bayer against each of more than 200 brands; this would
be prohibitively expensive. However, the Commission cited testi-
mony that all brands might first be tested for pharmaceutical equiva-
lence, as Sterling in fact had already done, and then clinical trials
might be conducted on two or three brands to determine whether
pharmaceutical differences correlated with therapeutic differences.
If so, pharmaceutical equivalence could be assumed to mean clinical
equivalence with very little testing.28 0
Bristol-Myers studies showed Bufferin absorbed into the blood-
stream twice as fast as aspirin. However, there was no evidence of
correlation between rate of absorption and the claimed speed of pain
relief. Such equivalence may seem logical, but must remain a hy-
pothesis until proven in clinical tests.281
275. American Home Prods., 98 F.T.C. at 381-83. Two studies in Bristol-Myers also
involved only post-partum pain. 102 F.T.C. at 346-47. A study was rejected because it
studied pain induced experimentally, results for which are not applicable to naturally
occurring pain. Id. at 343. A study of aspirin use by potential stroke victims was held
not relevant to the type of superiority claimed in Sterling Drug's ads. See Sterling
Drug, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 395, 767 (1983).
276. Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 725 (1984).
277. American Home Prods., 98 F.T.C. at 382.
278. Sterling Drug, 102 F.T.C. at 771-72.
279. Id. at 772.
280. Id. at 769.
281. Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 340 (1983); see also Sterling Drug, 102 F.T.C.
at 765. Similarly:
[T]he record contains substantial medical-scientific evidence tending to show
that two tablets of Anacin may reasonably be expected to provide technically
greater analgesia than two tablets of aspirin for some individuals. However,
that evidence is insufficient to overcome complaint counsel's prima facie
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Warner-Lambert cited a study in which Listerine was administered
to animals. It was found not probative, particularly since the product
was administered through stomach tubes rather than through gar-
gling.282 The Commission also criticized studies done in test tubes
because they were not demonstrative of what occurs in the human
mouth.283
A final equivalence issue involves the relationship of marketing in-
formation to advertising claims. The contention of consumer satisfac-
tion, as derived by respondent from its surveys, cannot begin to
approach in probative value the overwhelming weight of the expert
testimony.284 Thus,
[a] consumer may perceive a product to be effective when, in reality, it has no
efficacy. In short, he may repeatedly purchase the product out of igno-
rance. . . .Clearly, unless the patient can perform well-controlled clinical
tests, he is not in a position to know whether his improvement was attributa-
ble to the medication. 2 8 5
k. Expertise
Another necessary condition for an adequate test is the expertise
of those who conduct it:
"[T]he investigator should generally be both experienced and independent....
The persons who administer the test (be they medical personnel or the sub-
showing that the therapeutic superiority of Anacin over aspirin has not been
established as a scientific proposition.
American Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136, 304-05 (1981).
AHP noted evidence that the dose response curve ascends, meaning pain relief in-
creases as amount of aspirin increases. Therefore, it argued, because Anacin contains
150 mg. more aspirin per dose than common aspirin, it thus is shown to produce more
pain relief. The argument was rejected because, inter alia, the curve rises little if any
above 600 mg.; this does not prove superiority of 800 mg. over 650 mg. Id. at 383. The
appellate court agreed. American Home Prods. Corp. v. F.T.C., 695 F.2d 681, 692 (3d
Cir. 1982).
Thompson Medical observed that bioavailability is a necessary condition for bioactiv-
ity. Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 744-45 (1984). But evidence of bioavai-
lability is not evidence of bioactivity. Id. at 726, 744-45. Thus, bioavailability studies
are not a suitable substitute for clinical trials. Id. at 745, 773. In any event, studies
showed that the blood level of analgesic achieved did not reach the minimum levels
associated with analgesia, and that the drug was poorly absorbed and thus probably not
bioactive. Id. at 749, 773.
Bristol-Myers observed: "The result of a bioassay is the 'relative potency' of the test
drug." Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 344. "Respondent has failed to distinguish between
the two uses to which bioassays may be put. The primary purpose of a bioassay is dose
selection. . . .Scientists normally do not use bioassays to compare the efficacy of
analgesics." Id. at 345.
282. Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1451, 1507 (1975).
283. Id. at 1444.
284. Id. at 1462.
285. Id. at 1495. For similar comments see Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 760.
jects themselves) should be adequately trained to assure accuracy in recording
test results."' 2 8 6
"A clinical trial should be conducted by an experienced investigator with an
appropriate background in the disease being evaluated.... The personnel who
administer the test should also be experienced, as well as properly trained and
instructed in using the measures involved in the clinical trial .... ,,287
1. Prior Studies
An American Home Products study could not support advertising
claims because it was conducted after the claims were dissemi-
nated.288 Thompson Medical's reliance on an article describing test
results was rejected because, although the article had been written
long before, the respondent had not acquired it until after the claims
were disseminated.289
Prior testing is not a scientific requirement, but relates to the legal
conclusion that a violation occurs when claims are made without con-
current support. In 1984, the FTC declared that it might consider
post-claim evidence, which it had previously refused to do. The FTC
was not, it cautioned, offering advertisers a chance to substitute post-
claim evidence, nor was it changing its holding that the lack of pre-
claim evidence creates a violation.2 90
2. Scientific Tests Generally
a. Definitions
The general definition of "tests" is considerably broader than that
for clinical tests. This is so because such tests cover a more expansive
range of testing situations. While both clinical and nonclinical tests
involve examining the characteristics of an advertised product,
nonclinical tests do not examine consumer response to the product.
The early Firestone definition of "scientific test" has played a
prominent role:
In our view a scientific test is one in which persons with skill and expertise in
the field conduct the test and evaluate its results in a disinterested manner
286. Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 334 (1983) (citations omitted).
287. Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 723 (citations omitted).
288. American Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136, 382, n.38 (1981).
289. Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 750.
290. Id. at 841; see also supra note 111. It will consider post-claim evidence when it
wants to: (1) determine public interest-post-claim evidence that a claim is true might
influence the Commission to decline to prosecute, not because a violation does not ex-
ist, but because of factors such as competing demands on scarce resources; (2) assess
adequacy of prior substantiation-post-claim substantiation may shed light on the as-
sessment of pre-claim substantiation, but will not substitute for it; and (3) determine
scope of order-post-claim evidence of a claim's truth might lead to the framing of a
narrower order. Id.
General Nutrition is the first case to consider whether post-claim evidence can
"shed light" on pre-claim substantiation. General Nutrition, No. 9175, F.T.C. slip. op.
at 71-75, 78, 97-99 (Feb. 24, 1986).
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using testing procedures generally accepted in the profession which best in-
sure accurate results. This is not to say that respondent always must conduct
laboratory tests. The appropriate test depends on the nature of the claim
made. Thus a road or user test may be an adequate scientific test to substanti-
ate one performance claim, whereas a laboratory test may be the proper test
to substantiate another claim. Respondent's obligation is to assure that any
claim it makes is adequately substantiated by the results of whatever consti-
tutes a scientific test in those circumstances.
2 9 1
Later cases either cited the Firestone definition292 or offered varia-
tions of it, when defining either a "competent and reliable test"293 or
"scientific or professional tests, analyses, research, studies, or any
other evidence based on expertise of professionals in the relevant
area."
294
b. Discussion of Standards
Firestone set a high standard when it debated whether to require
"competent scientific tests" rather than merely "competent tests."295
The conclusion was that "[iln the circumstances of this case .... con-
sumers could reasonably have expected Firestone's performance and
safety claims to have been substantiated by scientific tests."296 The
tests for tire stopping ability were inadequate because they involved
291. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 463 (1972), aff'd sub nom., Fire-
stone v. F.T.C., 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973).
292. General Motors, and its agency, Campbell-Ewald, 104 F.T.C. 511, 513, 516
(1984) (Firestone definition plus sentence about handling tests); Teledyne, Inc., 97
F.T.C. 320, 330 (1981) (almost exact restatement of Firestone's first sentence); Crown
Central Petroleum, 84 F.T.C. 1493, 1549 (1974).
293. National Energy Associates, No. C-3179, F.T.C. slip op. at 8 (1986); Cynex Mfg.
Corp., 104 F.T.C. 464, 475 (1984); Cliffdale Ass'n, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 199 (1984); Cali-
fornia-Texas Oil, 104 F.T.C. 268, 278 (1983); Monte Proulx, 102 F.T.C. 1722, 1726 (1983);
Emergency Devices, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 1713, 1717 (1983); Plaskolite, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 344,
349 (1983); Champion Home Builders, 101 F.T.C. 316, 322 (1983); Boekamp, 97 F.T.C.
291, 314 (1981); Energy Efficient Systems, 97 F.T.C. 265, 285 (1981); Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 95 F.T.C. 406, 524 (1980); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 95 F.T.C. 265, 273 (1980);
C.I. Energy Dev., Inc., 94 F.T.C. 1337, 1359 (1979); RR Int'l, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 1312, 1334
(1979); Gordon Cooper, 94 F.T.C. 674, 696 (1979); Thompson, 94 F.T.C. 331, 339 (1979)
(agency for Sears, Roebuck & Co.); Norris, 92 F.T.C. 989, 1015 (1978).
294. Blue Lustre, No. C-3195, F.T.C. slip op. at 3 (1986); Sunbeam No. C-3181, F.T.C.
slip op. at 3 (1986); North Am Philips, No. C-3180, F.T.C. slip op. at 5 (1986); Young &
Rubicam/Zemp., 105 F.T.C. 317, 339 (1985) (agency for Rush-Hampton); Rush-Hamp-
ton, No. 9167, F.T.C. slip op. at 5 (1985); Associated Mills, 106 F.T.C. 5, 23 (1985); P.
Leiner Nutritional Prods., 105 F.T.C. 291, 301 (1985); Adria, 103 F.T.C. 512, 526 (1984);
FC&B, 102 F.T.C. 1274, 1283 (1983) (agency for Amana); Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 102
F.T.C. 1262, 1267 (1983); Merideth, 101 F.T.C. 390, 405 (1983).
295. Firestone, 81 F.T.C. at 426-27.
296. Id. at 463. The action was upheld without specific discussion of the nature of
tests. 481 F.2d at 251. See also supra text accompanying note 291.
only one road surface, albeit a hazardous one.297 One test surface,
similar to "glare ice," was not typical of roads in the United States,
and a tire's performance relative to other tires can vary from one sur-
face to another.2 9 8 Thus, there was not an adequate sampling of pos-
sible conditions.
Further, Firestone's ads for "The Safe Tire," by stressing exacting,
rugged tests "far exceeding any driving conditions" consumers will
ever encounter, constituted a representation that Firestone tires
would be absolutely safe, and that the company could assure that its
tires were free from any defects. 299 But the company had stipulated
that "[t]he state of tire manufacturing technology is such that use of
the best manufacturing procedures and tests and quality control tech-
niques known to the industry cannot insure that each tire.., is abso-
lutely free from any defects . . . .300 Therefore, the tests were
inadequate not only because they did not demonstrate absolute
safety, but because they could not possibly do so. 3 0 1
Sun Oil faced an equivalence problem when it showed that Sunoco
contained more phosphorus than some competitors, but offered no
performance tests that compared Sunoco with competing brands con-
taining less phosphorus.302
Sears did much to develop the requirements of scientific tests.
Although Sears
was not required to have had as substantiation 'scientific' tests, to the extent
Sears relied on tests, they were required to be competent and reliable ...
[meaning they] had to truly reflect the universe of food soils encompassed by
Sears' unqualified representation [that no pre-scraping or pre-rinsing were
necessary before dishwashing]. 3 0 3
Also, competent and reliable tests would have to
demonstrate that consideration had been given ... to the many variables
which affect the cleaning performance of Sears' dishwashers. Among these
factors...: detergent used and amount, voltage, mechanical function of dish-
washer, number of washes and rinses and their precise duration, water tem-
perature, water hardness, type and number of cooking and eating dishes
washed, loading of dishwasher, food soils used, method of food preparation
and soiling of dishes, counteraging, cooking temperatures.
The foregoing are illustrative only and are listed simply to provide an indica-
tion of the factors competent and reliable tests should have given considera-
297. 81 F.T.C. at 449.
298. Id. at 445.
299. Id. at 452.
300. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. F.T.C., 481 F.2d 246, 249 (6th Cir. 1983).
301. Firestone, 81 F.T.C. at 457.
302. Sun Oil, 84 F.T.C. 247, 272 (1974). A similar situation arose in Standard Oil
where the company was charged with claiming its gasoline would completely eliminate
all pollutants. Not only did the tests fail to examine all pollutants, they also failed to
support the claim for the ones they did examine. Standard Oil of Calif., 84 F.T.C. 1401,
1465, 1468 (1974). "Complaint counsel's major challenge to the Scott tests is aimed not
at whether the tests were properly conducted in a technical sense, but whether the
tests really show what respondents' advertisements say they do." Id. at 1467.
303. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C. 406, 423 (1980).
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tion to in determining, prior to dissemination of the representation, whether
or not the Sears' dishwashers would perform in accordance with the
representation.
Competent and reliable tests should have included information as to the scor-
ing procedure used and the analysis of the results. Records should have been
kept in sufficient detail so that the tests could be conducted again, and similar
results obtained.
3 0 4
The litany of Sears' failures on these criteria is far too extensive for
inclusion here.30 5
In Cliffdale, consumer tests provided no basis for fuel economy
claims.306 Consumers made subjective judgments for which repro-
ducibility was low, and measured fuel consumption merely by top-
ping their tanks.30 7 This illustrated that consumers respond to the
Hawthorne effect: they alter their habits when knowing they are in a
test situation.308 Many variables that affect fuel consumption are un-
controlled in consumer tests.3 09 Meanwhile, independent laboratory
testing showed benefits nowhere near the levels claimed.310
The requirement that tests be conducted by "persons qualified to
do so" has appeared in several provisions beginning with Amanaa3 ll
304. Id.
305. For example, failures occurred in those situations where: the tests used foods
relatively easy to clean, id. at 429, 434, 436; the tests used higher water temperatures
and lighter loads than many consumers would use, id. at 430; the wash phase extended
beyond length available to consumers, id. at 430, 432; the detergent used was in excess
of recommended amount, id. at 436; water softener was used, but not mentioned in test
reports, id. at 469; the dishes were placed flat, although consumers typically tilt them
at an angle, id. at 430; only a sample, rather than all dishes, was inspected, although
advertising claimed all dishes would be cleaned, id. at 438; the results were assessed on
the basis of photos of the dishes rather than the actual dishes, id. at 465-66; actual
dishes were introduced as evidence, but not examined at the end of the wash cycle, id.
at 466; despite such conditions favoring dishwasher, tests not only failed to support, but
actually refuted, claims of no pre-rinsing or pre-scraping and that the upper rack
cleaning ability was as good as lower rack, id. at 427, 445, 459, 465, 470, 514; tests of
different brands were offered as evidence of performance of the Sears' brand, id. at
434; claim of eliminating bacteria was based on no tests, id. at 476; knowledge from
Sears' own market research that many consumers rejected the claims after using the
dishwasher, id. at 452, 514; Sears' counsel improperly participated in allegedly impar-
tial tests, id. at 467; and inadequate record keeping: information missing, replication
impossible, Id. at 430, 433, 436, 438.
Sears claimed that a test should be discounted for creating abnormal conditions by
using foods especially prepared to stick to dishes. The ALJ rejoined that Sears' adver-
tisements were expressly designed to convince the public that the dishwasher could re-
move the most difficult foods. Id. at 427, 428.
306. Cliffdale Assoc., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 153 (1984).
307. Id. at 143.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 152.
310. Id. at 139.
311. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 1262, 1266 (1983).
This replaced requirements for qualifications such as expertise or ex-
perience in the given field. Although no explanation has been given
for this change, it is likely that Litton, which involved surveys rather
than tests, was influential.3 12
B. Surveys
While this section discusses surveys explicitly, many of the points
about clinical tests apply by analogy to surveys, since observing sam-
ples of people is common to both. Order provisions dealing with
surveys tend to be worded to forbid surveys lacking certain specifica-
tions. For that reason, some of the cases in this section have not been
discussed earlier.
1. Definition and Discussion of Standards
Only Litton has offered a definition of an adequate survey: "[a]
competent and reliable survey means one in which persons qualified
to do so conduct the survey and evaluate its results in an objective
manner, using procedures that insure accurate and reliable re-
sults."313 The phrase "persons qualified to do so" was not as strong
as complaint counsel had requested. Counsel had wanted to require
an "expert," but the Commission thought that standard would be too
inflexible. In addition, this standard would unnecessarily preclude
the legitimate use of persons with no professional expertise in certain
aspects of a survey project, such as interviewing.3 14
The Commission stressed Litton's admission that its surveys had
originally been intended only for internal company use. Surveys
used in advertisements should be conducted under stricter standards
than those conducted solely for internal use.315
312. Litton Indus., Inc., 97 F.T.C. 1 (1981), modified, Litton Indus., Inc. v. F.T.C. 676
F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1982), modified order, 100 F.T.C. 457, 458 (1982). See infra text ac-
companying notes 313-14.
313. Litton, 100 F.T.C. at 458.
314. Litton, 97 F.T.C. at 74-75. The appellate court approved the phrase "persons
qualified to do so." Litton, 676 F.2d at 373.
[T]he degree of experience and expertise required.., must inevitably depend
upon the circumstances .... Certain expertly designed surveys can obviously
be conducted by lay personnel, with no survey expertise.... Indeed, it is pos-
sible that some types of surveys might be so simple that relatively little or no
specialized training would be necessary even to design them. Most often, how-
ever, surveys or tests, to be competent and reliable, will require at least some
expert input at the design stage.
Litton, 97 F.T.C. at 75.
315. Litton, 97 F.T.C. at 73. Surveys for internal use may have lesser standards and
still be acceptable because the users are aware of the defects and equipped to assess
them. A consumer, however, could not adequately assess the deficiencies. Id.
The existence of a 'survey' as support for a claim of product superiority may
well imply to many consumers a measure of precision and accuracy that they
would be less willing to attribute to the same claim made without reference to
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2. Improper Design or Execution
Improper features make surveys incapable of producing valid find-
ings. To cite such a survey as inadequate appears equivalent to
charging that it cannot be used as a reasonable basis. The order pro-
visions seen here, however, are not worded to forbid the survey-based
claim unless a reasonable basis exists; rather, they forbid the claim
unless the improper survey feature is eliminated.
One type of improper feature involves samples unrepresentative of
the claimed population. The complaint in Teledyne charged that a
survey of dentists was inadequate to support claims for the Water Pik
oral irrigating device. Teledyne was ordered to:
cease and desist from . .. [e]mploying, in any advertisement for any product,
the word "survey" (or any comparable term), or basing any claim upon one or
more surveys in whole or in part which states, either expressly or by implica-
tion, the beliefs, opinions, practices, recommendations, or endorsements of any
group, unless... a representative, unbiased and fair sampling from the popu-
lation referred to in the advertisement is questioned... [and] the survey was
designed, executed and analyzed in a competent and reliable manner.3 1 6
Litton was ordered to cease "[a]dvertising the results of a survey
unless the respondents in such survey are a census or a representa-
tive sample of the population referred to in the advertisement."317
The provision resulted from improper methodology in surveying in-
dependent microwave oven service technicians who serviced Litton
and at least one competitor.318 The sample actually compiled was of
service agencies, with the stated intention of choosing one technician
at each sampled agency. However, there was no random selection of
technicians at given agencies. In some cases, a manager was chosen
rather than a technician.
Also, the sample consisted only of agencies that had "Litton-au-
thorized" technicians, even though at least one hundred additional
any statistical support. We assume this is why advertisers wish to use surveys
Id. at 72.
316. Teledyne, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 320, 329 (1981). Teledyne's agency, Thompson, re-
ceived an order that was similar but referred to a "projectable" sample. J. Walter
Thompson Co., 97 F.T.C. 333, 334 (1981) (consent order).
317. Litton, 100 F.T.C. at 459. "A representative sample need not be a probability
sample so long as when the ad is first disseminated respondents have a reasonable ba-
sis to expect the sampling method used would not produce biased results." Id. "A rep-
resentative sample . . . is [one] that has been selected in a manner which permits
projection of results from the sample to the universe from which it is drawn." Litton,
97 F.T.C. at 76 n.11. The appellate court upheld the use of the term "representative
sample," calling it sufficiently clear and specific. Litton, 676 F.2d at 372.
318. Litton, 97 F.T.C. at 70-78.
agencies fit the stated criterion of having technicians that serviced
Litton and at least one competitor. Litton claimed it could not get
lists of non-Litton-authorized technicians. However, the evidence
showed it was aware of many such persons. Technicians in non-Lit-
ton-authorized agencies might have answered less in favor of Litton
when asked what microwave ovens they preferred. Further, a
number of service agencies that were sampled were found inappropri-
ate because they were also dealers (which is bias-producing),1 9 or no
longer in business, or not actually servicing Litton and at least one
other brand. Litton did not help its case when it conceded that its
original intent had been to get an entire census and not just a sample.
The Commission concluded that Litton's knowledge of these de-
fects, prior to running the advertisements, meant Litton knew that
the surveys provided no reasonable basis.320 The FTC's counsel came
close to establishing additional points of error.3 21 Although they
tried to show that more agencies than the identified hundred could
have been included in Litton's sample, they failed because a survey
done for them by Chilton Research was disregarded as not useful.3 22
They also questioned whether the surveys were conducted indepen-
dently of Litton's influence, but the initial decision concluded there
were elements of both independence and dependence, and consumers
would not expect full independence.3 23
Counsel also claimed that the population which consumers would
see referenced would be all of the independent microwave oven ser-
vice technicians, including those not servicing Litton at all.324 This
was rejected in the initial decision even though some of Litton's ads
might be read as referring to all technicians.3 25 The Commission
agreed with the initial decision on the grounds that the additional de-
ception of consumers who made such assumption would be very
little.326
Litton served as sounding board for many efforts by complaint
counsel to limit use of surveys. The initial decision said that the pro-
posals tended to assume that "there are clearly defined and generally
accepted procedures in the market research field, which must be fol-
319. "Respondent's own experts have shown that the answers of a servicing dealer
would tend to be biased in favor of a brand which it sells, and that such agencies
should not be included in a survey for that reason." Id. at 28. See also infra text ac-
companying note 346 for a discussion of improper handling of experts.
320. Litton, 97 F.T.C. at 80.
321. Id. at 33-36.
322. Id. at 36-39.
323. Id. at 22-23.
324. Id. at 33.
325. Id. at 33 n.17.
326. Id. at 70 n.5.
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lowed if a survey is to have any validity."3 27 It concluded that the ev-
idence did not support this position because Litton had presented
unrebutted testimony that there was no such single body of generally
accepted principles. Since the proposals were so innovative, they
should be given affirmative support on the record rather than merely
urged.328 The Commission's opinion did not disagree with this find-
ing. Because of such extensive discussion, Litton stands as the key
expression of the FTC's approach to surveys.
Kroger, the grocery chain, was given the following order:
cease and desist from advertising any survey-based food price comparison that
refers, directly or indirectly, to a particular city, metropolitan area or competi-
tor (or competitors) by name or other designation unless ... [e]mployees re-
sponsible for pricing . . . [Kroger's] merchandise do not know which items
have been selected for the survey prior to its completion .... 329
Kroger claimed that its surveys constituted proof of pricing claims,
and therefore implied they were methodologically sound.330 How-
ever, the sample was not representative of, nor projectable to, the to-
tal population of Kroger's prices. The person who selected the
sample items in each marketing area was also the person who set
prices in that area. That person systematically chose items that Kro-
ger was getting from manufacturers on special promotion. Thus, the
products could be sold at reduced prices. A survey that Kroger con-
ducted separately for its own internal use, which lacked such defects,
showed Kroger to have higher prices than indicated by the advertised
survey.331
American Home Products advertised that twice as many specialists
in internal medicine preferred Anacin for headache pain to any other
nonprescription internal analgesic, and that more physicians recom-
mended Anacin for headache pain than any other comparable prod-
uct. In addition, American Home Products alleged that these facts,
327. Id. at 50.
328. Id.
329. Kroger Co., 98 F.T.C. 639 (1981), modified, 100 F.T.C. 573, 574 (1982) (modified
following internal reconsideration).
330. Kroger, 98 F.T.C. at 732. "Since I do not read the advertisements to contain
such implied claims, I would dismiss the complaint." Id. at 769 (Bailey, Comm'r,
dissenting).
331. Id. at 741-44. The original order was more specific: the items used had to be
randomly selected from the population of products to which the results would be gen-
eralized, and the items had to be representative of the population. Id. at 773. The
comparisons had to be of identical or substantially similar items. These specifications
were removed in the modification, with no explanation appended. But see 100 F.T.C.
at 575 (Pertschuk, Comm'r, dissent). The modification was made after the arrival of
Chairman Miller, who generally supported lesser degrees of regulation.
as demonstrated by a mail survey, constituted proof that Anacin is
more effective. It was determined that the survey was inadequate be-
cause it sampled only physicians with a primary specialty in internal
medicine who were in private practice and willing to receive promo-
tional mail.3 3 2
A second improper feature of a survey is a sample that is too small
to allow projections to the population. Teledyne was ordered to do
the following:
cease and desist from . .. [e]mploying, in any advertisement for any product,
the word 'survey' (or any comparable term), or basing any claim upon one or
more surveys... unless ... a projectable sample was used and the sample size
of and the response rate to the survey were sufficiently large so as to allow
meaningful projections to the population referred to in the advertisement
with a reasonable degree of confidence, unless there is a clear and conspicuous
disclosure in the advertisement that the survey may not be representative of
the population referred to in the advertisement .... 333
The next improper feature was an unacceptably small response
rate. The Teledyne provision relates to this problem as well. Also,
American Home Products, along with an unrepresentative sample,
had a response rate that was only 10%.334 Finally, there is the im-
proper feature of using survey results so old that the opinions of
those surveyed may have changed. Teledyne was ordered to do the
following:
cease and desist from ... [e]mploying, in any advertisement for any product,
the word 'survey' (or any comparable term), or basing any claim upon one or
more surveys ... unless . . . the survey was completed within three (3) years
prior to the date of the representation, unless there is other appropriate data
which establish a reasonable basis for concluding that the beliefs, opinions,
practices, recommendations or endorsements of the members of the group re-
ferred to in the advertisement have not materially changed since the comple-
tion of the survey .... 335
C. Summary
As this section has illustrated, the FTC has imposed professional
standards upon advertisers whose treatment of tests and surveys was
not up to professional expectations. In approximately fifteen years
the Commission has raised the standards of the marketplace to high
levels from a starting point that involved virtually no guidance what-
soever. One might observe that the basic guidance of the prohibition
against deceptiveness was always present. However, to replace the
statutory vagueness with the precision of the prescriptions just seen
332. American Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136, 182, 395 (1981). Respondent was
given an order provision described under General Misrepresentation Provisions. See
infra text accompanying note 352.
333. Teledyne, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 329 (1981). The order to the agency was substantively
the same. Id. at 334.
334. American Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C. at 182, 395.
335. Teledyne, 97 F.T.C. at 329. The order to the agency was substantively the
same. Id. at 334.
[Vol. 14: 229, 1987] FTC Order Provisions
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
constitutes a monumental change in the orientation given by a gov-
ernmental body whose Congressional mandate, after all, is to prevent
violations rather than punish violators.
X. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS REGARDING TESTS AND SURVEYS
This section takes up issues beyond the "mainstream" topic of mis-
representation of tests and surveys as substantiation for claims. The
issues discussed in this section represent significant additions to that
fundamental topic.
A. Overclaiming of Results
Thus far, the order provisions have reflected an absence or inade-
quacy of evidence. Another factual situation arises when the evi-
dence is adequate for certain claims, but the advertiser has made
stronger claims which the evidence cannot support. For practical
purposes the outcome is the same: the claim is prohibited unless sub-
stantiation becomes available. However, after several early cases, a
distinct form of order provision was designed for this particular
problem.
In Firestone, the FTC did not declare respondent's stopping tests
inadequate or unscientific for all claims, but stated that, "The prac-
tice of respondent being challenged here was not in the design of its
particular test but in its failure to limit its advertising claim to the
type of comparative tire performance which its test results
substantiated."336
General Motors was the first to receive a provision aimed specifi-
cally at overclaiming. Its Cadillac Eldorado was claimed to be proved
superior in gasoline mileage to many competitors, whereas in truth it
was superior only to some. The company was told to cease the
following:
[r]epresenting . . . by reference to a test or tests, that any of respondent's
automobiles is superior with regard to fuel economy to any other automobiles,
whether manufactured by respondent or others, unless: (a) such superiority
336. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 449 (1972), oqff'd, Firestone v.
F.T.C., 481 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1973). The provision was the one seen earlier, which
did not address overclaiming specifically. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
See also discussion supra text accompanying notes 297-98. See also Ford Motor Co., 84
F.T.C. 729 (1974) and J. Walter Thompson, 84 F.T.C. 736 (1974) (an automobile was
proved quieter than an airborne glider, but this did not prove the automobile was
quiet); Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 84 F.T.C. 1401 (1974); Crown Central Petroleum Corp.,
88 F.T.C. 210 (1976) (automobile pollution was proved to be reduced somewhat; how-
ever, there was no evidence for the claimed complete reduction).
has been demonstrated, as to the model(s) for which it is claimed, by such test
or tests with respect to each sample, or the valid average of all identical sam-
pies, of each model represented to have been tested; or (b) the valid test re-
sults for each sample, or the valid average of all identical samples, of each
model so compared, including the advertised model as well as such makes and
models to which the advertised model is compared, are clearly and conspicu-
ously disclosed.3 3
7
Advertisers of acne preparations had tests of bacteria being killed,
but overclaimed the relationship to acne.sss Contraceptives had
novel delivery characteristics, but that did not mean they had supe-
rior effectiveness.3 3 9 In the event that dynamometer tests would be
used in the future as support for claims,3 40 the FTC undertook to
prevent possible overclaiming by requiring the following in Caffdale:
[r]espondents shall, when using the results of any tests required, clearly and
conspicuously disclose the limitations upon the applicability of the results to
any motor vehicle. Where the results of such tests are used in connection
with a representation of fuel economy improvements expressed in miles per
gallon (or liter), miles per tankful, or where the representation of the benefit
is expressed as a monetary saving in dollars or percentages, all advertising and
other sales promotional materials that contain the representation must also
clearly and conspicuously disclose the following disclaimer: 'REMINDER:
Your actual saving may vary. It depends on the kind of driving you do, how
you drive and the condition of your car.'
3 4 1
The FTC ordered Kroger to do the following:
cease and desist from advertising any survey-based food price comparison that
refers, directly or indirectly, to a particular city, metropolitan areas or com-
" etit6r (oi competitors) by name or other designation unless .. . [t]he claim
does not generalize the results of the survey to a product category that has
been systematically excluded therefrom; provided, however, that no such gen-
eralization will be deemed to extend to any product category whose systematic
exclusion is disclosed clearly and conspicuously in ... advertisements. 3 4 2
Kroger had limited its surveys to dry groceries, yet advertised them
as applying to all food categories. In truth, Kroger compared favora-
bly to its competitors for dry groceries, but not for meat and produce.
A separate set of surveys, conducted for internal use, which included
meat and produce, showed Kroger had prices higher overall.
Although this may appear to illustrate improper sampling, it is not
337. General Motors Corp., 84 F.T.C. 653, 660 (1974). "Sample" was defined to
mean "an actual automobile tested." Id. Matsushita and Chrysler had similar facts
and similar provisions. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 89 F.T.C. 157, 162 (1977)
(consent); Chrysler Corp., 87 F.T.C. 719 (1976), modified, Chrysler Corp. v. F.T.C., 561
F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1977), modified order, 90 F.T.C. 606, 606 (1977).
338. Karr Preventative Medical Prods. Inc., 94 F.T.C. 1080, 1091 (1979); National
Media Group, Inc., 94 F.T.C. 1096, 1107 (1979).
339. American Home Products, 95 F.T.C. 884, 894 (1980); Sorga, 97 F.T.C. 205, 215
(1981).
340. See supra note 118.
341. Cliffdale Ass'n, 103 F.T.C. at 199-200.
342. Kroger Co., 100 F.T.C. 573, 574 (1982). Other cases of overclaiming include the
following: General Elec. Co., 89 F.T.C. 209, 217-18 (1977); Standard Brands, Inc., 97
F.T.C. 233, 242-43 (1981). Ted Bates, 97 F.T.C. 220, 229-30 (1981). The advertisements
involved only surveys, not tests, but the provisions cited both.
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impermissible per se to exclude certain categories. What is wrong is
to make claims as though they were not excluded.
B. Underclaiming of Results
In two survey cases order provisions were directed against suppres-
sion of findings that, if known to consumers, would create a lower re-
gard for the revealed findings. Standard Brands claimed that "twice
as many doctors choose Fleischmann's as any other brand." How-
ever, the ads did not reveal that at least 67.5% of the sampled doc-
tors, when asked what brand they would recommend, recommended
no specific brand name. Thus, although the claim was true for those
who did name a brand, only 15.5% of the total recommended
Fleischmann's. 343
Amana was charged with representing that its microwave ovens
and those of five competitors were given four tests, with only Amana
passing all four, whereas in fact the tests had involved six competi-
tors and the sixth had also. passed all four. The complaint also
charged that, although many owners of other brands rated Amana as
having the "best quality," they also rated their own brand that highly
as often or more often. Further, the vast majority of owners of other
brands did not rate Amana "best quality." And, although owners of
nine competitors were surveyed, Amana reported results regarding
only four of them.344
C. Misrepresentations About Experts
Advertisements may misrepresent the expertise of those who con-
ducted the tests.3 45 Moreover, they may misrepresent surveys of peo-
ple whose presumed expertise will enhance the value of claims.
Many of Litton's survey respondents were not experts.346 Teledyne's
survey of dentists did not amount to surveying their professional or-
343. Standard Brands, 97 F.T.C. at 242. Ted Bates, 97 F.T.C. at 229.
344. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 1262, 1265 (1983) (two provisions); FC&B
(agency for Amana), 102 F.T.C. 1274, 1282 (1983) (two provisions).
345. Kenrec Sports Inc., 80 F.T.C. 868, 872 (1972); Nu Dimensions Int'l Ltd., 81
F.T.C. 793, 803 (1972); Le Conte Cosmetics Inc., 87 F.T.C. 1348, 1355 (1976); Weider, 106
F.T.C. 584, 598 (1985) (all consent).
346. Litton Indus., Inc., 97 F.T.C. 1, 72 (1981). The order defined "expert" as "an
individual, group or institution held out as possessing, as a result of experience, study
or training, knowledge of a particular subject... superior to that generally acquired by
ordinary individuals." Litton, 100 F.T.C. at 459.
ganization. 347 Similarly, doctors commenting on brands of margarine
were not experts on those product types.3 48
D. Consumer Endorsements or Testimonials Related to Tests or
Surveys
Standard Brands included a statement that "[a]n advertising claim
which is a personal endorsement of a product reflecting solely the
subjective opinion of the endorser shall not be deemed to be a
test. ' ' 3 4 9 In other cases, however, endorsements or testimonials have
been regarded as implying that they were supported by tests, and
were forbidden unless so supported.3 0 Were such tests available, the
advertiser probably would prefer to devote his advertising space to
them rather than to endorsements. Therefore, such provisions ap-
pear to rule out endorsements or testimonials in situations where
claims can be substantiated only by scientific or medical tests.
Endorsements or testimonials by consumers may impliedly misrep-
resent that they are representative of the public at large. The FTC
makes no charge that the advertiser had conducted a survey improp-
erly, or conducted a survey at all, but rather that such endorsements
or testimonials give the misleading impression of applying to that
wider public. Since that is similar to the impact of a survey, provi-
sions forbidding it are cited here.351 The use of a single endorser has
been known to produce violations, as when astronaut Gordon Cooper
347. Teledyne, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 320, 329 (1981); J. Walter Thompson Co., 97 F.T.C.
333, 334 (1981).
348. Standard Brands Inc., 97 F.T.C. 233, 242-43 (1981); Ted Bates, 97 F.T.C. 230
(1981).
349. Standard Brands, 97 F.T.C. at 243; Ted Bates, 97 F.T.C. at 231.
350. Albano Enterprises, Inc., 89 F.T.C. 523, 528 (1977); Porter and Dietsch, Inc., 90
F.T.C. 770, 885 (1977); Cooga-Mooga, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 310, 320 (1978), modified, 98 F.T.C.
814, 816 (1981); Energy Efficient Sys., Inc., 97 F.T.C. 265, 286 (1981); Boekamp, Inc., 97
F.T.C. 291, 315 (1981); General Motors Corp., 104 F.T.C. 511, 512, 515 (1984) (all consent
except Porter & Dietsch) (GM's agency, Campbell-Ewald also a named party).
Cooga-Mooga was also ordered to disclose any familial connection between endorser
(entertainer Pat Boone) and advertiser (Boone was president). Cooga Mooga, 92 F.T.C.
at 321, modified, 98 F.T.C. at 816.
The terms "endorsement" and "testimonial" appear to be used interchangeably by
the F.T.C.
351. American Consumer Inc., 94 F.T.C. 648, 661 (1979); Leroy Gordon Cooper, Jr.,
94 F.T.C. 674, 696 (1979); RR Int'l, 94 F.T.C. 1312, 1334 (1979); C.I. Energy Dev., Inc., 94
F.T.C. 1337, 1359 (1979); Porter & Dietsch, 90 F.T.C. at 886; Macmillan, Inc., 96 F.T.C.
208, 326 (1980); Great North Am. Indus., Inc., 98 F.T.C. 817, 831 (1981); Cliffdale Ass'n,
Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 200 (1984).
Cliffdale was also ordered not to use outdated endorsements. Id. In addition, it was
ordered to disclose any connection between endorsers and respondents that might af-
fect credibility and would not be otherwise known to consumers. Id.
Several respondents were ordered to use no endorsements absent written authoriza-
tion within twelve months from the person or organization: American Consumer, 94
F.T.C. at 661; Cooper, 94 F.T.C. at 696; RR Intl, 94 F.T.C. at 1334; C. Energy, 94 F.T.C.
at 1359; Ball-Matic Corp., Inc., 98 F.T.C. 836, 853 (1981).
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touted a gasoline saving device. However, a single endorser is not
likely to create the impression that multiple endorsers would create:
namely, that the opinions of a wider group have been surveyed.
E. General Misrepresentation Provisions
These are order provisions of a catch-all or boilerplate sort that
cover violations generally, specifying no particular type of test or sur-
vey misrepresentation. Most of the orders discussed in this article
contain such a provision, with wording such as this section: "It is fur-
ther ordered, that respondent ... do forthwith cease and desist from
... [m]isrepresenting in any manner, directly or by implication, the
purpose, content, sample, reliability, results or conclusions of any
survey or test."3 52
There is virtually no discussion of these provisions. They always
accompany other provisions pertaining more directly to the specifics
of the case. Apparently the FTC wishes to curtail not only the actual
practices but also those of a related sort that the advertiser might
contemplate in the future.
Chrysler succeeded in having such a provision deleted on appeal
because the court found it to "lack a reasonable relationship to the
violations" and to be "potentially limitless."353 However, when Lit-
ton cited that action3 54 the Commission kept the provision.3 5 5 In af-
firming the Commission's decision, the appellate court stated that
"This prohibition, although broader than the facts of this case, is a
reasonable 'fencing in' provision."3 56
F. Records Maintenance Requirements
Most of the cases cited in this article include provisions for respon-
dents to maintain documents relating to compliance. The following
provision is a recent example:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent . . . shall maintain written
records:
1. Of all materials relied upon in making any claim or representation cov-
ered by this order;
2. Of all test reports, studies, surveys or demonstrations in its possession
that materially contradict, qualify, or call into question the basis upon which
respondent relied at the time of the initial dissemination and each continuing
352. Amana Refrigeration Inc., 102 F.T.C. 1262, 1266 (1983) (consent).
353. Chrysler v. FTC., 561 F.2d at 364.
354. Litton, 97 F.T.C. at 75 n.10.
355. Litton, 100 F.T.C. at 458.
356. Litton v. F.TC, 676 F.2d at 373.
or successive dissemination of any claim or representation covered by this
order.
Such records shall be retained by respondent for a period of three years
from the date respondent's advertisements, sales materials, promotional
materials or post purchase materials making such claim or representation
were last disseminated. Such records shall be made available to the Commis-
sion staff for inspection upon reasonable notice.
3 5 7
There is no discussion of these provisions. There is no indication
that failure to maintain records constitutes a violation per se; rather,
advertisers subject to other order provisions are made subject to this
as well.
G. Agency Defense Provisions
Advertising agencies, when prosecuted along with their clients,
often are assessed less responsibility on the assumption that they are
less well equipped to know whether a claim is substantiated. Ted
Bates received the following addition to its order: ". . . [provided,
however, [t]hat it shall be a defense hereunder that respondent
neither knew or had reason to know that the product, article or sub-
stance used in the test, experiment, or demonstration was a mock-up
or prop."3 58 The opinion added that "the agency will necessarily
know of the use of mock-ups in commercials which it itself
prepares."3 5 9 Recent provisions have wording such as the following:
"unless the respondent can establish it neither knew, nor had reason
to know, nor upon reasonable inquiry could have known that such
was the case." 360
Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn argued on appeal that such a
defense should have been applied in the instant case.3 6 1 The appel-
357. Associated Mills, 106 F.T.C. 5, 24 (1985) (consent).
358. Colgate Palmolive Co., 62 F.T.C. 1269, 1283 (1963) (consent) (Ted Bates also a
named party).
359. Id. at 1278.
360. Standard Oil of California, 84 F.T.C. 1401, 1492 (1974) (BBD&O) also a named
party). For similar provisions, see also: General Motors Corp., 104 F.T.C. 511, 515
(1984) (Campbell-Ewald also a named party); Dancer-Fitzgerald-Sample Inc., 96 F.T.C.
1, 14 (1980); Block Drug Co., 92 F.T.C. 852, 853 (1978) (two provisions) (Grey Advertis-
ing also a named party); STP Corp., 87 F.T.C. 56, 66 (1976) Stern, Walters & Simmons
also a named party); Whirlpool Corp., 83 F.T.C. 1830, 1837 (1974) (DDB also a named
party); American Home Prods. Corp., 81 F.T.C. 579, 586 (1972) (Cunningham & Walsh
also a named party); Campbell Soup Co., 77 F.T.C. 664, 677 (1970) (BBD&O also named
as a party); See also a similar provision in Allied Stores, 86 F.T.C. 1074, 1078 (1975).
Although respondent was a retailer, the principle was the same in assuming a lesser
responsibility for a peripheral participant.
In Standard Oil, the advertising agency BBD&O also benefited by being permitted
to support its claims with tests "by it or its client," whereas its client was required to
have its own tests. Standard Oil, 84 F.T.C. at 1490-91. Campbell-Ewald received a simi-
lar advantage in comparison to General Motors. See supra note 112 regarding different
treatment of the two. The same analysis applies to STP and its advertising agency,
Stern, Waiters & Simmons. Id. at 66.
361. Standard Oil of Cal. v. F.T.C., 577 F.2d 653, 660 (1978).
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late court responded:
The advertising agency argues vigorously that it was entitled to rely on the
elaborate safeguards, including independent laboratory tests and procedures
for high level review, that preceded this advertising campaign .... Neverthe-
less... [n]o specialized engineer was needed to put B B D & 0 on notice that
a gauge which drops from a reading of 100 ("dirty") to 20 ("clean") implies a
sweeping representation with reference to the change in level of pollution dis-
charge. In light of the advertising agency's active participation in developing
this advertising, it was BBD&O's responsibility to assure itself not only that
the gauge was not rigged, but also that use of the gauge did not convey a dis-
torted impression. The evidence is fully adequate to support the Commis-
sion's findings that, given the degree of participation by this advertising
agency, it knew or should have known .... 362
In Thompson, the advertising agency was offered an affirmative de-
fense if:
prior to disseminating an advertisement containing the statement or represen-
tation challenged in such compliance action, JWT submitted to its client in
writing all the performance claims which it reasonably believed were con-
tained in the advertising prepared by it and exercised due care to assure itself
that the advertiser possessed and relied upon a reasonable basis for those
claims.3 6 3
In another case, Thompson, ordered not to make certain claims with-
out a clinical test, was told the following:
where the clinical test or other evidence was not directly or indirectly con-
ducted or controlled by JWT, it shall be an affirmative defense.., for JWT to
prove that it reasonably relied on the expert judgment of its client or of an
independent third party in concluding that it had a reasonable basis .... Such
expert judgment shall be in writing signed by a person qualified by education
or experience to render the opinion. Such opinion shall describe the contents
of such test or other evidence upon which the opinion is based.3 64
With respect to the use of surveys in the same case, the Commission
stated the following:
in circumstances where the survey or sample was conducted by an independ-
ent third party and was not, directly or indirectly conducted or controlled by
JWT or its client, it shall be an affirmative defense to an alleged violation ...
for JWT to prove that it had a reasonable basis for believing that the survey
or sample was conducted in accordance with the provisions of . . . this
Order.3 6 5
362. Id.
363. J. Walter Thompson Co., 94 F.T.C. 331, 338 (1979). Similar language was con-
tained in Ted Bates & Co., 97 F.T.C. 220, 231 (1981).
364. Thompson, 97 F.T.C. at 336 (1981) (consent) (agency for Teledyne). The fact
situations and provisions for several agencies were similar. See Ogilvy & Mather Int'l,
Inc., 101 F.T.C. 1, 15 (1983) (consent) (agency for Thompson Medical), Stihl, Inc., 101
F.T.C. 840, 851 (1983) (consent) (Stuart Ford as agency); Foote, Cone & Belding Adver-
tising, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 1274, 1283 (1983) (consent); Young & Rubicam/Zemp., 105 F.T.C.
317, 340 (1985).
365. Thompson, 97 F.T.C. at 335. Extensive description of the nature of a reason-
able basis followed.
Clyne's client, American Home Products, was ordered not to make
certain claims unless their truth was established through clinical
tests.3 6 In contrast, Clyne was ordered not to make those claims un-
less it "knows or has reason to believe that the [claim] has been es-
tablished according to the terms set forth" in the order against
AHP.367 Clyne protested that "an advertising agency has no respon-
sibility to conduct an independent examination of the relevant scien-
tific evidence before participating in the creation of its clients'
advertising programs."3 6 8 The FTC, however, decided that "Clyne
could not have reasonably relied on the AHP study."369 The Com-
mission denied that such a finding burdens agencies with a duty to
conduct independent investigations. Rather, there was another alter-
native available to Clyne:
Clyne could easily have fulfilled its responsibility here by insisting that its cli-
ent provide further substantiation or by disclosing the lack of proof or exist-
ence of a substantial question. We hold only that when presented with a
facially inadequate study as substantiation, an advertising agency may not ig-
nore the study's defects .... 370
A test, however, even though inadequate, might not be facially so.
When Bristol-Myers received an order provision regarding the need
for a reasonable basis, its agency, Ted Bates, received no comparable
order, based on the following rationale:
what may not be a reasonable basis for a medical-scientific claim for a drug
manufacturer may be a reasonable basis for an advertising agency which re-
lied in good faith on the client drug manufacturer's judgment regarding the
adequacy of substantiation unless the purported substantiation was unreliable
on its face.... [Thus] We find that the substantiation for the tension relief
claim did constitute a reasonable basis for Bates (although not for Bristol-
Myers). 3 7 1
Several agencies cited in this article were not granted an affirma-
tive defense.3 72 As elsewhere, coverage is restricted only to those
cases involving tests or surveys.
366. American Home Prods., 101 F.T.C. at 699.
367. Id. at 702. See also DKG, 98 F.T.C. at 22.
368. American Home Prods., 98 F.T.C. at 397.
369. Id. at 398.
370. Id.
371. Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 367 (1983).
372. Sterling Drug, 101 F.T.C. 375 (1983) (SSC&B also named a party); McCaffrey
& McCall, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 367 (1983) (consent); Benton & Bowles, 97 F.T.C. 167 (1981)
(consent); Porter & Dietsch, 90 F.T.C. 770 (1977) (Kelly Ketting Furth also a named
party); Sorga, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 205 (1981) (consent); Perma-Strate Co., 87 F.T.C. 155
(1976) (consent) (Merrill Kremer also a named party); Admarketing, 94 F.T.C. 664
(1979) (consent); Parker Advertising, 87 F.T.C. 68 (1976) (consent); J. Walter Thomp-
son Co., 84 F.T.C. 736 (1974) (consent); Sun Oil, 84 F.T.C. 247 (1974) (William Esty also
a named party); Colgate-Palmolive Co., 77 F.T.C. 150 (1970) (consent) (Masius also a
named party); Esty, the advertising agent for Sun Oil, was told it "clearly knew or
should have known that [the] representations were false." Sun Oil, 84 F.T.C. at 274.
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H. Test Requirements Apart From Substantiation
Tests cited in this article typically are required only if the adver-
tiser makes certain claims. In two cases, however, respondents were
required unqualifiedly to make tests.373 Two others were ordered to
collect and retain product samples and be prepared to conduct tests
at the FTC's option.374
I Contradictory or Inconsistent Claims
The complaint against ITT charged that it had "certain surveys of
consumer attitudes conducted on its behalf... [and that] on the basis
of these survey findings . . . knew or had reason to know or should
have known that certain of the aforesaid advertisements constituted,
and now constitute, 'false advertisements.' "375 Therefore, the Com-
mission ordered ITT to do the following:
cease and desist from... disseminating... any advertisement... which rep-
resents . . . any characteristic, property, quality, use or result of use of any
such product which respondents know or have reason to know or should
know by means of any marketing surveys, marketing reports, commercial atti-
tudinal tests, commercial recall tests, or any other tests or surveys creates a
misleading impression upon consumers or potential consumers of any such
product.3 7 6
In General Electric, the complaint alleged that GE had represented
that evidence obtained in 1973 regarding lower service levels of GE
television sets (as opposed to other brands) was a reason to purchase
such sets in 1974-75, although it had available subsequently acquired
evidence which contradicted or was inconsistent with the survey evi-
dence it relied upon.3 77 Therefore, it was given this order:
cease and desist from advertising... by reference to evidence ... when such
evidence is inconsistent with or contradicted by any valid, reliable, or substan-
tially identical evidence known to respondent unless at the time such repre-
sentation is made: (1) respondent relies on an affidavit by a person qualified
by training or experience to evaluate such evidence who, relying on standards
generally recognized by qualified experts in that particular field, concludes
that the inconsistent or contradictory evidence may be disregarded; and
(2) the affidavit states the qualifications of the affiant and sets forth the gen-
erally recognized standards on which he relied in reaching his conclusion. 3 7 8
Sears had advertised that its dishwashers required no pre-scraping
373. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 95 F.T.C. 265, 276 (1980) (consent); Kettle Mo-
raine Elec., Inc., 95 F.T.C. 398, 401 (1980) (consent).
374. Sovereign Chemical & Petroleum Products, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 478, 482 (1984)
(consent); Pittsburgh Penn Oil, No. D-9203 F.T.C. slip op. (1986).
375. ITT Continental Baking Co., Inc., 79 F.T.C. 248, 251 (1971) (consent).
376. Id. at 254.
377. General Elec. Co., 89 F.T.C. 209, 214-15 (1977) (consent).
378. Id. at 217-18.
or pre-rinsing.379 That claim was contradicted by instructions in the
Owners Manual which told users they must pre-soak or firmly scour
cooked or baked-on foods. Sears protested that its Owners Manual
was mistaken. However, this testimony was deemed unreliable and
self-serving.3 o In addition, Sears' dishwasher tests and marketing re-
search gave contradictory evidence.38 1
Several additional cases included provisions directed to contradic-
tory or inconsistent evidence. 38 2 Also, many cases require mainte-
nance of records revealing contradictory evidence even absent
specific charges that respondent had access to such evidence.383
This topic is similar to the Substantial Question cases.38 4 However,
it differs in that it involves evidence establishing the opposite of what
was claimed, rather than showing that no conclusion is established.
Nonetheless, the Substantial Question cases did raise questions of
contradictory or inconsistent claims. A respondent might publish
separate advertisements for two or more brands in the same product
category, each making claims of superiority that must be mutually
contradictory or inconsistent as a group.3 8 5 As Commissioner Pert-
schuk protested, "[p]urely as a matter of logic, only one of these ad-
vertisers can possibly be telling the truth."386 This theory of
inconsistency failed in Bristol-Myers and Sterling Drug.38 7 The Ster-
ling decision called the idea a new theory contrary to existing under-
standings about substantiation.38 8
379. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C. 406, 525 (1980), aff'd, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
F.T.C., 676 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1982). Other cases with similar provisions include the fol-
lowing: J. Walter Thompson Co., 94 F.T.C. 331, 338 (1979); Norris Indus., Inc., 92
F.T.C. 989, 1016 (1978); Energy Efficient Systems, 97 F.T.C. 265, 287 (1981); Boekamp,
97 F.T.C. 291, 316 (1981).
380. Sears, 95 F.T.C. at 514.
381. See discussion supra note 305.
382. Sperry Corp., 98 F.T.C. 4, 9 (1981) (consent); DKG Advertising, Inc., 98 F.T.C.
15, 23 (1981) (consent); Heatcool, Inc., 101 F.T.C. 24, 32 (1983); Plaskolite, Inc., 101
F.T.C. 344, 350 (1983) (consent); Cynex Mfg. Corp., 104 F.T.C. 464, 475 (1984).
383. See note 357 and accompanying text.
384. See supra text accompanying notes 48-63.
385. This charge was made explicitly only against Sterling Drug, regarding claims
for Bayer, Cope, and Vanquish brands. Sterling Drug, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 395, 402, 404-05
(1983). However, Bristol-Myers was charged with claiming Excedrin to be superior to
any other nonprescription internal analgesic. Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 30
(1983). In addition, American Home Products was charged with representing Anacin
to be the same. American Home Prods., 98 F.T.C. at 141. This prompted Commissioner
Pertschuk to think in terms of the mutual contradictoriness in the entire "trilogy of
analgesics cases." Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 386.
386. Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 386. See also Commissioner Pertschuk's concur-
ring and dissenting opinions in Sterling Drug, 102 F.T.C. at 800.
387. Bristol's Excedrin claim was found not to have been made. Bristol-Myers, 102
F.T.C. at 326. Similar claims for the three Sterling brands were found to have been
made and to be mutually inconsistent. Sterling Drug, 102 F.T.C. at 695-96. However,
that was not found to constitute a violation. Sterling Drug, 102 F.T.C. at 696, 788-91.
388. Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 789.
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J. Misuse of Name or Authorization of Government or Testing
Organization
A number of consent orders have forbidden misrepresentations of
authorizations or approvals related to testing by government organi-
zations. 3 8 9 Two respondents misrepresented the status of their own
organizations. 390 National Dynamics was ordered to:
cease and desist from ... representing ... contrary to fact, that any product
has been approved by any laboratory or by any other organization or person
cease and desist from representing in any advertisement that an independent
laboratory has tested any product or that any laboratory test substantiates or
supports performance claims in said advertisement, unless each performance
claim in said advertisement has been substantiated by a competent scientific
test conducted by said laboratory or laboratories and unless such laboratory or
laboratories have supplied respondents with a written report which describes,
in detail, the entire test performed.3
9 1
On appeal, National Dynamics argued inconsistency with FTC's
findings that the claims were substantiated. The court, however,
ruled that the decision had not found that, but had found that the
test reports (not the tests) constituted a reasonable basis for a re-
spondent that lacked the expertise to know otherwise.3 9 2 Thus, the
respondent was not found lacking a reasonable basis for its product
claims, but rather lacking a reasonable basis for its claim that those
claims had been adequately tested by an independent organization.
389. Croton Watch Co., Inc., 59 F.T.C. 424, 427 (1961) (consent); Nationwide Indus.,
Inc., 74 F.T.C. 78, 83-84 (1968) (consent); Ex-Cell-O Corp., 82 F.T.C. 36, 44 (1973) (con-
sent); Boise Tire Co., 83 F.T.C. 21, 25 (1973) (consent); Wasem's, Inc., 84 F.T.C. 209, 213-
14 (1974) (consent); Robertson Prods., 87 F.T.C. 255, 264 (1976) (consent); Albano En-
terprises, Inc., 89 F.T.C. 523, 527 (1977) (consent); Emergency Devices, Inc., 102 F.T.C.
1713, 1718 (1983) (consent); Monte Proulx, 102 F.T.C. 1722, 1726-27 (1983) (consent);
Pharmtech Research, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 448, 459 (1984) (consent).
390. Biochemic Research Found., 83 F.T.C. 1096, 1103 (1973) (consent) (the word
"research" in the organization's name misled the public because they were not, in fact,
a research organization); Scuba Diving Schools, 100 F.T.C. 439, 446 (1982) (consent).
391. National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488, 568-69 (1973), modified, National Dy-
namics v. F.T.C., 492 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974) (modifications not affecting tests), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974), modified, 85 F.T.C. 391 (1975), modified, 85 F.T.C. 1052
(1975). Other cases in this category include the following: Revco D.S., Inc., 67 F.T.C.
1158, 1267 (1965); Nationwide, 74 F.T.C. at 83; Excel Chemical Corp., 74 F.T.C. 880, 885
(1968); Royal Indus., Inc., 83 F.T.C. 507, 512 (1973) (consent); Rapperswill Corp., 89
F.T.C. 71, 74 (1977) (consent); Teledyne, Inc., 97 F.T.C. 320, 331 (1981) (consent); Bris-
tol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 392, 393 (1983); Amana Refrigeration Inc., 102 F.T.C. 1262,
1265 (1983) (consent); Foote, Cone, & Belding Advertising, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 1274, 1282
(1983) (consent) (agency for Amana); Biopractic Group, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 845, 850 (1984)
(consent).
392. National Dynamics, 492 F.2d at 1336. This is why the case isnot cited in the
discussion of the RB/S Misrepresentation, supra at section VI.
K Failure to Forward Evidence
The complaint against General Electric alleged a failure to keep an
advertised promise to send consumers true and complete details
about surveys of television buyers that provided comparative brand
information. The company was told to cease:
[r]epresenting... that the details of any evidence will be forwarded upon re-
quest, unless respondent furnishes a fair and accurate summary of all the de-
tails of such evidence as to all products to which such representation extends,
including the methodology used and any qualifications respecting the applica-
bility of the results.3
9 3
L. Requirements to Disclose Test Limitations
Provisions in two consent cases pertained to test limitations that
should be disclosed:
cease and desist from: ... [m]aking any statement or representation .. .re-
specting the moisture removal capabilities of dehumidifiers which is not based
on tests conforming in all respects to the testing standards and procedures
generally accepted and used by industry members, without clearly and con-
spicuously setting forth in immediate connection therewith the following
statement: "Not rated by uniform industry testing methods. If industry tests
were used, this dehumidifer would remove - pints less water per day or a
daily total of - pints.,, 3 9 4
cease and desist from: .. .[miaking any representation ... including through
the use of testimonials, regarding ... any live tests performed on the quartz
tubes or resistance coils, without disclosing in close conjunction therewith, in
print at least as large as the print in which the representation is made, or in
an oral presentation, that the quartz tubes are: (1) fragile unless the quartz
tubes are supported or protected in such a manner that they will not break
when the Boekamp Heater is tipped over, and (2) not covered by the warranty
or guarantee unless the quartz tubes are covered under the warranty or
guarantee. 3 9 5
XII. CONCLUSION
The events discussed in this article have amounted to far more
than the routine prosecution of deceptive advertising. They have
constituted a two-decade period of substantial development of the
law applied to claims regarding tests and surveys. As the era opened
in the 1960's, blatantly false test demonstrations were the objects of
prosecution, and virtually nothing regarding the nature of profes-
sional standards had been established. By the 1980's the prosecutions
had advanced to reach the more subtle nature of the current misrep-
resentations. In addition, expectations regarding professional stan-
dards had been upgraded to extremely advanced levels.
Professionalization of standards arguably is the most significant
393. General Elec. Co., 89 F.T.C. 209, 218 (1977) (consent).
394. Berns Air King Corp., 76 F.T.C. 319, 323 (1969) (consent).
395. Energy Efficient Sys., Inc., 97 F.T.C. 265, 287 (1981); Boekamp, Inc., 97 F.T.C.
291, 314-16 (1981) (both consent).
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impact of the cases discussed here. Since the early 1970's the FTC
has hired numerous marketing and advertising researchers, from in-
dustry and universities, to serve as expert witnesses and/or full time
staff employees to aid in its prosecutions. This author has served in
both roles. The standards of such professionals, when applied to the
research offered as evidence in the cases discussed here, have created
a devastating indictment of the respondent advertisers. A student at-
tempting to obtain a graduate research degree at typical United
States universities, such as those attended by and/or staffed by the
cited professionals, would be failed without mercy if caught applying
the standards of these respondents.
The extent of inadequacy is often so extreme it seems unlikely to
reflect mere inadvertence or neglect. The persons assigned to con-
duct research at the respondent organizations typically are so trained
that they must have known the practices discussed were illegitimate.
The picture presented, therefore, by reasonable hypothesis, is of a
community that operated at a level of its own conscious choice. This
author's best speculation as to why it happened is that respondents'
perceptions of regulators' expectations were that it would suffice sim-
ply to be able to claim under threat of prosecution that some re-
search had been done-any research! It must have been presumed
that the findings would be accepted without scrutiny of the underly-
ing methodology, which, when in fact scrutinized, so often stripped
those findings of any validity.
The events described here may serve to indict the FTC as well, for
the woeful level of its oversight at the era's beginning. The Commis-
sion was criticized on many grounds in the late 1960's for inept han-
dling of its duties. 396 On the other hand, it may be that there were so
few advertising references to tests and surveys before the 1970's that
there were no vehicles available by which the Commission could
have addressed these topics sooner than it did.
In any event, the cases seen here constitute an immense develop-
ment in which the standards for advertisers' research, and claims
based on that research, have been raised toward professional levels.
The jeopardy advertisers now face for such misrepresentation consti-
tutes the principal message of the order provisions examined in this
article.3 97
396. Cox, Fellmuth, and Schulz, Nader's Raiders: Report on the Federal Trade Com-
mission (1969); Report of the American Bar Association Commission to Study the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (1969).
397. Just prior to publication a proposed consent settlement was announced which
orders the first corrective advertising referring to tests or surveys (and indeed, the
first corrective advertising since Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975)). In each
ad during the next year respondent must disclose prominently that "Our earlier stud-
ies . . . do not meet the criteria of modern testing and therefore we no longer claim
that the use of wheat germ oil or octacosanol will improve endurance, stamina or
vigor, or any aspect of athletic fitness or performance." Viobin, 51 Fed. Reg. 36406,
36408 (Oct. 10, 1986). Also, at least one such ad must be run in each print publication
in which Viobin Wheat Germ Oil was advertised during 1985. Id.
